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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the implementation and the control of non-functional safety prop-
erties during system execution. More concretely, it describes the development process of
such properties, starting with the formal specification, the verification, and the runtime
enforcement of the specified properties to avoid any undesired behavior.
This thesis starts by studying and classifying the approaches on the specification and
runtime verification of non-functional safety properties. When examining these approaches,
the following observations are made. First, the non-functional properties are generally
ignored in the early phases of the software development process. They are often addressed
after the functional part is implemented, which has negative effects on the quality of the
code. The approaches that use UML for modeling these properties cannot verify the absence
of contradictions between the specified properties. In addition, UML lacks means to express
various types of non-functional properties, such as temporal properties. Second, runtime
verification approaches monitor the execution of the application at runtime and detect
violations of the specified properties. However, just detecting the violation is not sufficient
for critical applications. These approaches should enforce these properties and avoid the
misbehavior of the system by skipping the execution of undesired events. Third, in current
approaches the code for enforcing non-functional properties is mostly not encapsulated in
separated modules. The implementation cuts across the functional application code. This
lack of modularity leads to serious problems related to the quality of code and the possibility
of changing those properties.
The thesis shows a generic and holistic approach, called Seven-pro that combines for-
mal methods and aspect-oriented programming for specifying and runtime enforcing non-
functional safety properties. Seven-pro covers the whole development process of non-
functional properties and avoids the gap between the specification and the implementation
by automatically generating aspects from a high-level specification. The generated aspects
will be integrated, in modular way, in the functional application code for enforcing the
formally specified properties at runtime.
In addition, this thesis shows how Seven-pro covers different types of non-functional
properties in distributed applications. This approach is applied to structural, qualitative
and quantitative behavioral non-functional properties. This thesis presents three applica-
tions for the supported types of properties.
In the context of structural properties, Seven-pro is applied for specifying and enforcing
architectural properties of distributed object-oriented applications that are characterized by
dynamic software architectures. Seven-pro uses a combination of Z notation and Petri nets
to specify (a) the architectural styles with their architectural invariants, (b) the reconfig-
uration operations with their pre- and post-conditions, and (c) the coordination protocols
describing the execution order of the reconfiguration operations. A verification step is per-
formed to verify the consistency of the specification and the preservation of the architectural
style after a reconfiguration of the architecture. After that, the Z and Petri nets specifica-
tions are automatically translated to AspectJ aspects to verify - before each reconfiguration
operation - that all related architectural properties are satisfied.
In the context of qualitative behavioral properties, Seven-pro is applied for specifying
and enforcing static and dynamic separation of duties and different types and character-
istics of delegation policies on top of role-based access control. In the specification phase,
TemporalZ, a combination of Z notation and linear temporal logic, is used for formally
specifying the supported policies. In the verification phase, the absence of contradictions
between the specified policies is verified. In the implementation phase, the aspect language
Alpha is extended with a new library for supporting the specified properties. In addition,
TemporalZ specifications are automatically translated to Alpha aspects to control the access
permissions according to the specified policies.
In the context of quantitative behavioral properties, Seven-pro is applied for specifying
and enforcing temporal properties in Web service compositions. To support both relative
and absolute timed properties, a new formal language called XTUS-Automata is proposed
which extends timed automata with the constructs of the XTUS language. After formally
verifying the absence of deadlocks in timed automata specifications and verifying other prop-
erties related to the XTUS language, the XTUS-Automata specifications are automatically
translated to AO4BPEL aspects.
Zusammenfassung
Schwerpunkt dieser Dissertation ist die Implementierung und Durchsetzung von nicht-
funktionalen Sicherheitseigenschaften (safety properties) wa¨hrend der Programmausfu¨hrung.
Konkret wird ein Entwicklungsprozess beschrieben, der sicherstellt, dass die Software die
gewu¨nschten Eigenschaften aufweist. Dieser reicht von der formalen Spezifikation u¨ber
die Verifikation bis zur Durchsetzung der spezifizierten Eigenschaften zur Laufzeit. Dies
ermo¨glicht es unerwu¨nschtes Verhalten zu vermeiden.
Diese Dissertation beginnt mit einer Studie und Klassifikation der Ansa¨tze zur Spezi-
fikation und Laufzeitverifikation von nicht-funktionale Sicherheitseigenschaften. Dabei wur-
den folgende Beobachtungen gemacht: Erstens werden nicht-funktionalen Eigenschaften
wa¨hrend der fru¨hen Phasen des Softwareentwicklungsprozesses weitestgehend ignoriert; sie
werden meist erst beru¨cksichtigt, wenn der funktionale Teil bereits implementiert ist was
sich negativ auf die Codequalita¨t auswirkt. Die Ansa¨tze, die UML zur Modellierung dieser
Eigenschaften benutzen, ko¨nnen die Widerspruchsfreiheit bezu¨glich der spezifizierten Eigen-
schaften nicht beweisen. Des Weiteren fehlt es der UML an Mo¨glichkeiten verschiedene
Arten nicht-funktionaler Eigenschaften, wie z.B. zeitbezogene Eigenschaften, auszudru¨cken.
Zweitens, Ansa¨tze, die das Verhalten der Anwendung zur Laufzeit beobachten und veri-
fizieren und dadurch Verletzungen detektieren, sind im Falle kritischer Anwendungen nicht
ausreichend. Solche Ansa¨tze sollten die geforderten Eigenschaften durchsetzen und ein Sys-
temfehlverhalten durch Unterdru¨cken der Ausfu¨hrung unerwu¨nschter Ereignisse vermeiden.
Drittens, der Code zur Durchsetzung der nicht-funktionalen Anforderungen ist in aktuellen
Ansa¨tzen nicht gut modularisiert. Die Implementierung durchschneidet vielmehr den funk-
tionalen Kern der Anwendung. Dieser Mangel an Modularita¨t fu¨hrt zu schwerwiegenden
Problemen bezu¨glich der Codequalita¨t und der A¨nderbarkeit der Sicherheitsanforderungen.
Diese Dissertation verfolgt einen generischen, holistischen Ansatz namens Seven-pro, der
formale Methoden und aspekt-orientierte Programmierung kombiniert, um nicht-funktionale
Sicherheitsanforderungen sowohl zu spezifizieren als auch durchzusetzen. Seven-pro deckt
den gesamten Entwicklungsprozess nicht-funktionaler Anforderungen ab und vermeidet
Diskrepanzen zwischen Spezifikation und Implementierung durch das automatische Gener-
ieren von Aspekten basierend auf der Spezifikation. Die generierten Aspekte werden auf
modulare Art und Weise mit dem funktionalen Kern der Anwendung integriert, um die
formal spezifizierten Eigenschaften zur Laufzeit durchzusetzen.
Zusa¨tzlich zeigt diese Dissertation, wie Seven-pro verschiedene Arten von funktionalen
Anforderungen im Kontext verteilter Anwendungen abdeckt. Der Ansatz wird dabei auf
strukturelle, qualitative und quantitative nicht-funktionale Eigenschaften des Verhaltens
angewendet. Die Arbeit pra¨sentiert drei Anwendungen fu¨r die unterstu¨tzten Arten von
Eigenschaften.
Im Kontext struktureller Eigenschaften wird Seven-pro zur Spezifikation und Durch-
setzung architektonischer Eigenschaften von verteilten, objekt-orientierten Anwendungen
angewandt welche eine dynamische Softwarearchitektur aufweisenen. Seven-pro verwendet
eine Kombination aus Z-Notation und Petrinetzen zur Spezifikation (a) des Architekturstils
und von Architekturinvarianten, (b) der Rekonfigurationsoptionen mit Vor- und Nachbe-
dingung, sowie (c) der Protokolle zur Koordination der Reihenfolge der Rekonfigurationsop-
erationen. Ein Verifikationsschritt wird durchgefu¨hrt, um die Konsistenz der Spezifikation
und den Erhalt des Architekturstils nach deren Rekonfiguration sicherzustellen. Daran
anschließend werden die Z- und Petrinetzspezifikationen automatisch in AspectJ-Aspekte
u¨bersetzt, um vor jeder Rekonfigurationsoperation sicherzustellen, das alle zugeho¨rigen Ar-
chitektureigenschaften erfu¨llt sind.
Im Kontext qualitativer Verhaltenseigenschaften wird Seven-pro eingesetzt zur Spez-
ifikation und Durchsetzung statischer und dynamischer Aufgabentrennungs- und Delega-
tionsrichtlinien auf Basis von rollenbasierten Zugangsbeschra¨nkungen. Wa¨hrend der Spez-
ifikationsphase wird TemporalZ, eine Kombination aus Z-Notation und linearer Tempo-
rallogik benutzt um die unterstu¨tzten Richtlinien formal zu beschreiben. Wa¨hrend der
Verifikationsphase werden die spezifizierten Richtlinien auf Widerspruchsfreiheit gepru¨ft.
In der Implementierungsphase wird die Aspektsprache Alpha mit einer neuen Bibliothek,
die die spezifizierten Eigenschaften unterstu¨tzt, erweitert. Des weiteren werden TemporalZ-
Spezifikationen automatisch in Alpha-Aspekte u¨bersetzt, die Zugriffsrechte gema¨ß der spez-
ifizierten Richtlinien beschra¨nken.
Im Kontext quantitativer Verhaltenseigenschaften wird Seven-pro zur Spezifikation und
Durchsetzung zeitbezogener Eigenschaften einer Komposition von Web Services eingesetzt.
Um sowohl relative als auch absolute zeitbezogene Eigenschaften zu unterstu¨tzen, wird eine
neue formale Sprache mit dem Namen XTUS-Automata vorgeschlagen, die zeitbezogene
Automaten um die Konstrukte der XTUS-Sprache erweitert. Nachdem sowohl die Deadlock-
Freiheit als auch andere, XTUS-bezogene Eigenschaften bewiesen worden sind, werden die
XTUS-Automata-Spezifikationen automatisch in AO4BPEL-Aspekte u¨bersetzt.
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Introduction
1.1 The Thesis in a Nutshell
Software systems are usually characterized by functional and non-functional properties.
While functional properties specify the structure and the behavior of the system, non-
functional properties address software qualities like maintainability, extensibility, reusabil-
ity, and system efficiency like reliability, availability, security, etc. Both kinds of properties
are relevant to software development. However, in practice, based on different proposed
methodologies and languages, the designer and the developer often focus on functional
properties and do not directly address the non-functional ones. The latter are generally
ignored in the early phases of the software development process and managed in an ad-hoc
manner without following a rigorous process.
There are two classes of non-functional properties. The first class corresponds to the
properties that can be monitored and verified at runtime, like security properties, time
related constraints, architectural invariants, etc. The second class corresponds to the prop-
erties that represent qualities of software such as portability, reusability, maintainability,
adaptivity, etc. Properties of the first class are called non-functional safety properties. The
main use of non-functional safety properties is for monitoring and for verifying at runtime
the execution of software systems. The runtime verification mechanisms are limited to
monitor the execution of systems and verify if their properties are satisfied. Enforcement
mechanisms, on the other hand, additionally ensure that bad things such as faults and dead-
locks do not happen. They allow controlling the execution and prohibiting (i.e., skipping)
any critical operation that do not satisfy a safety property.
There are two main phases for the runtime enforcement of non-functional properties.
The first phase consists in the specification of these properties. Formal methods are well
suited for specifying such properties and for reducing their complexity. Formal verification
mechanisms ensure that the specification of these properties is consistent and does not
contain any contradiction. The second phase consists of using an enforcement mechanism
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for implementing the formally specified properties. The enforcement code can be written
manually or generated automatically from the high-level specification.
Unfortunately, the code for enforcing non-functional properties is often scattered through-
out the functional code of the application and also tangled with code related to other
properties. These properties are mostly changed according to the user requirements or the
execution environment. As a result, having a modular implementation of non-functional
properties becomes necessary to master the complexity and the frequent change of these
properties.
There is also a gap between the specification and the implementation phase of the
non-functional properties. Generally, the code that checks and enforces these properties
is written manually. Besides being a tedious activity, such a manual translation has the
more severe problem that there is no guarantee that the result actually conforms to the
specification: The code that implements the properties may contain contradictions that did
not exist in the specification. An automatic and correct code generation can overcome the
previous limitations.
The goal of this PhD work is to define a generic approach for implementing non-
functional safety properties. This approach combines formal methods and Aspect-Oriented
Programming (AOP). Formal methods are used for formally specifying different types of
non-functional properties. Theorem provers and model checkers can be used for ensur-
ing the consistency of the specification and proving other application-specific properties.
Aspect-oriented programming, as the most appropriate solution for solving crosscutting
modularity problems, is used for enforcing the formally specified properties at runtime.
The formal specification of non-functional safety properties is automatically translated to
aspect code.
To illustrate the proposed approach, this thesis presents three case studies for specifying
and enforcing non-functional safety properties. These case studies address different types of
properties and different application domains. The considered properties are: architectural
properties, behavioral qualitative properties, and behavioral quantitative properties.
When dealing with architectural properties, we focus on the specification and the en-
forcement of architectural invariants and coordination protocols of dynamic software archi-
tectures for object-oriented applications. For behavioral qualitative properties, this thesis
shows how the proposed approach can be applied for specifying and enforcing separation-of-
duties and delegation policies on top of the role-based access control policy. As an example
of behavioral quantitative properties, this thesis describes the specification and the enforce-
ment of absolute and relative temporal properties in Web service composition.
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1.2 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is to provide a holistic and generic approach for im-
plementing non-functional properties. This approach, called Seven-pro, combines formal
methods and aspect-oriented programming for specifying and enforcing non-functional prop-
erties. It covers the main phases of the development process: formal specification, structural
validation, formal verification, and runtime enforcement of the specified properties. We ap-
plied, our approach to three applications domains, namely, software architecture, access
control protocols and service oriented applications. When addressing these application do-
mains we dealt with structural and behavioral non-functional properties. To be able to
formally specify and enforce the different kinds of properties, it was necessary to define
domain specific languages, by combining existing ones, and to extend some aspect oriented
languages. This led to the following contributions:
Application of the Seven-pro approach for specifying and enforcing architectural properties.
• Combination of Z notation and Petri nets
For formally specifying static, dynamic and coordination aspects of dynamic software
architectures of object-based applications, a combination of the Z notation and Petri
nets Z-PN is proposed. The Z notation is used to formally specify the architectural
styles, their architectural invariants, and the reconfiguration operations as well as their
pre- and post-conditions. Petri nets are used to specify the coordination protocols that
define the execution order of reconfiguration operations. The consistency and the
preservation of the system after an architectural reconfiguration are formally verified
using a theorem prover.
• Automatic transformation of Z-PN to AspectJ
A holistic process is proposed for generating aspect code from a high level specification
of architectural properties. The Z predicates and the specified Petri nets transitions
are automatically translated into aspect code. This generation process is based on
well-defined transformation rules and aspect templates. As a proofs-of-concept, a
prototype of AspectJ generator ZPN-2-AspectJ is implemented.
Application of the Seven-pro approach for specifying and enforcing access-control policies.
• A domain specific specification language for access control policies
TemporalZ, a formal language that combines the Z notation and linear temporal
logic, is extended by specific security predicates for specifying static and dynamic
separation of duties and different types and characteristics of delegation on top of the
RBAC model. Conflicts between RBAC constrains, and between separation-of-duties
and delegation constraints are resolved.
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• A domain specific implementation language for access control policies
For encoding the specified policies at the implementation level, the aspect-oriented
language Alpha is used. This language is extended by a specific security library to
easily translate the specified properties into Alpha aspects. This library contains
Alpha queries which correspond to the implementation of the TemporalZ security
predicates.
• From a domain specific specification language to a domain specific imple-
mentation language
An automatic code-generation process is defined which translates TemporalZ speci-
fications (i.e., as a domain-specific specification language) into Alpha code (i.e., as
a domain-specific implementation language). The generated aspects will be woven
into the functional application code to enforce the specified properties. A research
prototype of this generator is implemented.
Application of the Seven-pro approach for specifying and enforcing absolute and relative
temporal properties in Web-service composition.
• A formal language for absolute and relative temporal properties: XTUS-
Automata
A new formal language XTUS-Automata is defined, which combines temporal au-
tomata and the XTUS language for supporting the specification of absolute and rel-
ative time related properties in Web service composition. In this language, an XTUS
expression is written under the corresponding automata transition. To formally de-
fine this new language, the semantics of the XTUS language is specified using the
Z notation. As proof-of-concept, a GUI is implemented to support the design of
XTUS-Automata specifications.
• An Approach for specifying temporal properties
Based on the XTUS-Automata language, an approach for modeling the composition of
Web services and their temporal properties is proposed. Some specification patterns
are also proposed for helping the designer to specify such properties.
• AO4BPEL aspect generation process
A process for the automatic generation of AO4BPEL aspects from XTUS-Automata
specifications is defined. Based on aspect templates, the pointcut is automatically
generated for intercepting the corresponding BPEL activity and the advice skeleton
is automatically completed by translating timed automaton guards and XTUS ex-
pressions into BPEL constraints. A prototype of the AO4BPEL aspect generator is
implemented and integrated with the graphical user interface as an Eclipse plug-in.
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis consists of an introduction in Chapter 1, five chapters, and a conclusion.
• Chapter 2 presents the background information pertaining to this PhD work. This
chapter also describes the approaches most related to the specification and runtime
verification of non-functional properties.
• Chapter 3 describes the motivation of this work by discussing the limitations of exist-
ing approaches. After that, it introduces the Seven-pro approach, which we propose
for specifying and enforcing non-functional properties. The last part of this chapter
presents the validation of this approach using three cases studies considering different
properties and different application domains.
• Chapter 4 presents the application of the Seven-pro approach for specifying and
runtime-enforcing architectural properties: architectural invariants, pre- and the post-
conditions, and coordination properties. This approach is applied to dynamic software
architectures of object-oriented applications.
• Chapter 5 presents how to apply the Seven-pro approach to the role-based access
control model. The separation of duties and delegation policies are formally specified
on top of the role-based access control policy. These policies are also formally verified
and automatically translated to aspect code.
• Chapter 6 presents the application of the Seven-pro approach for specifying and
runtime-enforcing temporal properties in Web service compositions. Absolute and
relative temporal properties are considered.
• Chapter 7 summarizes the results and contributions of this PhD work. Moreover, it
presents a review of the proposed approach and the related tools. It also outlines
several directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the presentation of background knowledge and the related work
about specifying and enforcing non-functional safety properties.
A short overview of different types of non-functional properties will be given. In addition,
different mechanisms, methods and languages for formally specifying and runtime enforcing
these properties will be also discussed and classified. Finally, Aspect-Oriented Programming
as an enforcement mechanism used in our approach will be presented.
As related work, we will mention some interesting approaches focused on the speci-
fication of non-functional properties. We will present also different runtime verification
approaches that automatically translate high-level specifications into corresponding code
for runtime verifying the specified properties.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, background
knowledge about the relevant mechanisms and languages used in this PhD work is given.
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the most related work on the specification and the runtime
enforcement of non-functional properties, respectively. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Background
This section provides the reader with a necessary background comprising brief definitions
and reviews of the mechanisms and methods used in this PhD work. First, we classify
non-functional properties and we define the class of properties that we are interested in.
Second, we present an overview of the formal methods and the verification tools that can
be used for specifying such properties. Third, we describe the automatic code generation
associated with some industrial and research examples. Fourth, we present a classification
of the enforcement mechanisms and finally, we detail Aspect-Oriented Programming as a
powerful mechanism for runtime enforcement of non-functional safety properties.
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2.2.1 Non-Functional Safety Properties
Distributed applications use Non-functional properties for different purposes. We classify
these purposes into two classes:
First, these properties are used to provide a contract between the client and the service
provider as a service-level agreement (SLA) in Web services based applications. The SLAs
cover only the pre-defined properties (e.g., response time, execution time, etc.) which are
related to the application as a whole. Theses SLAs do not present any properties related
to the behavior of the individual components constituting the application as well as the
relation between the components [200].
Second, non-functional properties are mainly used in runtime monitoring, which is a
promising technique for verifying, achieving and maintaining a well-performing system.
The user can verify at runtime if the specified properties are satisfied according to the
system state. Despite that the properties can be formally specified and verified, they can
be violated at runtime. To resolve this limitation, the runtime-monitoring code of non-
functional properties can be generated automatically from a high level specification.
The non-functional properties are also classified into two categories:
• Liveness properties assert that “something good eventually happens during the pro-
gram execution” [126], e.g., the accessibility and the guarantee of a service, etc.
• Safety properties assert that “nothing bad should happen during the program exe-
cution” [126]. For example, ensuring mutual exclusion, deadlock freedom, preserving
invariants after a system reconfiguration, access control of resources, etc.
These two types of properties differ in how to ensure their satisfaction. If a safety
property is violated, it is possible to notice it after a finite execution of the system. This
violation can be detected, during the system execution, using runtime monitoring mecha-
nisms [173] and can also be detected, in some cases, early with testing, simulation methods
and model-checking tools. However, detecting violations of the liveness properties requires
to prevent some infinite execution of the system.
In our work, we are interested only in non-functional safety properties. These properties
ensure the proper functioning of software systems against undesirable behavior. These
properties can express the structure and the architecture of the application, and can also
be used to specify the behavior of the application, taking into account qualitative and
quantitative aspects. In the remainder of this thesis, we use simply the term “non-functional
properties” to describe such properties.
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2.2.2 Formal Specification and Verification
Assuring the safety of complex systems aims to guarantee a certain level of confidence that
there is no dangerous or unexpected behaviors. Ensuring the proper functioning of the
system requires clear and rigorous control of the critical operations of the system and verifi-
cation of the relevant properties. The formal methods are the most appropriate techniques
to provide high assurance about the reliability, the dependability, and the safety of such
systems.
Formal methods are based on mathematical foundations, enabling the specification and
the development of systems, as well as the verification of their properties. A range of formal
languages and techniques exist to treat different types of properties at different levels of the
development process, but they are highly recommended especially in the early phases of the
development process. They allow to specify the user requirements in a structured, precise,
unambiguous, verifiable, and maintainable way. In addition, formal methods eliminate any
ambiguous terminology or description and avoid the misunderstanding of the specification
by users at all levels of the development process.
There is a wide range of possible criteria to classify formal methods. The classification
based on the application area of the methods, proposed by Jeannette Wing [191] seems
to be the most concrete. There is two broad classes called model- and property-oriented
methods.
Model-oriented methods The specification of system consists in defining a model of
the system in terms of mathematical structures such as relations, functions, set and
sequences. There are two sub classes, depending on the type of the system to be
specified. (i) Formal methods for sequential programs and abstract data types, such
as: finite-state machines, VDM, B, and Z notation. (ii) Formal methods for concurrent
and distributed programs, such as Petri net, Communicating Sequential processes
(CSP), Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS), I/O automata.
Property-oriented methods The specification of the system consists in defining some
properties, usually in terms of axioms that should be satisfied by the system. There
are two categories: (i) Axiomatic methods originate from the work of Hoare on proofs
of correctness [93]. Iota and OBJ are formal languages that belong to this category.
(ii) Algebraic methods: The processes are defined to be heterogenous algebras, such
as temporal logic and LOTOS.
The use of one of these methods for specifying non-functional properties depends on the
type of the properties and on the application domain. The most important advantage of
using formal methods, compared of other design systems, is the use of formal verification
9
Background and Related Work
schemes. The verification tools are often used to guarantee the correctness and the consis-
tency of the formally specified system. There are two techniques to prove the properties of
a system.
Theorem proving This technique is used when the system is specified through mathe-
matical definitions. Such system is verified using automatic/semi-automatic theorem
provers, which are based on a library of axioms and a set of predefined inference rules.
Theorem proving is independent of the size of the state space, and can therefore be
applied to models with a large number of states, or even to models whose number of
states is not determined.
Automated theorem proving allows to prove the properties of the system automati-
cally, without human intervention. This technique is very expensive in terms of time
and resources and is not practical for many complex specifications. Therefore, there
exist interactive theorem provers which allow the designer to guide the proof. For
example, Z/EVES [139] is a semi-automatic theorem prover, which allows to prove
theorems for verifying specifications written in Z notation. After specifying the system
using Z schemas and writing a Z theorem, the designer helps the prover by providing
reduction commands (e.g., simplify, reduce, prove by reduce, prove by rewrite), com-
mands for applying theorems, definitions and lemmata (e.g., apply, try, invoke, invoke
predicate, Use), quantifiers (e.g., Instantiate, Prenex), etc.
Model checking This technique is used when the system is specified as a set of states
connected by a set of transitions. Model checking verifies the satisfaction of a property
by executing an algorithm that enumerates the list of possible reachable states that a
system could enter during its execution. The effectiveness of model checking depends
on the size of the space of reachable states. To improve the efficiency, the number
of the accessible states is minimized using abstraction techniques generally guided by
the designer.
To cover all aspects of a property, the designer is sometimes obliged to use two formal
languages, which have two different semantics. There are two different alternatives. In
the first one, the designer can use two languages separately. Each language is used to
specify a separate aspect of a property. Two verification mechanisms can also be used to
assure the required properties. For example, we separately used Z notation and Petri nets
to specify respectively the structural aspect and the coordination aspect of the dynamic
software architectures of distributed applications. The other alternative is to combine the
two languages or extend one language by another. The combination should be formally
defined to be supported by the existing verification tools. For example, we used a new
formal language, called TemporalZ, which combines Z notation and linear temporal logic.
The temporal operators are formally defined in the framework of Z notation.
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2.2.3 Automatic Code Generation
Automatic code generation is a useful technique to automatically construct code in a specific
programming language from a high-level model. Code can be generated from:
• A set of requirements of the program written in a semi-formal model defined using
UML diagrams and their extensions. Several commercial tools support the automatic
generation of code from a UML model such as Omando under Eclipse [95] and IBM
Rational Rose Developer for Java [94]. Other research approaches have been proposed
for generating code from a UML profile of a specific application domain. For example,
Basin et al. [23] generate code from secureUML, a profile for modeling access control
policies. Vidal et al. [189] proposed an approach based on the MDA approach for
generating code from MARTE profile (i.e. a UML extension to describe real-time
properties).
• Formal specifications or mathematical models. In this case, the code generation is also
known as program synthesis [22]. The translation of formal specifications to code has
been addressed in several approaches such as Z and ObjectZ [97,165], B method [131],
CSP-OZ [145], Petri nets [162], Automata [16], etc. For example, in [165], Ramkerthik
and Zhang propose the generation of Java code with design contracts from an Object-
Z Specification. This work translates the structure of Object-Z specifications to XML
and then generates a Java skeleton by processing the XML representation. Another
approach is proposed by Jia and al. [97] for synthesizing functional code from UML
and Z. They translate UML models into a Z specification, which is used to generate
C++ code.
Generally, the code-generation process consists of the following steps. The generator
parses and analyzes the specification for checking syntax and type errors. After that, the
specification is translated into code or code fragments. Finally, the generated fragments
are assembled and integrated within the code of the application. Some powerful generators
can optimize the generated code and even try to verify if this code satisfies the original
specification. To facilitate the generation process, the developer can define well-defined
transformation rules form a high level specification to code based also on templates of code.
The generation of code from a high level model has the potential to minimize errors,
reduce the cost of the development in terms of time and efforts, and improve the quality
of the code. The generated code is more likely correct than a handcrafted. However,
the automatic code generator does not guarantee that the generated code satisfies the
specification to be developed. In addition, if the model contains errors, these errors will
be translated to code. For this reason and to minimize the limitations of code generation,
we motivate the use of formal methods as techniques for specifying as well as verifying the
model before generating code.
11
Background and Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed to automatically generate aspect code to profit
from advances in Aspect-oriented programming [113]. These approaches are generally used
to enforce or to verify non-functional properties at runtime. The generated aspect code can
be woven in a modular way, without affecting the functional code of the original application.
If the user requirements or the specifications change, new aspects can be deployed and
replace the old ones. Using a runtime aspect weaver, the developer can modify/add new
aspects that represent new requirements without stoping the deployed process. As examples
of aspect generation approaches, Bodden et al. [32] propose to generate AspectJ aspects
from LTL specifications. The approach presented in [88] allows also to generate AspectJ
aspects from LSC specifications. Aloulou et al. [11] propose an approach to automatically
generate JBoss AOP aspects from a formal specification of security policies written in Z
notation.
2.2.4 Enforcement Mechanisms
Enforcement mechanisms allow to verify the application against a set of expected properties.
The application should be executed without violating any properties. These mechanisms
can be performed statically or dynamically. Hamlen et al. [87] classify the enforcement
mechanisms into three classes: static analysis, program rewriting, and execution monitoring
(i.e., runtime monitoring).
The static analysis [152] covers methods that analyze the code of the application before
the execution of the program. The static analyzers detect in the application code errors that
can be caught at runtime. The result of this analysis is the acceptance or the rejection of
the controlled program: If the analyzer does not detect unsatisfied properties, the program
is permitted to be executed unhindered. Otherwise, the program will be rejected until
the programmer intervenes to modify the infected part of the code. For example, security
policies and special control of information flow is an example of non-functional properties
that can be enforced by static analysis [148].
The program rewriting is a powerful enforcement mechanism which allows to rewrite
the controlled program in order to enforce the properties before the execution. The idea
is to rewrite the part of the code that does not satisfy a property. The program rewriting
tool takes the untrusted code as input and automatically transforms it to a new version
satisfying the infected properties. During the execution, the new program should guarantee
the same functionalities of the original program except those that do not satisfy the infected
properties. [66, 67] propose approaches for enforcing different security policies based on
program rewriting techniques for Java.
Execution monitoring monitors critical (i.e., sensitive) events of an application during
execution. When one of these events is about to violate a safety property, an intervention
will be performed immediately to terminate the execution of the undesirable event [173].
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If all properties related to an event are satisfied, this event will be normally executed.
Other powerful techniques have been proposed to extend this definition based on execution
monitoring and modifying programs at runtime. Ligatti et al. [26,129] propose other types
of intervention than the termination of the program. They can also suppress undesired or
dangerous actions without necessarily terminating the program and also insert additional
actions into the program at runtime.
To enforce non-functional safety properties, we should adapt an enforcement mechanism
that supports the dynamic behavior of these properties: The satisfaction of these properties
depends on the execution of the application. For this purpose, we dismiss the static analysis
and the program rewriting mechanisms because they operate on the program before its
execution. On the other hand, the execution monitoring mechanism controls the behavior
of a program at runtime and intervenes when an imminent violation of a property is detected.
This intervention consists of interrupting the execution of the undesired action that violates
the property.
Based on the runtime enforcement monitoring, several approaches and languages have
been proposed to enforce at runtime different types of non-functional safety properties.
Section 2.4 presents the most important works in this field.
2.2.5 Aspect-Oriented Programming
Traditional programming languages make the evolution and the maintenance of large and
complex applications relatively difficult. In addition to main functionalities, the code of
these applications contains other important concerns such as logging, security, temporal
properties, etc. which are generally dispersed and mixed. The code relative to these concerns
is scattered throughout the functional code of the application and also tangled with code
related to other concerns.
One of the solutions that have been proposed to resolve such problem is the separation
of concerns. Its principle is to dissociate the implementation of various concerns consti-
tuting the software system to make its code more readable and more comprehensible. In
this context, Kiczales et al. [114] explicitly define Aspect-Oriented Programming [114] by
formalizing the concept of separation of concerns and define different steps to implement
modular applications.
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is a programming paradigm not introduced to
replace the other paradigms such as object oriented programming. It is rather an extension
to the previous paradigms for supporting the modularization of concerns that cut across
the implementation of a software application.
AOP introduces a unit of modularity, called aspect that implements a concern that would
otherwise cut across several modules. The defined aspects are then woven (i.e. integrated)
within the functional code using an aspect-oriented programming language to produce the
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final application. AspectJ [113] is the most popular, stable sophisticated AOP language.
AspectJ extends Java with new keywords to support the aspect concepts. Several aspect-
oriented languages have later appeared but the majority of them is influenced by AspectJ.
Since AspectJ can be considered as a standard for AOP in terms of language design, and for
the sake of simplicity, we explain the concepts of AOP with an AspectJ example throughout
this section.
The aspect encapsulates crosscutting concerns in complex systems by means of three
key concepts: join points, pointcuts, and advice.
Join points are well-defined points in the execution of a program. The definition of
these points depends on the join point model of the used aspect-oriented language. The
join point model defines where, when and how aspects observe, augment or alter the program
execution [9]. The joint point model influences the ability of an aspect oriented language
to modularize the crosscutting concerns. In AspectJ, the join points correspond to the call
of a method, the construction of an abject, the assignment to a variable, the execution of
an exception handler, etc.
The pointcut is a query which picks out a set of join points, where some crosscutting
functionalities should be executed. In addition, the pointcut can collect the context of those
points. For example, a pointcut can select the call or the execution of a method in the base
program, and capture the context of this method, such as the type of its parameters, the
return value, the target object on which the method was called, etc. Other information
can also be captured when the pointcut selects a set of related setter and getter execution
points, a set of constructor calls, an exception hander, etc.
Each aspect oriented language defines pointcut constructs to capture the joint points. In
AspectJ, the pointcut can contain wildcards (i.e. “..” and “∗”) to capture related set of join
points and can use different predefined patterns to specify, for example, the fully qualified
class name of the captured method or constructor, the type of the field, etc. The pointcuts
can also be combined using the operators “&&” and “||” and can define a negation of a
joint point using the operator “!”.
The advice is a piece of code that implements a crosscutting functionality, which can be
associated with pointcuts. The advice is executed whenever a join point identified by the
pointcut is reached. The advice is similar to the method in object-oriented programming
in some ways, but it is never called explicitly. The advice is always attached to a set of
pointcuts which define in which points the advice code will be executed. The advice can be
executed before, after, or instead of the join points that are selected by that pointcut, this
corresponds respectively to the advice types before, after and around in AspectJ. With an
around advice, the aspect can integrate the further execution of the intercepted join point
in the middle of some other code. For example, in the advice of AspectJ language, the
keyword proceed is used as place holder for the join point.
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Furthermore, the advice has access to the information captured by the current pointcut.
The data structures can be used in the code of the advice. For example, the AspectJ
language provides constructs for extracting the arguments of a method call, the object which
executes the intercepted method, etc. In addition to the advice and the set of pointcuts,
the aspect can also contain helper methods which are used within the advice code.
Listing 2.1 presents an example of aspect in the AspectJ language. The aspect logs
calls to objects of the class Account, which contains methods for crediting, debiting and
transferring money.
1 public aspect Logging
2 {
3 //where?
4 pointcut logAccount(Account a) : call(* Account.* (..)) && this(a);
5 //when?
6 after (Account a) : logAccount(a)
7 {
8 //what?
9 System.out.println("The method " + thisJoinPoint + " is called" );
10 System.out.println("The new amount of this account is " +a.amount);
11 }
12 }
Listing 2.1: Example of aspect in AspectJ
In this aspect, the pointcut logAccount (line 4, Listing 2.1) specifies where exactly the
logging concern will be executed. This pointcut captures the call of any method in the
class Account without specifying the return types and the input parameters. The use of
the wildcard “∗” serves to abstract from the return type and the name of the method, and
the wildcard “..” serves to abstract from the parameters. The pointcut designator this is
declared to identify the object Account that executes the intercepted methods.
The advice (lines 6–11) answers the questions about when and what behavior of the
concern will be executed. This advice is associated with the pointcut logAccount declared
with the instance a of the type Account (line 6). The advice will run after executing any joint
point that is matched by the defined pointcut. In addition, this advice prints out two logging
messages. The first one (line 9) specifies the method captured by the pointcut, using the
keyword thisJoinPoint. The second message (line 10) uses the current object a, that executes
the intercepted method, to show the variable amount defined in the class Account. In case
the logging concern is required in other classes or modules, the developer can just modify
or extend the pointcut. If this concern was not implemented as an aspect, the developer
would have to localize all places where logging is required and add the corresponding code
there.
Aspect weaving is a mechanism for integrating aspects with a base program. A weaver
inserts the code of the advice at the appropriate places according to the associated pointcut
definitions. There are two categories of weaving: static and dynamic.
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Static weaving is performed by a tool, which takes the code of the base program and
the aspects as input and outputs appropriate base code with the aspects integrated. Static
weaving requires the analysis of the pointcuts defined in the aspect before adapting the
code of the base program. The programmer cannot activate or inactivate the aspects once
the program is compiled. This type of weaving allows for a good execution performance.
Static weaving can also take place at load time instead of compile time. The weaver injects
the aspect into the woven classes as they are loaded. AspectJ and CaesarJ [14] are two
aspect-oriented languages that support static weaving.
Dynamic weaving occurs during the execution of the application. Therefore, the aspects
can be deployed and undeployed at runtime. Dynamic weaving allows for a good reactivity
and flexibility by adapting the base program to the changes of the requirements and en-
vironment. However, dynamic weaving can lead to large runtime cost when code needs to
be woven or un-woven often. JAC [160] and PROSE [151] are examples of languages that
support dynamic weaving.
Most of the aspect-oriented languages, including AspectJ, provide pointcut languages
that are characterized [85] by a lack of expressiveness: only syntax patterns are matched
and the available wildcards are not rich enough to easily express design requirements, which
can give rise to long and awkward pointcut definitions that list many program locations.
Such pointcuts are not robust, as they need to be updated consistently when the code or
the API methods are changed.
Several research approaches and languages [32, 85, 118, 156, 196] have been proposed to
enhance the expressivity of pointcut languages. These languages aim to define a robust and
expressive semantic pointcuts by defining rich models of the program semantics and use
abstraction mechanisms for defining the pointcuts. For example, different aspect-oriented
languages [85, 118, 156] use Prolog as mechanism for defining an expressive pointcut lan-
guage. Yang and Zhao [196] propose an approach for specifying pointcuts using program
views, defined as abstractions of the classes and methods of the base program.
2.3 Specifying Non-functional Properties
Several approaches have been proposed for specifying and verifying non-functional safety
properties. Some of them are generic (i.e., can be applied to any type of property) and
others are applied only to a specific property and/or to a specific application domain. We
classify these approaches into three groups: (i) approaches that propose UML profiles for
specifying a specific non-functional property, (ii) aspect-oriented modeling approaches, (iii)
approaches that use formal methods for specifying and verifying such properties.
For each group, we present, as an example, three related approaches to ours. Each
approach allows specifying architectural properties, access-control properties, or temporal
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properties. We already used these properties to validate our approach. More details on
these properties and their applications are presented in the next chapters.
2.3.1 Using UML Profiles
UML profiles [153] are a standard extension mechanism for adapting the UML to particular
domains (e.g. embedded systems, real-time applications, software architecture, etc.) and
platforms (e.g. CORBA, EJB, J2EE). Extensions are defined using stereotypes, tagged
values, and constraints which are applied on UML elements such as class, activity, con-
nection, state, etc. Constraints are preferably specified using the OCL (Object Constraint
Language). The OMG [153] standardized some UML profiles such as UML profiles for
CORBA, for Enterprise Application Integration (EAI), for Schedulability, Performance and
Time (UML/SPT). Several researchers further proposed interesting UML profiles for mod-
eling different types of non-functional properties [42,101].
Modeling architectural properties Hadj Kacem et al. [101] propose a UML profile
for modeling dynamic software architecture of component-based applications. This profile
is associated with three meta models to describe the architectural styles, the dynamic recon-
figuration operations (i.e., add, delete, duplicate component/connection) specified in terms
of pre- and post-conditions, as well as the reconfiguration protocol (i.e., the execution order
of reconfiguration operations). This profile supports also the specification of architectural
constraints that should be preserved during architecture evolution. The proposed profile
is associated with new graphical notations by extending UML2.0 component and activity
diagrams with new meta classes and stereotypes. This profile is implemented and integrated
as a Fujaba plug-in [144].
Modeling security properties Cirit and Buzluca [42] propose a UML profile for
integrating access-control policies in the early phases of software development. The pro-
posed profile allows graphical modeling of role-based access control policies (RBAC) and
their constraints such as static and dynamic separation of duties, cardinality and time
constraints. The profile extends UML class diagrams with stereotypes representing the hi-
erarchical RBAC concepts (e.g., role, role inheritance permission, user, session stereotypes,
etc.). In addition to the informal description of each proposed stereotype, the authors de-
fine the basic RBAC rules and specify also tagged values for defining additional attributes
and making relations between profile elements. The authors propose also the use of the
OCL language to specify constraints to verify that the model defined by the designer is
well-formed and does not violate the RBAC rules.
Modeling temporal properties In 2002, the OMG adopted a UML profile for Schedu-
lability, Performance and Time (UML/SPT) [154]. This profile is based on a set of stereo-
types and tagged values for modeling quality of service, concurrency, and real-time concepts.
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It contains the sub-profile RTtimeModeling, which is associated with a meta model for rep-
resenting time and time-related mechanisms. In addition, this profile supports predictive
quantitative analysis of UML models. Based on this profile, designers can annotate sequence
diagrams to specify, for example, the periodicity of an event, and/or the timing constraints
on the actions of a component, etc.
2.3.2 Using Aspect-Oriented Modeling
Many aspect-oriented approaches have been proposed to aid the early stages in software
development. Aspect-oriented modeling approaches allow software designers to isolate and
separately address solutions for crosscutting concerns [183]. Different types of languages
have been extended by aspect concepts. Some of these approaches are generic and can be
applied for any crosscutting concern, and other approaches are proposed for specifying a
specific property.
Most of the aspect-oriented modeling approaches are applied to UML, for modeling dif-
ferent crosscutting concerns such as security [78,159,166], temporal properties [96], software
architecture [120]. These approaches focus on the specification of join points and pointcuts
based on UML. They introduce aspect concepts using different graphical techniques, to
weave the aspect based on the behavior of application instead of the inner details of the
application.
Modeling architectural properties Krechetov et al. [120] provide a proper abstrac-
tion of the system using UML as visual notation to modularize architectural crosscutting
concerns. They define the basic aspect-oriented modeling concepts and the requirements
that should be considered for defining an aspect-oriented architecture modeling approach
based on UML. The authors analyze and compare four existing aspect-oriented architectural
design approaches and extract from them the most expressive and generic features (i.e., as-
pect concepts, such as advice, crosscutting interface, aspect-aspect and aspect-component
relations, etc.). These features are combined in a single approach that satisfies the defined
requirements.
Other approaches have been proposed by software architecture community to extend
architecture description languages (ADLs) with aspect concepts. For example, Loukil et
al. [132] propose an approach for specifying non-functional properties of embedded systems
using AO4AADL, which is an aspect extension to the AADL. The AO4AADL specifications
are then automatically translated to AspectJ aspects. Another interesting aspect-oriented
ADL is called AO-ADL, proposed by Fuentes [163] for describing aspect-oriented architec-
tures.
Modeling access-control policies Ray et al. [166] propose an approach for designing
access-control policies using aspect-oriented modeling techniques. Access-control concerns
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are specified as aspects that will be composed with a primary model (i.e., main function-
alities of the application) to produce a complete design model of a secure application. The
aspects are modeled as patterns for specifying (1) the structure of the policy (i.e., the enti-
ties constrained by the access control policy and their relationships) using stereotyped UML
class diagram, and (2) the behavior of the policy (i.e., constraints that the access control
policy imposes on behaviors) using stereotyped UML interaction diagrams. Ray et al. pro-
pose to model the hierarchical RBAC and static separation-of-duty policies as aspects and
then compose it with the primary model.
Modeling temporal properties Iqbal and Elrad [96] propose an approach for model-
ing temporal behavior (i.e., time elapse and delays) using real-time statecharts. To model
temporal properties in a modular way, the authors propose an extension of the aspect-
oriented statechart framework [134] using time-annotated statecharts. This extension allows
to model temporal properties (or any other crosscutting concerns) as separate statecharts
and also allows to weave crosscutting and core concerns into a functioning system. As an
example, the authors apply the extended framework to model the synchronization of local
clocks with a global clock.
2.3.3 Using Formal Methods
Formal languages and methods are often used to rigorously define non-functional properties
to avoid ambiguous descriptions that would be prone to mis-interpretation. Since formal
methods are based on a formal foundation, several verification approaches and tools have
been developed for verifying the specified properties, e.g., verifying that there is no conflict
between specified constraints.
Software architectural properties have been specified using different formal languages.
For example, Z notation [2], temporal logic [4], graph grammars [141], CSP [92], the pi-
calculus [155], etc. This diversity is due to the types of properties to be specified (e.g.,
structural, behavioral, and coordination properties, etc.), the types of architectures and
styles (service-oriented architecture, component based architecture), and the abstraction
levels that the designer is interested in.
Access-control policies can also be specified using various types of formal languages.
Several approaches based on logics have been proposed for specifying role-based access
control (RBAC) such as temporal logic [146, 172] or Z notation [1, 197]. Other formal
methods have been also used to specify other access-control policies such as Petri Nets [174],
graphs [119], process algebra [37], and automata [71, 130, 173]. The choice of the formal
languages depends on the type of policies (e.g., RBAC, OrBAC, TBAC, Chinese Wall, etc.),
and on the type of constraints. For example, the specification of separation-of-duties and
delegation policies require temporal aspects, whereas the specification of access constraints
on resources requires only a simple mathematical logic.
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To specify temporal properties, researchers use different formal languages that support
the concept of time. Temporal logic, timed automata and timed Petri nets are generally used
to specify relative timed properties. These formal languages are also extended manually or
formally to support the specification of absolute temporal properties using for example the
XTUS language [35].
UML profiles are a specialization of UML for modeling domain-specific applications.
This technique has appeared to resolve the limitation of UML for supporting different
application domains. Similarly, Aspect-Oriented Modeling is an extension of the existing
modeling languages (applied generally on UML) for specifying crosscutting concerns at
a higher abstraction level. These techniques take advantage of the expressive power of
standard visual notations provided by UML. The use of UML profiles and Aspects allows the
designer to easily specify a specific non-functional property by annotating UML diagrams.
In addition, several existing tools support the extension of UML in terms of plug-ins such
as Eclipse UML2tools, Papyrus, Fujaba, etc. Despite the benefits of UML, there are some
limitations to point out: (i) the absence of a clear and rigorous semantics of UML and OCL,
(ii) the absence of formal verification tools to avoid any types of errors and contradictions,
(iii) the limited expressive power of OCL for specifying complex and temporal constraints.
The formal languages allow rigorously specifying non-functional properties since they
are based on mathematic foundations. Using a model checker and/or a theorem prover, the
designer can also verify the specified properties. In addition, for each application domain
there is at least an appropriate formal language that can be used to specify the corresponding
non-functional properties. The choice of the appropriate formal language depends on the
application domain, the type of property, the abstraction level, and also on the property to
be verified. The designer can also combine two formal languages to cover all aspects of an
application domain.
2.4 Runtime Verification Approaches
Runtime verification approaches allow to automatically check the behavior of a program
against a set of expected properties. Generally, these approaches are composed of two main
phases. The first phase consists in specifying the properties that should be verified, and
the second one consists in automatically generating monitoring code from the high-level
specification.
In this section, we present the most related approaches for verifying non-functional safety
properties at runtime. First, we present an overview of the approaches that generate aspect
code from UML models. Second, we focus on aspect languages that are used to verify at
runtime non-functional properties using expressive pointcut languages. Third, we present
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the Java-MOP framework, which allows formal specification of non-functional properties
using different high-level specification languages and synthesizing runtime monitors. Fourth,
we present two approaches that generate aspect code from a high-level specification of
scenarios. Finally, we describe the three well-known runtime-verification frameworks Java-
MaC, Java Path Explorer, and Temporal Rover.
2.4.1 Generating Code from UML Models
Several research approaches [23, 53, 83, 189] and commercial tools [94, 95] have been pro-
posed to generate code in different programming languages from UML models. Some of
them generate skeleton of code and others extend the UML to support the behavior of the
application to generate executable code.
Most of these approaches are based on MDA (i.e., Model Driven architecture), which
allows the designer to specify a platform-independent model (PIM) using an appropri-
ate domain-specific language, generally, using a UML profile. Given a platform definition
model (PDM), the platform-independent model is automatically translated to one or more
platform-specific models (PSM) (e.g. a specific programming language, operating system,
etc.). This mapping is defined based on well-defined transformation rules. This approach is
also applied to generate aspect code from a UML model. In the following, we present two
interesting works that generate aspect code from an aspect-oriented design model.
In [53], Cooper et al. propose a model-driven approach to automatically generate AspectJ-
aspect stubs from an aspect-oriented design model. The proposed approach is based on three
principal steps: First, the authors define an aspect-oriented design based on UML, as an
extension to the formal design-analysis framework [55]. They propose to extend UML class
diagrams with AOP concepts using icons, stereotypes, and new graphical elements. The de-
signer uses the developed tool which supports these extensions to model his non-functional
properties. Second, using a syntactic analysis, the visual design model is translated into
XML. The generated file contains the required information to generate an aspect skeleton.
Finally, the XML specification is automatically translated into AspectJ code stubs. The
designer should complete the generated aspect with the respective advice to be integrated
in the functional application code.
Groher and Schulze [83] propose an approach for specifying crosscutting concerns at
the design level and generating the respective AspectJ aspects on the implementation level.
The authors propose to extend UML with aspect concept without modifying its metamodel
specification. This extension is based on the core concepts presented in AspectJ and sup-
ports a terminology where aspect and base elements are completely kept apart. In addition,
the authors propose a validation module which allows the designer to validate the syntac-
tical and semantical correctness of the design model, e.g. the validation of the existence
of referenced pointcuts. After validating the model, the authors implement an automatic
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mapping to translate the design models to concrete implementations in terms of AspectJ
code skeletons.
One limitation of most MDA-based works is the lack of formal verification step to verify
the consistency of the specifications and other properties related to the application domain,
before performing the code generation.
2.4.2 Expressive Aspect Languages
Aspect-oriented languages are often used as runtime verification mechanisms. They inter-
cept sensitive actions during the execution, and verify if the properties attached to this
action are satisfied or violated. Several research approaches and languages [32, 60, 85, 118,
156, 196] have been proposed to enhance the expressivity of traditional aspect languages,
such as AspectJ. These languages provide a high level specification (e.g., temporal logic,
prolog, etc.) for easily intercepting sensitive actions by defining expressive pointcut lan-
guages.
J-LO: Java Logical Observer
J-LO [33,184], the Java Logical Observer, is a powerful runtime verification tool for checking
temporal assertions in Java programs. It allows to verify temporal properties by building
expressive formulae with free variables over AspectJ pointcuts. The tool uses an automata-
based solution to verify if the execution of a program satisfies a high-level specification of
temporal properties.
The workflow of using J-LO is shown in Figure 2.1 [184]. First, the designer should
formally specify the temporal interdependencies between the application events using linear
temporal logic (LTL). He specifies these properties (i.e., temporal formulas) as Java anno-
tations in the source code of the program to be verified. Second, the annotated source code
is compiled using a Java compiler. Third, J-LO extracts the annotations from the Java byte
code and parses the temporal properties for generating the abstract syntax tree (AST).
After that J-LO translates the temporal properties into an alternating finite automaton
and generates also AspectJ aspects to trace the execution of the program. The generated
aspects only monitor events related to the LTL specification. Based on the execution trace,
the aspect browses through the generated automaton during the program execution to ver-
ify if the defined property is satisfied (entering the state representing “true”) or detect
violations by entering an error-state. Fourth, the generated aspects will be woven with the
original program.
The generation process of J-LO is transparent, the designer specifies the temporal prop-
erties as Java annotations and the corresponding aspects are automatically generated and
deployed in the original application code.
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Figure 2.1: J-LO workflow
One limitation of J-LO is that no static verification mechanism is used to verify certain
properties related to the specified formulas such as the absence of deadlock. In addition,
J-LO does not verify the syntax and type errors of the properties before the compilation of
the application source code. Another limitation of J-LO is that it is not efficient compared
to other runtime-monitoring tools such as java-MOP [47] and tracematches [10].
Tracematches
Tracematches [10] is a history-based language for tracing and verifying at runtime the
execution of object oriented programs by using, as J-LO, free variables in trace patterns.
Tracematches can be seen as an expressive and powerful pointcut language. The point-
cut is specified via a regular expression, free variables, and a sequence of actions (defined
as AspectJ joinpoints) to execute in a particular order during execution. The advice of
this language, defined as an extra code, will be triggered whenever the regular expression
matches a suffix of the execution trace (i.e., the defined order is satisfied) by taking into
account the variable bindings.
The use of variable bindings in the pointcuts has two advantages: first, it allows the
advices to access to context values at the joinpoints matched by the tracematch symbols.
Second, it allows to match traces in the behavior of objects, rather than just control-flow
traces, as defined in AspectJ.
Allan et al. propose a well-defined grammar and a declarative and operational semantics
which is used to lead the implementation of Tracematches. The language is implemented
as an extension of the AspectBench Compiler. The code-generation process is presented in
Figure 2.2 (taken from [34]). First, the extension generates a finite state machine from the
regular expression of each tracematch. Based on the generated automaton, this extension
emits multiple Java classes which implement the actual runtime monitor that consumes
these program events. Second, the extension generates an AspectJ aspect which triggers
the finite automaton transitions to update its internal state when the relevant events occur
at runtime. Finally, the compiler weaves the generated aspects into the program under test.
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The weaving is performed in a transparent way, without generating the AspectJ file.
AspectBench Compiler
Tracematch
Tracematch
Finite‐state 
back‐end
machine
History‐based aspect& 
support classes (AST)
Matcher/Weaver
Program under
test
Program instrumented with
runtime monitor
Figure 2.2: Tracematch workflow
Tracematches can be applied only for applications with a finite state. Another limitation
of tracematches is that no verification step is proposed to formally verify that the regular
expressions (defined as pointcuts) express a deadlock-free sequence.
2.4.3 Java-MOP: Monitoring Oriented Programming
MOP [46, 47] is a formal and extensible framework for runtime monitoring software and
hardware systems. It can be applied to different programming languages such as Java and
VHDL. Java-MOP [48,49], is an instance of the MOP framework for specifying and runtime
monitoring safety properties in Java programs.
The current version of Java-MOP [140] supports several specification logics: the Java
Modeling Language (JML), Extended Regular Expressions (ERE), Past-Time and Future-
time Linear Temporal Logics (LTL), and Context-Free Grammar (CFG). These specification
logics are integrated in a modular and extensible way, as logic plug-ins, which are seen as
monitor synthesizers for properties defined as formulae. In addition, Java-MOP is not
limited to these languages, the designer can also extends the Java-MOP framework by a
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new domain specific specification formalism by providing logics plug-ins. He should also
define the generation monitors of his formalisms inside the logics plug-ins. To ease the use
of the proposed logics plug-ins, Java-MOP provides a general specification schema allowing
the designer to specify his properties and define the system behavior when these properties
are validated or violated.
Java-MOP separates the formal specification into two parts: the first part associates the
interesting events and attributes to their corresponding Java methods declaration, while
the second part contains the specification of the properties as a formula according to the
underlying logic. To bridge the gap between the formal specification and the software
implementation, Java-MOP automatically translates the formal specification into monitors
and integrate it in appropriate places in the original program according to the configuration
attributes defined by the designer. The code generation is encoded inside logics plug-ins.
Java-MOP suggests the use of AOP paradigm and especially AspectJ as instrumentation
mechanism. The AspectJ aspects are automatically generated and integrated with AspectJ
compiler, as an extension of the original program.
Java-MOP is based on client/server architecture to easily extend the monitoring sys-
tem with new formalisms such as logic plug-ins, to support various interfaces (web-based
interface, a command-line interface, and Eclipse-based GUI) and for portability reasons.
For monitoring a complex property, Java-MOP generates several lines of code in the
AspectJ aspect. The use of expressive pointcut language such as ALPHA [156] can fa-
cilitate the generation process from formal specification and allows also generating more
comprehensible code.
2.4.4 S2A: for Scenarios to Aspects
Maoz and Harel [88] propose the compiler S2A to automatically generate aspects in AspectJ
language from a Multi-Modal UML Sequence Diagrams (MSD). This formalism is a UML
profile for specifying inter-object scenarios. Its semantics is based on that of Live Sequence
Charts (LSC) which allows to specify various rich features such as the scenario that must
(may or should never) happen.
They propose an approach for generating aspects to enforce the specified inter-object
scenarios. The generation of aspects is based on a compilation scheme presented in [136].
Two types of aspects are generated: a set of scenario aspects and a single coordinator
aspect. Each LSC specification is translated to a scenario aspect representing an automata.
The scenario cuts are represented by automata states connected between them by the
corresponding methods.
An AspectJ aspect is generated for each method specified in LSC scenario (i.e., au-
tomata transition). The pointcut intercepts this method and the after advice advances the
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scenario aspect to the next state. The coordinator aspect collects the set of enabled and
violated events and other information from the active scenario aspect. Based on the col-
lected information and using a plat-out strategy, the coordination aspect chooses a method
for execution, and ensures that this method will be executed by actual object.
In a recent work [137], Maoz and Harel propose an approach for analyzing, visualizing,
and exploring the execution traces using a inter-object scenarios. These traces can be used
for runtime monitoring, detecting errors that can be matched, and verifying coordination
constraints during the execution of the scenarios.
2.4.5 M2Aspects
In [122], Kru¨ger et al. propose M2Aspects, a tool which generates AspectJ aspect from a
high level specification in Message Sequence Chart (MSC). They use an extended version
of MSC to represent for example the alternative and the conditional repetition of messages
and propose new operators such as the join operator to synchronize scenarios.
The main idea of the approach allows to explore different architecture candidates from a
high level specification. The generated aspects are used to define prototypes for the different
architecture candidates. These aspects implement the coordination of the interactions (i.e.,
defined as methods) between roles (i.e., an abstract concept representing components). The
pointcut intercepts each specified method, and the after advice executes the next method
as defined in the LSC specification.
This approach is similar to that proposed by Maoz et Harel [136]. In this work, the
aspect executes the next method defined in the LSC scenario without taking in consideration
the other scenarios that have the same method. In S2A, based on a defined strategy, the
coordinator collects the required information and takes the decision on which method should
be executed.
In [123], Kru¨ger et al. propose a runtime verification approach. They generate aspect
oriented runtime monitors from MSCs specifications.
The proposed approach uses a synthesis algorithm to translate the MSCs specifications
into an optimized component state machine. This generated state machine is the input of
the M2Aspect which generates the AspectJ aspects. These aspects identify and trace all
exchanged messages between roles, and verify at runtime if the execution of the application
is conform to the state machine (i.e., automatically generated from MSCs specifications).
These aspects verify only the coordination of the interactions between roles. The pointcut
intercepts the methods and the before advice shows an error message if the execution of the
intercepted method is not conform to the specification.
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The two previous works are similar, but they use just different languages and technolo-
gies. They propose a generation of AspectJ aspects from scenario-based software specifica-
tions. The generated aspects are used to implement the interactions between the entities
constituting the system (i.e., object, components, etc.). They generate also history-based
aspects to monitor at runtime the coordination of these interactions. In these approaches,
the authors do not cover specifying the behavior of the entities constituting the system and
their constraints.
2.4.6 Java-MaC
MaC [115] is a framework for runtime monitoring and checking software programs, inde-
pendently of the programming language. Java-Mac [116] is a Mac prototype for Java.
The Mac architecture consists of two main phases: static phase and runtime phase. The
static phase ensures the mapping between the high-level requirement specification and the
low-level program implementation. In this phase, the designer manually specifies the safety
properties (i.e. constraints) of the application inspired from the informal requirements
specification.
The specification is composed of two parts. In the first one is the high level specifica-
tion. Using MEDL language (Meta Event Definition Language), the designer specifies the
invariants that should be satisfied during the system execution and associates them to their
corresponding events. In this part, the designer is not interested in implementation details.
The second part of the specification is called low level specification. Using the PEDL lan-
guage (Primitive Event Definition Language), the designer defines the list of events and
their corresponding method definitions that should be monitored during the system execu-
tion. According to the authors, the separation of the specification level and implementation
level has two advantages: the first is to ensure that the Mac architecture can be used with
any implementation language, and the second is to provide a clean interface to easily design
and implement the design of the monitors.
In addition, the static phase generates three components, which are used, in the runtime
phase to monitor and check if the specified invariants are satisfied.
The filter is the result of weaving the low level specification within the functional pro-
gram. This filter keeps track of the changes of monitored objects and variables and sends
these information to the event recognizer. Based on the received information, the event
recognizer detects and recognizes the events according to a low-level specification and sends
them to the runtime checker. The role played by the filter and the event recognizer can be
combined in one component. Finally, the runtime checker verifies if the formally specified
invariants are satisfied according to the current execution history.
In this approach, the role of the generated runtime components is limited to keeping
track of the program execution and raise a signal if one of the specified invariants is not
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satisfied. The generated components cannot enforce the specified invariants, and disallow
the execution of the responsible method.
2.4.7 JPaX: Java Path Explorer
JPaX [89] is a runtime verification system for monitoring the execution of Java programs.
JPaX is built on Pax, which is a generic environment to monitor programs in any program-
ming language. JPaX is close similar to Java-MaC [115].
JPaX supports two kinds of verification. The first is the logic based monitoring that
checks, during the program execution, the user requirements defined formally in a high
level specification. These specifications are written in future and past temporal logic on
top of Maude (i.e. a system based on rewriting logic and membership equational logic).
The second kind of verification is the error pattern analysis, which consists in analyzing the
trace of the event execution to detect error-prone programming practice such as deadlock
and race detection.
The monitoring in JPax is performed in four steps: First, the designer formally specifies
the requirement using temporal logic on top of Maude. Similar to the MaC framework,
this specification is composed of two parts: one represents a high level specification and
the other one is an instrumentation module which projects the specification to the program
code. Second, The instrumentation module performs scripts to instrument the byte code of
the application in order to be observed at runtime. Third, The instrumented program emits,
at runtime, the event traces to the observation module. Fourth, the observation module,
implemented in Java, verifies the error pattern analysis using defined algorithms.
To verify the logic based monitoring, there are two possibilities. (1) The observation
module sends the list of execution events to the Maude program which evaluates them
against the specified requirements. (2) The formal user requirements are translated to data
structures and verified in Java.
Compared to the MaC framework, JPaX uses the Maude Program for formally specifying
the user requirements. The designer can also specify other temporal logics on top of Maude
and also verify them at runtime using JPaX. Besides the user requirements, JPaX is used
to verify the various errors in the programs, such as the deadlock. The separation of the
specification has several advantages (as cited in the Java-MaC section), but JPaX does not
provide any mechanism to separate the monitoring module from the functional code at the
implementation level.
2.4.8 Temporal Rover
Temporal Rover [61] is a commercial tool for runtime verifying programs written in different
languages (e.g. C, C++, Java, etc.). It supports the linear temporal logic and metric
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temporal logic, and two other specific operators for specifying temporal properties. These
specifications are written as comments in the source code of the program. The designer
should follow a precise assertion to specify his properties. He can also associate for each
property, a list of actions which will be performed in special case, e.g., he can specify an
action if the property is fulfilled or violated.
Temporal rover parses the source code and generates a new program that is similar to
the original one. The specification of the temporal properties, defined as comments, will
be automatically integrated in the source code of the new program. The algorithm for
generating verification code is not presented.
Temporal rover does not provide any mechanism for checking the defined properties
before the generation of code. In addition, the generated code is not well modularized.
2.5 Conclusion
After presenting background information pertaining to the proposed approach, this chapter
detailed the related work on the specification and runtime verification of non-functional
safety properties.
Through a classification of related work on non-functional safety properties, we con-
cluded that formal methods seem to be the most interesting techniques for specifying and
also verifying such properties. In addition, the study of different runtime verification ap-
proaches has shown two interesting results: The first one encourages the use of aspect-
oriented programming as a runtime verification mechanism. The second one is that these
approaches do not provide a generic and holistic process for specifying and enforcing non-
functional properties.
In the next chapter, we will present the motivations of our work and we will detail our
approach for specifying and enforcing non-functional safety properties. We will describe
also the validation of our approach using three case studies.
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The Proposed Approach
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the motivations and an overview of our approach for implement-
ing non-functional safety properties in distributed applications. In addition, this chapter
presents the validation of this approach through three case studies.
The research works, that were presented in the previous chapter, proposed different
solutions related to the specification, implementation, and/or the runtime verification of
non-functional properties. These works are limited to detecting violations of the specified
properties, they must enforce the properties instead. There is a lack of a complete method-
ology that supports all phases of the development process of these properties. In addition,
most of the proposed approaches are interested in some specific properties in a specific ap-
plication domain. They cannot be applied to other properties. Some of them use UML for
modeling non-functional properties which lacks support for rigorous semantic analysis and
lacks sufficient expressivity for specifying all aspects of these properties. Some other limita-
tions are due to the gap between the specification and the implementation phases, the lack
of formal foundations for designing non-functional properties, and the lack of appropriate
mechanisms for modularizing such properties.
To solve these problems, we propose a holistic approach for implementing non-functional
safety properties. Our approach allows formal specification, validation, formal verification
as well as enforcement of these properties at runtime. Our approach is based on runtime
enforcement, which is composed of two aspects:
(a) A formal specification of the properties to be verified at runtime. The formal methods
are techniques useful for modeling complex software based on mathematical foundations.
These techniques offer the possibility to build a rigorous specification with well defined
syntax and semantics. Based on a rigorous specification, the designer can formally verify
the properties of the system.
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(b) Mechanisms to enforce the formally specified properties on particular program runs.
Aspect-Oriented Programming is a programming paradigm that increases modularity by
allowing the separation of cross-cutting concerns. We use this paradigm for the enforcement
of non-functional properties. It allows to encapsulate the behaviors of these properties,
which affect places in the application code, into reusable modules.
We validate our approach with three classes of properties. First, we apply this ap-
proach to structural properties of dynamic software architectures. Second, we focus on
access control policies as an example of qualitative behavioral properties. Third, we apply
our approach to temporal properties in Web-service compositions as an example of quali-
tative behavioral properties. In these application domains, we consider different types of
architecture, formal methods and aspect languages.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the motiva-
tions related to the implementation of non-functional properties. Section 3.3 presents an
overview of the proposed approach and its three phases. In Section 3.4, we describe the
validation of our approach through three applications (case studies). Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Motivations
Ensuring that software exhibits certain non-functional properties is crucial in many appli-
cation domains. Static verification, while the most reliable means for this purpose, may not
always be feasible. Runtime verification or enforcement is an alternative in such cases.
Specifying and enforcing these properties is important to ensure that bad things such
as faults, deadlocks, etc. do not happen. Unfortunately, application designers and develop-
ers often focus on the functional concerns only and do not directly address non-functional
properties including safety ones. Providing capabilities for the specification of various types
of non-functional properties early in the development process, and their automated enforce-
ment, are major challenges for designing reliable software systems. However, the state-of-
the-art in addressing the specification and runtime enforcement of non-functional properties
has several limitations. We will detail these limitations in the following sections.
3.2.1 Enforcing Non-Functional Properties
Most approaches presented in the previous chapter are focused only on the runtime ver-
ification of applications. They supervise the execution of the application at runtime and
detect violations of the specified properties. These approaches generally specify the system
as sequence of operations using a finite-state machine. The violation-detection is performed
by verifying if the execution trace is conforming to the defined state machine.
Generally, just detecting the violation of a property is not sufficient and is unaccept-
able for critical applications. These approaches should not limit themselves to verifying the
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specified properties at runtime, but they must enforce [68] the properties instead. Run-
time enforcement avoids misbehavior by modifying the execution of the system, e.g. by
skipping/stopping the execution of undesired operations.
3.2.2 Lack of a Holistic and Generic Approach
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many approaches and tools that support sev-
eral types of non-functional properties such as security, temporal properties, etc. But there
is a lack of a complete methodology for implementing these properties. These approaches
do not support all phases of the development process of non-functional properties. This
process starts normally with (1) the specification of the properties using formal or semi-
formal methods, (2) the verification of the specified properties, (3) the implementation or
the generation of code that enforces these properties, (4) and finally, the integration of this
code within the functional application code.
Non-functional properties are generally ignored in the early phases of the software devel-
opment process of distributed applications. They are often considered to be identified and
addressed at the implementation level, after the functional part is implemented, which can
have a negative effect on the quality of the resulting application code.
Existing approaches are often focused on the specification and/or the implementation
of non-functional properties for a specific domain. They cannot be generalized (i.e., they
cannot be applied to other domains). In addition, many existing approaches focus on a
single specific non-functional property, for example they propose a solution for implementing
security policies, which cannot be applied to other properties.
3.2.3 Problems of Works using Non Formal Methods
Some existing approaches [23, 180] which are interested in the specification of the non-
functional properties use informal or semi-formal languages such as UML as well as different
extensions to it for specifying non-functional properties [102]. Such specifications have
three problems. The specification cannot be verified formally and contradictions, in the
specification cannot be excluded. Further, the OCL language, which is often used with UML
for specifying constraints has a limited expressivity and cannot be used to specify complex
properties such as separation of duties and delegation policies. Finally, the specification
language may not cover all aspects of non-functional properties, for instance UML lacks
means to express temporal properties.
Due to the lack of a formalism for identifying and formally verifying the non-functional
properties, conflicts between these properties themselves and between these properties and
the functional properties can happen in the modeling and the implementation phases.
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3.2.4 Gap between Modeling and Implementation
There is a gap between the modeling and the implementation of non-functional properties.
The code that checks and implements these properties is mostly written and integrated
manually in the functional application code. Besides being a tedious activity, such a manual
translation has two severe problems:
• No guarantee that the code implementing the non-functional property is conform to
the high level specification. For example, the designer may forget to implement an
important property or he may implement it more than once.
• Errors and contradictions may be introduced by the programmer when mapping a
specification to code, although these errors do not exist in the high-level specification.
3.2.5 Crosscutting Concerns Modularity
In most existing approaches that are interested in the implementation of non-functional
properties, the code corresponding to these properties is not encapsulated in separated
modules. The implementation of these properties (concerns) cuts across the functional
application code and cannot be cleanly modularized using conventional languages.
As a result, the implementation of non-functional properties becomes scattered across
multiple and unrelated application modules and tangled with the functional code that im-
plements the business logic. This lack of modularity leads to the following serious problems:
Problem in the change of the properties: Each change of a non-functional property
requires the programmer to find all places in the implementation related to that
property and update them accordingly. Such a process is tedious and error-prone when
the code to be changed is not well-localized. This problem is accentuated especially
because non-functional properties tend to change more frequently than the functional
part of the application. For example, a change of the role based access control policy
to another policy requires the update of several functional application modules, rather
than updating a single module.
Difficult evolution: Since the non-functional properties are not implemented in separate
modules, the programmer cannot easily addresses new non-functional properties be-
cause this requires reworking the implementation. In this case, the developer is limited
to properties that have been already implemented at the beginning.
Low degree of code reusability: The developer cannot easily reuse a module that im-
plements multiple concerns since the code corresponding to the non-functional prop-
erties is dispersed within the functional code. Other applications that require similar
functionalities cannot reuse this module.
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Poor code quality: If the code corresponding to the non-functional properties is not mod-
ular, the developer can produce hidden problems in the code, because he cannot
concentrate an one module when he implements a non-functional property.
3.3 The proposed approach
We propose a holistic approach called Seven-pro for specifying and enforcing non-functional
safety properties. It covers all phases of the development process of such properties: it starts
by the specification using formal methods, then the validation and the formal verification
of the specification, and finally the implementation of these properties and their integration
in the functional application code.
Seven-pro combines the strengths of Aspect-Oriented Programming with those of for-
mal methods. It allows the user to implement non-functional properties in an automatic,
reliable and modular way.
On the formal methods side, we combine formal specification techniques to specify
various kinds of non-functional properties. The choice of these techniques depends on the
type of properties at hand and also on the considered application domain. For example, to
specify temporal properties in Web service composition, we combine timed automata and
XTUS language to specify respectively the properties related to relative and absolute time.
The high level specification of non-functional safety properties facilitates the tasks of
the designer who generally concentrates on the specification of the main functionalities of
his application. In addition, thanks to the formal verification and the associated tools,
the designer can verify that his specification is not ambiguous and does not contain any
contradictions.
In addition to the high level specification and verification of non-functional properties of
distributed applications, our approach makes another important contribution: it presents
a general scheme for automatically generating aspect code that enforces non-functional
properties. Such generative approach, that compiles formal specification of non-functional
properties into enforcement code, helps to avoid the risk of inconsistency at the implemen-
tation level.
Aspect-Oriented Programming has gained popularity as a programming paradigm that
supports the modularization of crosscutting concerns. The crosscutting nature is a feature
that aspects share with specifications of non-functional properties, which makes aspects a
natural choice for compiling such specifications into code. We propose generic compilation
schemes from formal specifications to aspect code. This process is automatic, whereby user
input is expected for mapping a part of the specification to points in the implementation
of the application.
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Compared to other generative approaches that would compile formal specifications di-
rectly into code, the aspect-based generation has several advantages. The generation pro-
cess is more direct and the resulting code is more reusable as it is well-modularized in
aspects. Thanks to aspect generation, the approach as a whole can profit from advances
in aspect-oriented language technology targeting faster aspect compilation time and run-
time efficiency [30, 31]. Also, by being kept explicit, the crosscutting structure in which
the non-functional properties manifest themselves in code becomes subject to advanced
tooling technology for aspect-oriented systems. Examples are the AspectJ development
tooling (AJDT), which makes the crosscutting structure of aspects explicitly visible in the
development environment, and aspect-oriented refactoring technologies [124].
On the other side, compared to writing non-functional specifications directly as aspects
[176], the combination of formal specifications and aspects has the advantage that the
consistency of the specifications can be proved for correctness at the formal specification
level, avoiding the risk of manually introduced errors and surprising aspect interactions at
the code level [59].
The Seven-pro approach presumes a three-phase process, schematically shown in Fig-
ure 3.1.
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3.3.1 Formal Specification Phase
This phase consists in expressing at a high level the non-functional safety properties with
the appropriate formal languages. It is composed of three steps.
In the first step, the specification step, the designer should formally specify the non-
functional properties based on the defined specification patterns, whereby a specification
pattern is a generalized description of a commonly occurring requirement [63]. The de-
signer should instantiate and adapt the proposed specification patterns to the context of
his application. He can also combine them to specify more complex properties.
For each considered application domain, we propose some specification patterns to cover
the most relevant properties. We use these patterns for the following reasons:
• Patterns facilitate the specification of complex properties: The designer is not obliged
to specify a complex property from scratch if this property is already defined as
pattern.
• Patterns improve the reuse of specifications: The designer can instantiate, combine,
or extend the patterns to specify the required properties. As an example, Blazy et
al. [29] propose the reuse of specification patterns written in the B method (i.e., a
formal method).
• Patterns structure the specification so that it can be easily translated to code. Without
specification patterns, the designer can specify a property in different ways which may
lead to problems in the automatic code generation.
For expressiveness reasons, we combine formal languages in order to cover the whole
range of non-functional properties. For example, we use Z notation and Petri nets to specify,
respectively, the architectural style and its reconfiguration operations, and the coordination
protocol of dynamic software architectures.
In the second step, the validation step, the designer should validate his specification. To
fully automate the code generation process from the high-level specification, the specification
should be well structured, since it will be used as an input for a code generator.
The validation of the specification structure is performed according to the patterns pre-
sented above. This step allows to verify if the designer has correctly instantiated or combined
these patterns. If the specification of the properties is not validated, the enforcement code
cannot be automatically generated, and the designer should specify the properties again.
We use XML to validate the conformity of the specification with the proposed patterns.
We represent patterns using the XML schema language (as a meta-model), whereas the
specification of the non-functional properties is automatically translated to an XML docu-
ment (as a model). Using the DOM package, the designer can easily verify the conformity
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of the generated XML document to the XML schema and detect specification parts that do
not conform to the defined patterns.
The third step, the verification step, plays a major role to ensure reliability. After the
specification of the properties and the validation of the structure, a formal verification checks
that the specification does not contain any contradictions between the specified properties.
Based on this rigorous model offered by the formal specification, performed as a first
step, the designer can formally verify the properties of his system. He first verifies general
properties such as the consistency, the absence of deadlocks, etc. and other properties related
to his application. Second, he verifies application specific properties.
The designer can use two types of verification. The first one is Model Checking, used
in the case that the system and its properties are modeled as a sequence (or set) of states
connected by a set of transitions (i.e., labeled transition system). This model presents the
chronology of the execution of the system (i.e., moving from one state to another). The
designer can verify temporal properties expressed using a mathematical assertion language
that can represent the system states over time like UPPAAL [27] or SMV [52]. The second
type of verification is Theorem Proving, used when the system can be modeled as a set
of mathematical definitions in some formal mathematical logic [13]. The designer should
define a theorem for each property and then prove it using for example Z-EVES [139] (if
the specification is written in Z notation as in our case), HOL [82], or ISABELLE [157].
For example, in the specification of the invariants of dynamic software architectures, we
formally verify, using Z-EVES, the consistency of the specification, and the preservation of
the system state after a reconfiguration.
3.3.2 Implementation Phase
In this phase, the developer provides the functional code of his application. This code
contains only the business logic of the application and does not address any non-functional
properties.
The functional code should conform to the formal specification of the non-functional
properties in terms of the name, the type and the number of methods and their attributes.
For example, if the formal specification states that a certain object has some attributes,
then the class that implements that object should have fields that match these attributes. In
the case that the functional code does not totally conform to the specification, the designer
should create a mapping between the specification and the implementation. This mapping
will be defined as an input for the code generator.
There is no restriction on the programming language and on the technology used for
implementing the business process. For example, we apply our approach to a collaborative
authoring system implemented as a Java-based application with the RMI technology. We
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use also Web services with the BPEL language for implementing a Web service composition
for a travel agency.
3.3.3 Enforcement Phase
The third phase ensures the relation between the two previous phases. It consists of the
generation of aspect code from the formal specification defined in the first phase. The
generated aspects will be automatically integrated, in a modular way, in the functional
code defined in the second phase.
The generated aspects verify the specified properties at runtime. Before the execution of
a critical operation in the main application (e.g., implemented as a Java Method), an aspect
verifies all specified properties related to this operation, according to the system state. If
these properties are satisfied, the operation will be executed, otherwise the aspect prohibits
the execution of this operation and an exception is raised. For example, in a dynamic
software architecture, before the execution of a reconfiguration operation that modifies the
structure of the architecture, the generated aspects verify that the specified pre-conditions
and the invariants related to this operation are satisfied.
The generation of aspect code from the formal specification is based on the transfor-
mation rules that we defined. These rules translate the specified constraints to code (for
example in the enforcement of architectural properties, a Z constraint is translated to a
Java conditional statement). These rules are based on well-defined aspect templates that
define how to generate the corresponding pointcut and the associated advice. These tem-
plates facilitate and accelerate the code-generation process, and ensure more comprehensible
code for developers. In some cases, the definition of the templates depends on the defined
specification patterns, explained in the specification phase.
The pointcut of the generated aspect captures the execution of the critical operation,
which is identified using the formal specification. The advice of the generated aspect has an
around advice that is executed instead of the method calls to the critical operation captured
by the pointcut. The around advice takes the decision to allow/prohibit the execution of
the corresponding operation after monitoring the corresponding non-functional properties.
In our approach, there is no special restriction on the type of aspect that should be gen-
erated. An aspect compiler should be able to weave the generated aspects in the functional
part of the application, as discussed in Phase 2. For example, in one case, we generate as-
pects in AO4BPEL, which is an aspect oriented extension for BPEL, for enforcing temporal
properties in Web service composition. The generated aspects will be woven at runtime
(without stopping the BPEL process) using the AO4BPEL engine. In another case, we
generate aspects in ALPHA, an expressive aspect language extension to Java, for enforcing
access-control policies.
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3.4 Applications of Seven-pro
As shown in Figure 3.2, we apply Seven-pro to three different case studies to cover the
different types of non-functional properties in distributed applications. In addition, we also
diversify addressed the application domains, the types of architectures, as well as the formal
methods and the aspect languages.
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Figure 3.2: Application of the Seven-pro approach
3.4.1 The Types of Non-Functional Properties
We apply Seven-pro to both structural and behavioral non-functional properties. By struc-
tural properties, we mean those properties related to the structure and the architecture of
the application, e.g., the cardinality of the objects constituting the system, the types of
relation between objects. By behavioral properties, we mean those properties related to
the behavior of the application, e.g., temporal constraints on certain operations of the ap-
plication, or constraints on permitted operation sequences. We distinguish two kinds of
behavioral properties: qualitative and quantitative properties.
In the context of structural properties, we specify the invariants and properties of dy-
namic software architectures. First, we specified the architectural style describing the types
of objects constituting the system, the types of connections between these objects, and the
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architectural constraints (i.e. invariants). Then, we specify the reconfigurations of software
architectures, which correspond to the operations that modify the structure of the archi-
tecture. This specification includes also pre- and post-conditions. Finally, we define the
coordination protocol describing the execution order of the reconfiguration operations. We
formally verify the specification’s consistency and the preservation of the system constraints
after a reconfiguration.
With respect to qualitative properties, we apply the Seven-pro approach to security
properties, specifically role-based access control. Using the TemporalZ language, we for-
mally specified the different types of static and dynamic separation of duties, which allow
avoiding the risk of fraud in business processes by fine-grained control over the privileges
for workflow tasks. We also specify several types and characteristics of delegation policies
that allow the users to assign all or part of their permissions to other users.
For addressing quantitative properties, we apply the Seven-pro approach to temporal
properties in Web services composition. We use XTUS-Automata, a formal specification
language that allows to formally specify temporal properties related to absolute and relative
time. We specify three types of temporal properties that can be combined to express
more complex properties. The first type, duration properties, identifies the time between
two BPEL activities. The second type, temporal properties over cardinality, identifies the
number of occurrence of a BPEL activity in a defined time interval. The third type of
properties, absolute time properties, expresses that an activity can be executed only within
an absolute time interval.
Our approach supports also other properties than the previously mentioned ones. Soft-
ware architectural properties, access control policy and temporal properties are juste exam-
ples. We can apply Seven-pro for example to other access control policies, resources related
properties for embedded systems, etc.
3.4.2 The Types of Distributed Applications
We apply the Seven-pro approach to different types of distributed applications. In the first
and second case studies, we focus on distributed Java applications that can be implemented
using object or component technologies.
In the first case study, we validate our approach with a collaborative authoring system
of structured documents based on client/server style. A set of writers and reviewers connect
to a server to collaborate for editing shared documents. We enforce architectural properties
of this applications to manage the collaborative edition of a document.
In the second case study, we consider a loan approval process as an example of a sensitive
process with respect to security. This application has a critical nature, an access control
policy is required to manage the duties and control the access of the bank employees to the
process steps.
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In the third case study, we are interested in service-oriented architecture. We look at
Web service compositions implemented using the BPEL language. We consider a travel-
agency scenario to book flights and hotels. The temporal properties have a high importance
on this type of applications.
3.4.3 The Formal Methods and the Aspect Languages
In the three case studies, we try to use the most appropriate formal methods and aspect
languages.
To cover all architectural properties in dynamic software architecture, we use both the
Z notation and Petri nets to specify respectively the architectural invariants, pre- and post-
conditions of reconfiguration operations, and coordination constraints. The specifications
are automatically translated to AspectJ aspects. This aspect language ensures static com-
pilation and weaving of aspects which is considered the most efficient manner to integrate
aspects in the functional code.
Formal specification of the separation of duties and the delegation policies on top of
the role-based access control requires the expressive power of the temporal logic as well as
the first order predicates. For this reason, we use TemporalZ as a formal language, which
combines the linear temporal logic and Z notation. In contrary to the specification in the
first case study, we do not use two separate formal languages, but we use TemporalZ which
embeds the temporal logic operators in the framework of Z notation: the temporal operators
are used as Z operators. The TemporalZ specifications are translated to Alpha aspect code.
This aspect language is characterized by an expressive pointcut language based on Prolog
and it also supports the concept of time. The Alpha aspects become effective only after
they are deployed. The details and the advantages of this strategy are explained in [142].
For specifying temporal properties in a Web service composition, we require a formal
language that supports both absolute and relative time. First, we defined the syntax and
the semantics of the XTUS language using Z notation. Second, we propose a new language
called XTUS-Automata that combines the XTUS language within Timed automata. Third,
we propose an approach to specify the temporal properties of a Web service composition
using BPEL. The formal specifications in XTUS-Automata are automatically translated
to aspect code in AO4BPEL (aspect oriented extension for BPEL). These aspects can be
dynamically woven within BPEL processes at runtime.
In our approach, we combine two formalisms for formally specifying different types of
non-functional safety properties. Interferences between the formal specifications of each
property that we supported cannot be happen, since we use complimentary formalisms for
specifying different aspects of these properties. We do not propose to combine all supported
properties in one application. We diversify addressed the non-functional properties to prove
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the generality of our approach. In addition, we use different types of distributed applica-
tions. In the first and the second applications, we focus on distributed Java application,
while for the third application; we look at Web services compositions using BPEL language.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the whole approach for implementing non-functional safety
properties in a reliable and modular way.
First, we described the motivations related to the development of these properties. We
classified the motivations in four classes. The first one covers the motivations related to the
lack of a holistic approach for non-functional properties, The second addresses the problems
related to the use of non-formal methods. The third class presents the limitations caused
by the gap between the specification and the implementation. The fourth class represents
the motivations related to the crosscutting concern modularity.
Second, we presented the Seven-pro approach, which covers all phases of the develop-
ment process for enforcing non-functional safety properties. This process is composed of
three principal phases : (1) the formal specification of the non-functional properties, the
validation and the formal verification of the specification, (2) the implementation of func-
tional code, and finally (3) the generation of aspect code to verify at runtime the specified
properties.
Finally, we presented the validation of the proposed approach through three applications.
We explained also the choice of these applications and the diversity in terms of the type of
properties, the type of architectures, the formal methods and the aspect languages.
In the three next chapters, we present the case studies used to validate the whole ap-
proach. In the next chapter, we focus on the specification and the enforcement of architec-
tural invariants. In Chapter 5, we apply the Seven-pro approach to the separation of duties
and delegation policies on the top of role-based access control. Chapter 6 describes the ap-
plication of the approach to the specification and the enforcement of temporal properties
in Web service compositions.
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Specifying and Enforcing Architectural Properties
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a concrete application of the Seven-pro approach to implement
architectural properties. The contributions presented in this chapter were published in
[105,106,111].
Some distributed applications are characterized by a dynamic architecture that evolves
over the time to meet user requirements. For instance, new objects (or component) may
be added, and existing connections between the objects may be modified during execution.
When such reconfigurations are done, it is necessary to verify that no faults are caused and
that the software application works correctly. Therefore, different architectural properties
should be formally specified and also enforced to verify at runtime that each reconfiguration
satisfies the respective properties.
We apply the Seven-pro approach for implementing architectural properties of object
oriented applications in a reliable and modular way. As already mentioned in Chapter 2,
this approach combines the strengths of formal methods with those of Aspect-Oriented
Programming.
On the formal-methods side, we use Z [181] together with the Z-EVES tool [139] to
specify and verify various kinds of architectural properties, and we use Petri nets [147] to
model the coordination protocols. At the architectural specification level, formal methods
are often used to specify architectural properties and to ensure their consistency by proving
theorems on the specified architecture [90,133,141].
On the aspect side, we use the AspectJ [113] language to enforce the specified properties.
Our approach automatically generates AspectJ aspects from the formal specification and
integrates these aspects into the functional application code in a modular way. The aim of
these aspects is to enforce properties of the architecture evolution at runtime. Each aspect
intercepts the execution of a specific reconfiguration operation and allows or prohibits the
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execution of this operation according to the satisfaction of the operation’s pre-conditions,
i.e., architectural properties.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce
the different architectural properties used in our approach. In Section 4.3, we describe an
overview of the proposed approach and in Section 4.4, we present the case studies that
we applied this approach to. Section 4.5 describes the formal specification of architectural
properties and Section 4.6 details the aspect based enforcement of such properties. Sec-
tion 4.7 presents an overview of our prototype. Section 4.9 reports on some related work
and Section 4.10 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Software Architecture Properties
A software architecture is based on the principle of abstraction: hiding some of the details
of a system through encapsulation to better identify and sustain its properties [175]. Con-
sider the software architecture as an important issue for designing and developing complex
software applications. A good specification of the architecture facilitates the development
of applications that meet key requirements in terms of scalability, reliability and interop-
erability [74]. Taking into account these properties on the specification level (i.e., early
steps of software development) allows their easy integration in the application and also may
reduce the cost, the risk of error and duplication.
We are interested in applications that are characterized by a dynamic software archi-
tecture. Such an architecture evolves over time to meet user requirements. For instance, a
developer could add a new element or delete an existing connection between elements during
execution. We use architectural styles [75], one of the important concepts for specifying and
structuring dynamic software architectures. Architectural styles describe families of archi-
tectures by laying down the component/connector vocabulary, the topology for structuring
components and connectors, and constraints to be satisfied by any (re-)configuration of the
architecture.
We focus on expressing and enforcing architectural constraints for distributed object-
oriented software architectures. That is, the components in the subject systems are objects,
whereby connectors can be method calls or events. More concretely, we target four kinds
of semantic constraints:
1. Constraints on objects and object cardinality, e.g., constraints on the possible values
of a certain object attribute, or on the total number of objects of a certain class in a
system.
2. Constraints on object relationships and their cardinality, e.g., constraints on the num-
ber of objects of a class A that may be connected to an object of a class B. Using
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this kind of constraints, the designer can specify, for example, the topology of the
architecture.
3. Constraints on methods that modify the software architecture. These constraints
represent pre-conditions and post-conditions that are defined before, respectively after,
the respective method.
4. Method-call protocols, i.e., constraints on the order in which methods that modify the
architecture should be called. For instance, “the method m1 can be executed only
after the methods m2 and m3 have been executed”.
We call constraints of the first two types architectural invariants whereas we call con-
straints of the third type pre- and post-conditions of architecture reconfiguration operations
because they constrain operations that modify the software architecture. We call constraints
of the fourth type coordination constraints as they constrain the ordering of architecture-
reconfiguration operations.
The execution of a method modifying the software architecture depends on the satisfac-
tion of (1) the architectural invariants that are related to the input and output parameters
of the method, (2) the corresponding pre-conditions, and also (3) the execution order of
this method regarding the other application methods.
4.3 The Approach in a Nutshell
We applied the Seven-pro approach for specifying and enforcing software-architectural
properties of distributed object-oriented applications as shown in Figure 4.1.
In the first phase, the designer formally specifies the architectural style of the desired
application and the reconfiguration operations that describe the architectural evolution.
The designer also defines the coordination protocol by specifying the execution order of the
defined reconfiguration operations. After that, the designer can verify some generic and
specific properties such as the consistency of the architectural style and the preservation
of the style after a reconfiguration. The designer should modify the specification if one of
these properties is not satisfied.
In the second phase, the developer provides the functional code of the object-oriented
application. For now, we restrict ourself to Java code. This code provides only the core
functionalities of the application and does not enforce any architectural properties. The
functional code should conform to the formal specification of the components and their
relations. For example, if the formal specification states that a certain object has some
attribute, then the class that implements that object should have a field that matches that
attribute. However, enforcing the formal specifications pertaining to individual objects is
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out of scope for this work. Our focus is rather on the enforcement of architectural cross-
object invariants.
In the third phase, the developer uses our aspect generator to generate a set of As-
pectJ aspects that enforce the formally specified properties. The advice is generated from
the formal specifications, while the pointcut is generated from the functional application
code. If the specification is not conform to the implementation, the developer should de-
fine a mapping between the formal specification of the reconfiguration operations and the
implementation in terms of AspectJ pointcuts. This mapping will be used by the code
generator.
Architectural 
Style 
Specification
Reconfiguration 
Operation 
Specification
Coordination 
Protocol 
Specification
Application 
Implementation
Initial 
State 
Specification
Pre-condition 
Theorem
Verification
Consistency 
Theorem
Verification
Specification
Verification
PointcutAdvice
Formal Specification and Verification 
Phase
Implementation  
Phase
Enforcement  
Phase
Aspect
Figure 4.1: Specifying and enforcing architectural properties
4.4 Case Studies
As a proof of concept, we applied the proposed approach on two case studies with different
architectural styles. The first is a collaborative authoring system for structured documents
(CAS) [138] and the second is a patient monitoring system (inspired from [141]). For illustra-
tion, consider the class of software systems supporting collaborative authoring of structured
documents. Typically such a system is organized in a client/server style. Documents are
structured as a set of non-overlapping sections. These documents are located onto a server.
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Clients connect to the server to view and edit these documents, at the granularity level of a
section. Clients can have two different roles: writers can modify, create, and delete sections
of a document, whereas reviewers can correct a section by adding annotations to it or by
modifying the section formatting (i.e., they cannot edit the text but can change text fonts
and colors). This application contains four distributed objects: shared document, section,
writer and reviewer.
In this application, several important architectural invariants should be defined and en-
forced. For example, two writers should not be allowed to connect simultaneously to the
same section. Another constraint is that the number of writers that are connected simul-
taneously to the same document should not exceed a predefined value. A third constraint
is that a reviewer can only connect to documents that were modified by at least one writer
since the last review. Other constraints affect the order in which re-configuration operations
are executed. For example, a writer should not be able to edit a document that was changed
by another writer before a reviewer corrects it.
Similar architectural invariants appear also in other applications with other architectural
styles, for instance a patient-monitoring system defined according to the publish/subscribe
architectural style. This system allows nurses to remotely control their patients within
a certain hospital department. In this application, a nurse can see the patient’s data,
e.g., blood pressure, temperature, etc., by periodically receiving events from the respective
bed monitor. Moreover, a bed monitor can raise an alarm to the responsible nurse if
the patient’s state becomes abnormal. In this application, several architectural constraints
should be addressed. For instance, a nurse should not be assigned to more than five patients,
otherwise, she will not be able to do her job appropriately. Further, to avoid having several
nurses being called to the bed monitor when an alarm is raised, a patient should not be
controlled by more than one nurse.
In the remainder of this chapter, we focus only on the collaborative-authoring-system
case study and we present some examples in the specification and the enforcement of its
architectural properties.
4.5 Formal Specification Phase
Formal methods are often used to specify dynamic software architectures and their proper-
ties. We used the Z notation together with the Z-EVES tool and Petri nets for specifying
such properties .
Based on the classification of architectural properties presented in Section 4.2, we distin-
guish three kinds of specifications which should be defined and verified. (1) The specification
of the structure of the individual objects as well as the architectural style, i.e., the overall
architecture of the system, including the definition of the constraints on objects and objects
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relationships. (2) The specification of the pre- and post-conditions for reconfiguration op-
erations. The previous kinds of specifications are inspired from [133]. (3) The specification
of valid sequences of reconfiguration operations. In the following, we present how formal
languages, Z notation and Petri nets are suitable for describing these kinds of specifications.
4.5.1 Formal Languages
We use two well-known formalisms, namely Z notation and Petri nets, to specify architec-
tural invariants and coordination protocols respectively. Using Z and Petri nets has two
main advantages over using other formal specification methods as far as the particular needs
of the kinds of architectural constraints that we address are concerned.
The combination of Z notation [181] and Petri nets [147], called Z-PN, allows us to cover
all architectural properties previously presented in Section 4.2. Due to its set-theoretic and
predicate-logic foundations, Z is well-suited not only for expressing constraints on the struc-
ture of individual objects and on relations between objects in an object-oriented system,
but it can also be used effectively to specify the pre- and post-conditions of reconfigura-
tion operations, which allows us to verify that reconfiguration operations do not break any
architectural invariants. On the other side, Petri nets are well-suited to specify method
protocols [3].
Z specification language
The Z notation [181] is a formal specification language for describing and specifying hard-
ware and software systems (see Bowen’s book [36] for some examples). Z was adopted
as an ISO standard in 2002 [182]. The standard defines three languages: a mathematical
language, a schema language and a refinement theory between abstract data types.
The mathematical language is based on set theory (i.e., set operators, set comprehension,
cartesian products, and power sets) and on mathematical logic (i.e., first order predicate
logic). Using the schema language, one can describe the state of a system and the manners
according to which this state can change. Using the refinement theory, one can develop a
system by building an abstract model from a system design.
A Z specification can be defined as a collection of state schemes and operation schemes.
The state schema State describes the system state and the invariant relationships that
are to be maintained when the system is updated. This schema consists of two parts:
a declaration part and a predicate part. The latter defines constraints and specifies the
values of the variables that are declared in the declaration part. The operation schemes
Operation define the possible operations in the system, the relationship between their inputs
and outputs, and the state changes resulting from their execution. An operation schema
comprises the state State before and the state State’ after performing the operation. These
two states are represented in the schema language by ∆State.
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State
Declarations
Predicates
Operation
∆State
Input/output parameters
pre − conditions
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Functions and constants are defined by an axiomatic definition as shown in the following
form. The declarations introduce the type of the function or constant, and the predicates
give its value. Every variable in Z has a particular type which can be defined as an abbre-
viation, a free type (i.e., user-defined type), an enumeration or a numeric type.
Declarations
Predicates
Researchers have proposed several tools for editing, animating and/or proving properties
about Z specifications, such as ProofPower [15], HOL-Z [39], and Z/EVES [139]. We used
Z/EVES for type and domain checking, schema expansion, precondition calculation, and
theorem proving. For example, we verify the absence of contradictions between architectural
properties and the preservation of the architectural style after reconfiguration. Z/EVES
offers both graphical and command-line interfaces, and exports specifications to different
formats including LATEX, which we use as an input for the code generator.
Petri nets
Petri nets [147] are a graphical and mathematical tool to model and analyze discrete systems.
In Petri nets, the different states of a system are modeled by places and tokens. Events are
represented by transitions between places.
Formally, a Petri net can be defined as a 5-tuple < P ,T ,F ,W ,M0 >, where:
• P = {p1, ...pm} is a finite set of places,
• T = {t1, ...tn} is a finite set of transitions with (P ∩ T ) = ∅ and (P ∪ T ) 6= ∅,
• F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P) is a set of arcs,
• W : F → N1 is a weight function and
• M0 : P → N is an initial marking where for each place p ∈ P there are n ∈ N tokens.
The system behavior can be described in terms of the system state and its changes.
To simulate the dynamic behavior of the system, the state or marking will be changed
according to the following rules:
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- A transition t is enabled, if each input place pi is marked with at least W (pi , t) tokens.
∀ pi ∈ •t ,M (pi) ≥W (pi , t) (4.1)
where •t denotes all input places for the transition t .
- If a transition t is enabled for the marking M then the enabling of t will lead to the
new marking M ′:
∀ pi ∈ •t ,M ′(pi) = M (pi)−W (pi , t) + W (t , pi) (4.2)
where W (Pi , t) is the weight of the arc (Pi , t), and W (t ,Pi) is the weight of the arc
(t ,Pi).
We use P3 [76] as a Petri-net software tool for modeling coordination protocols. P3
offers a graphical user interface to represent Petri-net models as graphs, and a simulator for
the individual execution of transitions and parallel execution of all transitions. P3 exports
Petri-net models to different formats including XML, which our code generator uses as
input.
4.5.2 Specification and Verification of Overall Architecture
Predicate logic is used to specify properties of the individual objects participating in the
system following the object specification pattern shown below. In this pattern, atti denotes
an attribute, pri denotes the properties of an object.
Objecti
att1 : Type1, att2 : Type2, ...., attn : Typen
pr1, ..., prn
As an example, consider two kinds of objects in our collaborative authoring system:
shared documents and sections. A shared document is accessible to any client that is
authorized either as a Writer or as a Reviewer. A section is defined by the positions of its
first and last characters in the whole document. In the schema below, the shared document
is defined as a sequence of sections that do not overlap, as specified by the predicate in the
lower part of the specification of a shared document.
Section
firstCharacter : N
lastCharacter : N
lastCharacter ≥ firstCharacter
SharedDoc
sections : seq Section
∀ i : N | 1 ≤ i < #sections
• (sections(i + 1)).firstCharacter
= (sections(i)).lastCharacter + 1
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The overall system specification defines a set of objects, the relationships between them,
and the architectural invariants that must be maintained when the system evolves. In the
sample System schema shown below, oi denotes an object instance, Objecti denotes an
object type, relationij denotes a relation between Objecti and Objectj (as denoted by the
bidirectional arrow), and Apri denotes architectural invariant. These invariants describe
constraints on objects (e.g., the maximum and/or the minimum number of the object in-
stances, etc.), and constraints on object relationships (e.g., the domain and the range of
the defined relations, the maximum and/or the minimum number of the relation instances,
etc.).
System
oi : Objecti ;...
oj : F objectj ;...
relationij : objecti ↔ objectj ;...
Apr1, ...Aprn
To verify that our architectural style does not contain any contradiction within the
defined invariants, we verify the system consistency by ensuring that at least one valid
initial state exists [192]. Using Z/EVES, we can define an InitialisationTheorem and prove
it, whereby
• System represents the system schema that describes the architectural style
• SystemInit corresponds to a Z schema that describes the initial system state.
SystemInit
System
oi = {...}
Ri j = {(..., ...), (..., ...)}
Theorem InitialisationTheorem
∃System • SystemInit
For illustration, the system CollaborativeAuthoringSystem is specified in the schema
below. It consists of finite sets (F) of writers and reviewers, a shared document and relations
between authorized writers/reviewers and sections of the shared document. Conditions on
the relations are preserved by verifying the domain dom and the range ran of each relation
(as defined in [C1]). Some other invariants are given: [C2] limits the number of the writers
to six. [C3] specifies the maximum number of writers that are connected to sections and
[C4] fixes the number of occupied sections by reviewers or writers to four. [C5] states that
a writer or a reviewer can be connected to only one section at any point in time. [C6]
states that two actors (writers or reviewers) are never connected simultaneously to the
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same section. These constraints should be satisfied by any operation that changes the sets
of writers, reviewers, and sections.
CollaborativeAuthoringSystem
writers : FWriter
reviewers : FReviewer
sections : FSection
WriterSection : Writer ↔ Section
ReviewerSection : Reviewer ↔ Section
dom ReviewerSection ⊆ reviewers [C1]
ran ReviewerSection ⊆ sections
dom WriterSection ⊆ writers
ran WriterSection ⊆ sections
#writers < 6 [C2]
#reviewers < 5
#sections < 7
#(writers CWriterSection) < 4 [C3]
#(reviewers C ReviewerSection) < 3
#((ReviewerSection(| reviewers |)) [C4]
∪(WriterSection(| writers |))) < 4
∀w : writers • #(WriterSection(| {w} |)) ≤ 1 [C5]
∀ r : reviewers • #(ReviewerSection(| {r} |)) ≤ 1
∀ r : reviewers;w : writers;s : sections
• (w , s) 6∈WriterSection ∨ (r , s) 6∈ ReviewerSection [C6]
∀ r , rr : reviewers;s : sections | r 6= rr
• (r , s) 6∈ ReviewerSection ∨ (rr , s) 6∈ ReviewerSection
∀w ,ww : writers;s : sections | w 6= ww
• (w , s) 6∈WriterSection ∨ (ww , s) 6∈WriterSection
To verify the consistency of the CollaborativeAuthoringSystem schema, we define an
initial system state, InitCASystem, shown below. The initial state consists of two writers
w1, and w2, one reviewer r1, and three sections s1, s2, s3. The proof of the consistency
theorem ensures that the specification of our collaborative authoring system is consistent
and does not contain any contradictions.
InitCASystem
CollaborativeAuthoringSystem
writers = {w1,w2}
reviewers = {r1}
sections = {s1, s2, s3}
WriterSection = {(w1, s1), (w2, s3)}
ReviewerSection = {(r1, s2)}
Theorem ConsistencyCASystem
∃CollaborativeAuthoringSystem
• InitCASystem
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4.5.3 Specification and Verification of Reconfiguration Operations
Each reconfiguration operation is specified by means of a Z operation schema, which defines
the input parameters (ci?) as well as the pre- and post-conditions. These conditions are
essential to verify that the evolution of the architecture preserves the defined invariants.
Reconfiguration operations are executed only if their pre-conditions are satisfied. In the
operation schema below, PreCond i and PostCond i denote a pre- and a post-condition of
the reconfiguration operation Operation i .
Operationi
∆System
oi? : objecti ;
...
PreCondi , ...,PreCondn
PostCondi , ...,PostCondn
Theorem PreConditionTheorem
∀System, o? : Objecti
| preConditions(System, o?)
• pre Operationi
After specifying the reconfiguration operations formally, these operations need to be
verified. To evaluate the impact of a reconfiguration operation on invariants, we define and
prove the pre-condition theorem PreConditionTheorem shown on the right-hand side of the
specification above, whereby (as defined by [128]):
• System denotes the Z schema describing the architecture style (see previous section).
• o? denotes the input parameter presenting the objects related to this operation.
• preConditions(System,o?) denotes the pre-conditions in terms of the defined system
and the input parameters o?.
• Operationi denotes the Z operation schema describing this operation.
• pre Operationi describes that a final system state denoted by system ′ (i.e., the new
system state after the execution of the current operation) with the output parameter
(out !) can be shown to exist. Formally,
∃System ′;out ! : Output • Operationi
This theorem specifies the pre-conditions that must initially be satisfied to guarantee
that the constraints are preserved after the execution of the operation and verify that the
execution of the reconfiguration operation preserves the architectural style describing the
whole system.
Let us now illustrate the approach to specify reconfiguration operations by means of our
collaborative authoring system. We have specified and formally validated reconfiguration
operations such as the insertion and connection of writers, reviewers, and sections. For
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illustration, the following schema specifies the operation ConnectWriter . As pre-conditions,
the operation schema states that when a writer w? is connected to a section of the shared
document, then it should be one of the writers that are already present in the system
([preC1]) and the section s? should be already created ([preC2]). As post-conditions, the
relation WriterSection is modified. After the execution of the operation ConnectWriter,
the new state of the relation denoted by WriterSection ′ contains additionally the couple
composed of the new writer w? and the new section s? ([postC5]). The other objects
and relations defined in the architectural style are not modified after the execution of this
operation ([postC1, postC2, postC3, postC4]).
ConnectWriter
w? : Writer
s? : Section
∆CollaborativeAuthoringSystem
w? ∈ writers [preC1]
s? ∈ sections [preC2]
reviewers ′ = reviewers [postC1]
writers ′ = writers [postC2]
sections ′ = sections [postC3]
ReviewerSection ′ = ReviewerSection [postC4]
WriterSection ′ = WriterSection ∪ {(w?, s?)} [postC5]
To validate the connection operation of a new writer, we use Z/EVES to prove the
theorem PreConnectWriter , which ensures that the connection of a writer conforms to
the system invariants described in the system schema CollaborativeAuthoringSystem. The
theorem below states that the connection of a writer to a section requires that no reviewer
or any other writer are connected to that section.
Theorem PreConnectWriter
∀CollaborativeAuthoringSystem;
w? : Writer ;s? : Section | w? ∈ writers ∧ s? ∈ sections
∧ (∀ rr : reviewers • (rr , s?) 6∈ ReviewerSection)
∧ (∀ww : writers • (ww 6= w? ∧ (ww , s?) 6∈WriterSection))
• pre ConnectWriter
4.5.4 Specification of Valid Protocols
We use Petri nets to define constraints on the execution order of reconfiguration opera-
tions that are already specified in Z. Typical coordinations in distributed object-oriented
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InsertWriterInsertReviewer
DeleteWriterDeleteReviewer
P1P2
P3P4
P5P6
P7
ConnectWriterConnectReviewer
DisConnectWriterDisConnectReviewer
.
.
P8P9
Figure 4.2: Valid protocol of the collaborative authoring system
applications such as synchronization, mutual exclusion, parallelism, etc., can be naturally
specified with Petri nets. We model each reconfiguration operation by a transition and the
system state by a set of places and tokens. Enabling a transition in the Petri net means that
the corresponding reconfiguration operation conforms to the constraints given the current
system state. Consequently, the transition can be executed and its target places can be
occupied by tokens.
In our collaborative authoring system, the writers can create, modify, and delete sections.
Then, the reviewers can correct these sections and add annotations. To enforce the activity
order described above, we define a coordination protocol that requires that each section must
be created or modified by a writer before it becomes accessible to reviewers for correction.
In addition, after a section is corrected, the next reviewer cannot revise it before an author
modifies it.
In the initial state shown in Figure 4.2, the transitions InsertWriter and InsertReviewer
are always enabled. Consequently, the transition ConnectWriter will be enabled. Thus, a
writer can connect to a section. After enabling the transition DisconnectionWriter , the
writer can be deleted but it cannot connect because there is no token in P8. However, a
reviewer can still connect because the transition ConnectReviewer is enabled.
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4.5.5 Verification of Specification Structure
To facilitate the automatic translation of Z specifications to aspects, we proposed specifica-
tion patterns that describe how to structure formal specifications of software architectural
properties. We do not define any patterns for Z predicates. The designer can define any
Z predicate to express the architectural constraints. He should only respect the following
rules in his specification.
1. Each object must be specified by a Z schema that defines a unique identifier for the
object and one or more constraints on the object.
2. An object can be atomic or composite (composed by a set or a sequence of sub-objects).
3. The architectural style (i.e., presenting the whole system architecture) must be spec-
ified by a Z schema.
4. The architectural style consists of a finite set and/or a sequence of object instances.
Each object must be connected to at least one other component.
5. Object connections must be specified using Z relations (↔) and the domain (dom)
and range (ran) of each relation must be specified in the system schema.
6. The reconfiguration operations must be specified using Z operation schemes. This
schema consists of a set of input parameters presenting the related objects, the pre-
conditions and the post-conditions in terms of defined objects and relations.
7. Each Petri-net transition should correspond to a reconfiguration operation already
specified by a Z operation schema.
These rules are specified as a meta model, using XML Schema Definitions. To verify that
the Z-PN specification is compliant with this meta-model, we translate the specification into
an XML document. We use the Java package JDOM to verify that the XML representation
of the Z specification satisfies the meta model.
4.6 Mapping Formal Specifications to Code
This section describes how formal specifications are mapped to code. The mapping of the
specifications pertaining to individual components and to the overall system architecture
are done manually. We focus on mapping cross-component specifications related to re-
configuration operations and their valid protocols. This mapping is done by translating
specifications to aspects in the AspectJ language. In the following, we first present the
structure of the generated aspects and subsequently describe the code generation process.
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4.6.1 Aspects that Implement Cross-Component Invariants
The layer that is responsible for checking and enforcing architectural constraints at runtime
consists of a set of aspects that are generated from Z operation schemes and corresponding
Petri-net transitions. There is one aspect per reconfiguration operation, i.e., per each pair
of Z operation schema and corresponding Petri-net transition.
For example, consider again our collaborative authoring system. Each reconfiguration
operation, e.g., insert writer, connect reviewer, delete section, etc., corresponds to a Z
operation schema in the formal specification of the architectural style and to a Petri net
transition in a coordination protocol. For each reconfiguration operation, an AspectJ as-
pect is automatically generated. In other words, the aspects connect the formal level and
the functional level to ensure that formally specified invariants are maintained when the
architecture evolves.
The overall structure of these aspects is as follows. The pointcuts of the generated
aspects intercept the execution of operations from the functional layer that correspond to
architecture reconfiguration operations. For example, every call to the operation insertW
in the public interface of the class Writer corresponds to the reconfiguration operation In-
sertWriter. The advice of the generated aspect first checks and enforces the coordination
protocols that are defined by Petri net transitions and then checks the constraints specified
in Z. The first check verifies whether the transition in the Petri net is enabled, based on
the current system state. The second check verifies the constraints and pre-conditions cor-
responding to the reconfiguration operations that are specified within the style schema and
the operation schema. If both checks are successful, the aspect executes the reconfiguration
operation, and after that, the aspect updates the state of the system. Otherwise, the aspect
prohibits the execution of the reconfiguration operation.
For illustration, consider the aspect shown in Listing 4.1, which controls the connection
of a writer to a section. This operation is specified by the Z operation schema ConnectWriter
and the Petri-net transition with the same name. The pointcut ConnectWriterToSection
(lines 3 and 4 in Listing 4.1) selects all calls to any public method connectW independently of
its parameters. The constructs target and args are used to bind to the variables w: Writer
and s: Section respectively the target, respectively the arguments, of the method-call
joinpoints that the pointcut selects.
The around advice of the aspect in Listing 4.1 controls the execution of the recon-
figuration operation ConnectWriter. First, the advice executes code to ensure that the
coordination protocols are respected. For example, in the Petri net shown in Figure 4.2,
we specified that a writer cannot modify a section unless a reviewer has corrected it. The
generated advice contains a call to the method isTransitionEnabled (line 9) to check
whether the transition ConnectWriter is enabled, given the current state of the system.
Next, Z constraints are checked.
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1 public aspect EnforceConstraintsForConnectWriter {
2
3 pointcut ConnectWriterToSection(Writer w,Section s):
4 call(public * connectW(..)) && target(w) && args(s);
5
6 void around(Writer w, Section s): ConnectWriterToSection(w,s)
7 {
8 ...
9 if (isTransitionEnabled (CurrentMarking, ConnectWriterTransistion)) { ...}
10
11 ...
12 if (isMemberOf(wInput,SystemState.writers)) { ... } //Pre-condition preC1
13 if (isMemberOf(sInput,SystemState.sections)) { ... } //Pre-condition preC2
14 ...
15
16 if (checkConstraintC1()) { ... }
17 if (checkConstraintC2()) { ... }
18 ...
19
20 if (allConstraints) {
21 proceed(w,s);
22 updateSystemState(w,s);
23 }
24 else { ... }
25 }
26
27 boolean checkConstraintC1() { ... } //Constraint C5
28
29 boolean checkConstraintC2() { //Constraint C6
30 boolean constraints, result0, result1, result2 = true;
31 String [] Tab0 = SystemState.Newreviewers;
32 while ((Tab0.length!=0) && result0) {
33 String r = getFirstElement(Tab0);
34 String [] Tab1 = SystemState.Newwriters;
35 }
36 while ((Tab1.length!=0) && result1) {
37 String w = getFirstElement(Tab1);
38 String [] Tab2 = SystemState.Newsections;
39 }
40 while ((Tab2.length!=0)&& result2) {
41 String s = getFirstElement(Tab2);
42 constraints = Or(isNotMemberOf(w, s,SystemState.NewWriterSection),
43 isNotMemberOf(r, s,SystemState.NewReviewerSection));
44 result2 = result2 && constraints;
45 result1 = result1 && constraints;
46 result0 = result0 && constraints;
47 }
48 return result0;
49 }
50
51 void updateSystemState(String NameW, String NameS) { ... }
52 }
Listing 4.1: Example of the generated AspectJ aspect
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For example, the constraints [preC1] and [preC2] from the Z operation schema connectWriter
are translated to calls to the method isMemberOf of a Z-operator package that we imple-
mented (lines 12 and 13 in the Listing 4.1). Quantified constraints such as the constraint
[C5], which ensures that a writer or reviewer can modify only one section at a given point
in time, and the constraint [C6], which disallows overlaps between sections, are translated
to Java code by using helper methods. For instance, a helper method checkConstraintC2
(lines 29–49) is generated to evaluate the constraint [C2]. This helper method is called in
the advice (line 17).
Moreover, the advice contains a method updateSystemState (lines 51) that updates
the system state that is stored in a generated class, which represents the components of the
system, their relationships, and the marking of the Petri net. If all generated constraints
are evaluated to true, the reconfiguration operation will be executed (using proceed) and
the system state will be updated (lines 20–24).
4.6.2 The Aspect Generation Workflow
The aspect generation workflow is composed of two main phases. The first phase consists
in generating the AspectJ pointcut while the second consists in automatically translating
Z and Petri net specifications into an around advice associated to the generated pointcut.
The generation of pointcut can be performed manually or automatically. If the specifi-
cation of architectural properties is conform to the implementation of the functional code,
the pointcut will be automatically generated, i.e., without the intervention of the developer.
It will be generated from the Z operation schema representing the corresponding reconfig-
uration operation implemented as a Java method. In the case that the specifications of
architectural properties are not totally conforming to the implementation, the developer
should provide an AspectJ pointcut for each specified reconfiguration operation, denoted in
a XML file. These pointcuts ensure the mapping of the reconfiguration operations to points
during the execution of the functional code. For example, Listing 4.2 shows the mapping of
the reconfiguration operation ConnectWriter, defined in the formal specification, to calls
to the method connectW (lines 5–7 in the Listing 4.2) from the functional level.
1 <Mapping Name="CollaborativeAuthoringSystem">
2 <PointCut Reference="InsertWriter">
3 InsertW(Writer w):
4 call(public * insertW(..))&& target(w); </PointCut>
5 <PointCut Reference="ConnectWriter" Component="Section">
6 ConnectWriterToSection(Writer w,Section s):
7 call(public * connectW(..)) && target(w) && args(s); </PointCut>
8 ...
9 </Mapping>
Listing 4.2: Mapping formal specification to code
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The generation of advice consists in translating Z predicates and the enabling of Petri
transitions to Java condition code. The aspect code generator extracts the properties of the
objects, the relations between objects, and the architectural constraints that are specified in
the system schema and in the operation schemes. For each reconfiguration operation, which
corresponds to a Z operation schema and to a transition in the Petri net, the pre-conditions
are translated to pieces of around advice as schematically shown in line 5 of Listing 4.3.
The generated advice is associated with a pointcut that can be automatically generated or
provided by the programmer in the XML mapping file (cf. line 2 in the Listing 4.3).
The workflow of the generated around advice is composed of three phases. First, the
advice checks whether the Petri net transition for the corresponding reconfiguration op-
eration is enabled. For that purpose, we automatically generate a call to the method
isTransitionEnabled that take in parameter the current marking and the name of the
Petri nets transition (line 8 in the Listing 4.3). This information is extract from an XML
representation provided by the P3 tool used for drawing and checking the Petri nets speci-
fications.
Second, the advice checks whether all pre-conditions of the corresponding reconfigura-
tion operation, specified in Z notation, are fulfilled. The translation of these pre-conditions
into Java code makes use of a Java-based package that we developed for Z notation. This
package contains classes representing the elements of the Z language such as operators,
mathematical objects such as sets, relations, sequences, bags, etc. The developed methods
are denoted ZOperators in the aspect template by (lines 11 and 14). Our aspect code
generator parses the LaTeX file provided by the theorem prover Z/EVES and extracts the
pre-conditions that should be translated. The constraints specified in the operation schema
(line 11) and the constraints without quantification (line 14) specified in the system schema
are evaluated first. These predicates are automatically translated to a call of one of the
methods that are implemented in our Java package for Z notation, which corresponds to
the used Z operator. Next, constraints that use quantification operators are evaluated by
calling auxiliary methods generated for them (e.g., method checkConstraintCi, lines 18
and 30 in Listing 4.3). For example for the operator ∀, the auxiliary method verifies that
all possible alternatives are satisfied.
The third phase consists of verifying the generated conditions that implemented the pre-
conditions (lines 22–26). If one of the generated pre-conditions is not fulfilled the operation
will not be executed (lines 26). Otherwise, the operation will be normally executed by calling
the keyword proceed (line 23) and update the system states. For that, the aspect code gen-
erator emits a Java class that stores the current state of the system in terms of objects and
relations between them. Each generated aspect implements a method updateSystemState
(line 33), which updates the current state of the system if the reconfiguration operation can
be executed. This method is called in the aspect after proceed (line 24).
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1 //extract the pointcut from the mapping file
2 public pointcut PointCutName (parameters1): set of join points
3
4 //The around advice for controlling the reconfiguration operation
5 void around(parameters1): PointCutName(parameters1) {
6
7 // check if the Petri net transition is enabled
8 if (isTransitionEnabled (CurentMarking, respectiveTransistion)) { ...}
9
10 // evaluate the constraints defined in the operation schema
11 if (ZOperators(parameters2, SystemState)) { ... }
12
13 // evaluate constraints without quantification defined in the system schema
14 if (ZOperators(parameters3, SystemState)) { ... }
15
16 // call the auxiliary method for evaluating constraints with quantification
17 ...
18 if (checkConstraintCi()) { ... }
19 ...
20
21 // verify that all constraints hold and proceed if this is the case.
22 if (allConstraints) {
23 proceed(parameters1);
24 updateSystemState(parameters4);
25 }
26 else { ... }
27 }
28
29 // helper method for evaluating constraints with quantification
30 public boolean checkConstraintC_i() { ... }
31
32 // the method for updating the system state
33 void updateSystemState(parameters4) { ... }
34 }
Listing 4.3: Template of the generated AspectJ aspect
4.7 Overview of the Prototype
For proving the proposed concepts, we implemented an Eclipse plug-in that supports our
approach. The main goal of our plug-in is to automatically generate AspectJ aspects from
the Z and Petri net specifications of the architectural properties. Figure 4.3 presents a
screenshot of our eclipse plug-in. Developers can invoke the plug-in the menu bar of Eclipse.
In the following, we present the different functionalities that our plug-in provides.
Using the menu item Load Petri net, the developer loads the Petri-net specification that
describes the execution order of the reconfiguration operations. This specification should
be edited using the P3 tool and exported as an XML document. After that, the developer
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Figure 4.3: Screenshot of the ZPN-to-AspectJ plug-in
uses the menu item Load Z specification to load the Z specification that describes the
architectural style and the reconfiguration operations. This specification should be edited
using Z/EVES and exported as TEX file. After that, the plug-in automatically generates
an XML document which represents the structure of the Z-PN specifications. This XML
file is required to verify if the specifications (i.e., the model) are well-structured according
to the defined patterns (i.e., the meta-model) as previously detailed in Section 4.5.5. This
verification is performed by the menu item Check. In addition, the developer can visualize
the generated XML file and the XDS file respectively through the menu item Z2XML file and
XSD file. If the specification of architectural properties conforms to the implementation of
the functional code, the developer can automatically generate the AspectJ aspects using the
menu item Automatic generation. Otherwise, the developer should ensure first the mapping
between the specification and the implementation by defining the corresponding pointcuts as
an XML document. The menu items Create pointcut, View pointcut, and Edit pointcut allow
respectively the creation, the visualization, and the editing of the pointcut. After that, the
developer can generate the corresponding aspects according to the defined pointcuts using
the menu item Semi-Automatic generation.
Our plug-in further allows developers to launch the Z/EVES and P3 tools to edit the
specification of the architectural properties in Z-PN. It provides also some help for guiding
the developer to better understand our proposed approach and to use our aspect generator.
4.8 Meidya: An Extension of the Seven-pro Approach
The programming model introduced by our approach is relatively complex, as we expect
the user to have a good knowledge of the Z notation and Petri nets. We believe that the
benefits of our approach make the increased programming-model complexity worthwhile.
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Figure 4.4: The Meidya approach
We deal with this problem by basing our approach on the work by Hadj Kacem et
al. [101], who propose to graphically model dynamic software architectures based on the
MDA modeling process. This approach provides modeling solutions to guide and assist
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design activities. They define a new UML profile associated with two metamodels for
describing dynamic software architectures. They propose a set of stereotypes and constraints
for specifying architectural styles and reconfiguration operations as well as their pre- and
post-conditions. This profile proposes also the use of the OCL language to specify the
different types of architectural properties. The authors propose also automatic generation
of Z specifications from UML models and the associated OCL constraints.
The Seven-pro approach complements the work proposed by Hadj Kacem et al. by
formally verifying the generated Z specifications, and also by generating aspect code for
verifying at runtime the architectural properties. The provided approach called Meidya
[110, 111] covers the whole process for developing architectural properties of distributed
applications, as shown in Figure 4.4. Meidya is based on three main steps:
In the first step, the designer specifies the dynamic software architecture using a UML
profile. First, he defines the architectural style as well as the reconfiguration operations
specified in terms of pre- and post-conditions. Second, the system maps automatically
UML models towards the XML language. This function ensures that each generated XML
descriptions is valid according to the appropriate XML schema defining the proposed meta-
model (as previously defined in Section 4.5.5).
In the second step, the system automatically translates the graphic UML models to Z
specifications. The designer can interact with a theorem prover, such as Z/EVES, to verify
the consistency of the architectural style, on the one hand, and the preservation of the
architectural invariants during the architectural evolution, on the other hand.
In the third step, the programmer uses our aspect generator to automatically produces
AspectJ aspects from Z specifications. The generated aspects will be integrated in a modular
way in the functional application code in order to enforce the architectural invariants at
runtime.
A software environment supporting these features has been developed and integrated as
a plug-in in the open source tool FUJABA [110].
Using the Meidya approach, the designer models the software architecture of his dis-
tributed applications using UML and OCL: No knowledge about the Z notation is required.
Meidya defines a high level language enabling specification of generic and reusable model.
In addition, this approach seeks to take advantage of the standard visual notations provided
by UML2.0 and the associated OCL language. It bridges the gap between the steps of the
development process by automatically generating Z specifications and AspectJ code.
4.9 Related Work
In this section, we present an overview of related work on the specification, verification, and
enforcement of architectural properties.
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4.9.1 Specifying architectural properties
There have been many works on modeling dynamic software architectures. The proposed
approaches can be classified into three classes.
The first class uses Architecture Description Languages (ADL) to model software ar-
chitectures. There are two main limitations: First, some of these ADLs do not provide
any mechanisms for formally verifying the architectural properties such as the absence of
contradiction between constraints. Thanks to the theorem prover Z/EVES, the Seven-pro
approach can verify the consistency and other application-specific properties. Second, ac-
cording to [100], the majority of ADLs are unsuitable for defining complex properties and
describing pre- and post-conditions, and coordination constraints of architecture reconfigu-
ration operations. In our approach and based on logic predicate and set theory of Z notation
as well as Petri nets, the designer can easily specify very interesting properties.
The second class uses UML and OCL for modeling software architectures. The expressive
power of UML is limited for expressing dynamic software architectures. The UML diagrams
cannot specify the reconfiguration operations and their pre- and post- conditions. The
common solution to solve this limitation is to extend UML to support concepts for modeling
dynamic architectures, such as [101, 168]. These approaches lack formal foundations for
verifying the consistency or other specific properties. An automatic translation of UML
models to formal languages, as proposed in Meidya can solve this limitation.
The third class of approaches uses formal methods. We classify them according to
the techniques that they use: (1) approaches based on logic and (2) approaches based on
process. In the following, we focus on works that use Z notation and Petri nets.
Some researchers propose using logic-based approaches such as first-order logic [65], Z [2],
and temporal logic [4]. First-order logic can cover only the architecture invariants and pre-
and post-conditions of architecture-reconfiguration operations, whereas temporal logic can
express some coordination properties and temporal constrains at a very high level.
Abowd et al. [2] propose using Z to analyze the architecture styles and the relation
between them. However, this work does not support the modeling of dynamic software
architectures and their constraints. Based on work by Loulou et al. [133], we combine Z
notation and Petri nets to specify dynamic software architectures, associated with their
architectural invariants, pre- and post-conditions, as well as the coordination constraints.
Thus, we can formally verify several types of properties such as the consistency of our spec-
ification, the maintaining of the invariants when the architecture evolves, and the absence
of deadlock in Petri nets specifications.
Other approaches use process-based formalisms such as CSP [92], pi-calculus [155], graph
grammars [141], and Petri nets [73,90].
Le Me´tayer [141] uses a graph grammar, based on a mathematical model, to formally
specify dynamic software architectures. He defines the architecture in terms of graphs and
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the architecture style using graph grammars. Constraints on the evolution of the architec-
ture are specified by means of graph rewriting rules. In addition, an algorithm is defined
to verify the consistency of the rewriting rules to prove that the architectural constraints
are preserved after a reconfiguration. Compared to the Seven-pro approach, this type of
grammars does not support logical properties such as reasoning about the number of object
(component) instances and logical conditions such as absence of a communication link be-
tween two objects. In addition, the designer can verify also other specific properties using
the Z/EVES theorem prover.
SAM [90] (Software Architecture Model) is a general software architecture development
framework based on Petri nets and temporal logic. Petri nets are used to model the structure
and the behavior of components and connectors, while temporal logic is used to specify the
required temporal properties of the given architecture. This work is related to ours as
it uses two formalisms to specify the architectural properties. However, the SAM does
not support dynamic software architectures and corresponding pre- and post-conditions
of reconfigurations. In our approach, we use the Z notation and specially Z operation
schema, which is well suited to define the reconfiguration operations and their constraints.
In addition, we focus only on the architectural level, we are not interested in the behavior
of components.
In [73], the authors propose a dynamic software architecture model based on pi-net, a
formal language that combines object-oriented Petri nets with pi-calculus. The proposed
model takes into account the structure and dynamic aspects of software architecture. Com-
pared to ours, this approach does not support the specification of architectural properties.
No verification mechanism has been proposed. In addition, as other process-based formal-
ism, the pi-calculus is a very high-level language and cannot be easily translated to code.
In our approach, we implement a Java package for helping the translation of Z predicates
to code and we generate also a code that enforces the Petri nets specifications.
Compared to our approach, most of the approaches mentioned above do not support
code generation from the specifications of software architectural properties. Moreover, they
do not cover all architectural properties mentioned in Section 4.2. In the next section, we
introduce some approaches that address the enforcement of architectural properties.
4.9.2 Enforcing architectural properties
ArchJava [8] is an extension to Java that seamlessly unifies software architecture with im-
plementation, ensuring that the implementation conforms to the architectural constraints.
It extends a practical implementation language (Java) to incorporate architectural features
and enforce communication integrity. Although the approach allows developers to enforce
architecture constraints, it mainly focuses on communication integrity. ArchJava does not
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support other types of architectural reasoning, such as reasoning about coordination pro-
tocols and architectural styles.
DiscoTect [195] is a tool that allows to determine the architecture of a system using dy-
namic analysis for multiple architectural styles and multiple systems. The implementation
level events are mapped into architectural operations using a modified version of a state
machine. This tool uses online monitors for system observation to guarantee the consis-
tency of the implementation with its architectural design. DiscoTect does not support the
specification and the enforcement of dynamic software architectures.
SonarJ [91] is a commercial Eclipse plug-in for enforcing architectural constraints in Java
programs. This plug-in allows an efficient enforcement of architectural constraints, but it
does not support coordination constraints and many constraints that can be defined with Z
notation. The previously mentioned tools do not have a formal basis and do not ensure any
modularity for monitoring and controlling software architecture evolution. Few approaches
address the use of aspect-oriented techniques for specifying and enforcing architectural
properties.
Some ADLs have been extended by aspect paradigms such as [25, 57, 132] to specify
and enforce architectural properties in a modular way. For example, Loukil et al. propose
AO4AADL, an aspect-oriented extension for AADL. This new language allows specifying
non-functional properties and specially architectural properties. The authors propose also
an AO4AADL compiler that generates AspectJ aspects, which verify at runtime if the
running system conforms the AAO4ADL specifications. In general, these extended ADLs
allow to model and enforce architectural properties in a modular way. Compared to our
approach, they do not present any formal foundations to verify architectural properties.
In [135], the authors present an approach for enforcing predefined architectural styles
(e.g. client/server, publish/subscribe, etc.) and their constraints on top of the Prism-
MW, an architecture middleware platform. This approach allows developers to modify the
architectural style without impacting the rest of the system. For each architectural style, an
AspectJ aspect is defined. In [135], only the structure of the architectural style is supported
without considering the architectural constraints defined in Section 4.2.
4.10 Conclusion and Limitations
By considering architectural properties on the specification level one can more easily manage
the reconfiguration of the dynamic architecture and detect errors and faults earlier in the
development process. In addition, by automatically generating verification code from the
specified properties, one can define more reliable distributed applications. The Seven-pro
approach for architectural properties guarantees these previous advantages.
This chapter presented an approach for specifying architectural properties of distributed
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applications based on dynamic architecture. The combination of Z and Petri nets allows
us to specify most important architectural properties. Z notation is used to specify invari-
ants, pre- and post-conditions, while we use Petri nets to model coordination protocols.
We also presented a verification phase that allows developers to verify the consistency of
architectural properties and the preservation of the system after a reconfiguration of the
architecture.
This chapter also presented the aspect based enforcement of the specified properties.
AspectJ code is generated from the Z and Petri-net specifications. The generated aspects
control the evolution of the architecture at runtime. The aspects prohibit the execution of
the reconfiguration operations if their corresponding pre-conditions are not satisfied.
Our approach has some limitations. First, as we use Petri nets, we support only ap-
plications with finite states. The use of linear-temporal logic, extended with Z notation,
can resolve this problem. Second, the generated aspects are complex and additional code is
needed to explicitly keep track of the system state. This is because of the limited power of
querying capabilities of AspectJ. More expressive pointcut languages such as Alpha [156]
support a more declarative quantification over execution history and object heap. By using
them, we hope to achieve a more direct mapping of formal specifications to aspect code.
Such pointcut languages are also less fragile with respect to syntactic changes.
In the next chapter, we will detail the application of the Seven-pro approach for imple-
menting access control policies. We use TemporalZ as a specification language for specifying
separation of duties and delegations policies, and we use Alpha as an expressive aspect
language for runtime monitoring the specified policies.
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Specifying and Enforcing Access Control Policies
5.1 Introduction
This chapter shows how we applied Seven-pro approach for implementing secure applica-
tions. The contributions presented in this chapter were published in [107–109].
We address the specification and enforcement of security policies that are enforceable by
runtime monitoring as characterized by Schneider [173]. More specifically, we propose an
approach to the runtime verification of separation of duties and delegation policies on top of
the role-based access-control policy. These policies allow defining user roles and controlling
user permissions in a multi-user system. They ensure that only authorized users can call
and execute certain functions of the system. For example, separation-of-duties policies are
access-control policies that allow defining constraints on the assignment of users to the
critical activities of a business process to prevent frauds and errors.
The formal specification phase of the Seven-pro approach is covered by a new formal
specification language called TemporalZ, which combines Z and linear temporal logic. We
extend this language by domain specific predicates for specifying access control policies.
Based on this language, we verify that there is no contradiction between security predicates.
In the runtime enforcement phase, we propose to encode the enforcement logic as aspects
in the aspect-oriented language Alpha, which has built-in means for reasoning about an
expressive model of the program execution, including the execution history and the object
store by using logic programming. We also extend Alpha by a new library to easily enforce
the access control predicates as aspects.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces role based
access control, separation of duties, and delegation policies. In Section 5.3, we present
the case study, a loan-approval process, used throughout this chapter. An overview of the
approach is given in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 introduces TemporalZ and explains the formal
specification of separation of duties and delegation policies. Section 5.6 explains how formal
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specifications are automatically mapped to Alpha aspects. Section 5.7 reports on related
work. Section 5.8 concludes this chapter and discusses areas of future work.
5.2 Access Control Policies
As defined in [170], access control is the process of mediating every request to resources
and data maintained by a system and determining whether the request should be granted
or denied. Several access-control policies have been proposed in literature such as DAC
(Discretionary Access Control), MAC (Mandatory Access Control), and RBAC (Role-Based
Access Control). In this work, we focused on the formal specification and the enforcement
of RBAC policies, extended by several types of separation of duties and delegation policies.
5.2.1 Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [69] is an authorization mechanism in which access
decisions are based on the user roles in the organization (Figure 5.1, taken from [69]). The
permissions to execute a set of operations are grouped in roles and users are assigned to
one or more roles. A role can contain many users and a user can be member of many roles.
Also, a role can have many permissions, and a permission can be assigned to many roles.
For example, the security administrator of the banking software may define the following
roles for LAP: Teller , FinancialClerk , Supervisor , Manager , and Customer . Each role has
operations associated with it, e.g., the role Teller includes permissions for the operations
EnterApplicationData, CheckExternalRating and TransferMoney .
The session and role hierarchies concepts have been proposed to enrich the basic RBAC
policy. The session concept ensures the mapping between a user and an activated subset
of roles that are assigned to the user. The role hierarchy allows to structure the roles in
a large organization and it is based on inheritance relationships between roles. The role
hierarchy enables a senior role to perform the permission of a junior role.
In this work, we focus on the separation-of-duties [79] and delegation policies [54] on
top of RBAC.
5.2.2 Separation of Duties
Separation-of-duty (SoD) policies reduce the risk of frauds and errors in business processes
by a fine-grained control over the privileges for workflow tasks. Two main categories are
distinguished: static and dynamic separation of duties [79].
- Static SoD (SSoD) This class of separation of duty specifies that two mutually ex-
clusive roles must never be assigned to the same user simultaneously, e.g., a bank
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Figure 5.1: Role-based access control model
employee cannot be assigned, at the same time, the roles Supervisor and Manager .
- Dynamic SoD (DSoD) This class of policies takes the dynamics of the system execu-
tion into account for managing roles and role membership. Four variations of dynamic
SoD are distinguished in the literature:
Simple Dynamic SoD (SDSoD) two mutually exclusive roles must never be acti-
vated by a user at the same time, e.g., a bank employee can be statically assigned
both roles Teller and FinacialClerk , but cannot activate them simultaneously.
Object-Based SoD (ObjDSoD) a user can activate two exclusive roles at the same
time, but he cannot act upon the same object via both roles. E.g., if a user in LAP
can be Supervisor and Teller , then he would be able to execute the operations of
the role Teller and verify his own work using the Supervisor role. For example,
an ObjDSoD constraint in the loan application example may state that the user
can activate the role Supervisor and Teller at the same time as long as he does
not act on the same loan application object.
Operational SoD (OpDSoD) a user can activate two mutually exclusive roles at
the same time, but cannot have all required authorizations to execute all tasks
in a workflow process. For instance, the critical sub-processes (e.g., enterAppli-
cationData, verifyRating, verifyTransfer) cannot be executed by the same em-
ployee.
Operational Object-Based SoD (OpObjDSoD) combines operational and object-
based SoD; a user can activate two exclusive roles at the same time and can have
the authorizations to execute all tasks in a workflow process, as long as these
tasks do not act upon the same object.
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5.2.3 Delegation
Delegation [54] is a further extension of the basic RBAC that allows users to assign all or
a part of their permissions to other users. For example, when a manager takes a vacation,
he may assign some of his permissions to his assistants so that they can carry out his
tasks. Also, many projects require the collaboration of different people, which means that
delegating certain permissions is necessary to allow such collaborations. In the rest of this
chapter, we call the user who performs the delegation task “delegator”, and the user who
receives the access right “delegatee”. Two types of delegation can be distinguished:
• User-to-User (U2U for short) the delegator can delegate his rights at the same time
to a single user or a set of users.
• User-to-Role (U2R for short) the delegator delegates his rights to a role (i.e. all
users assigned to this role).
Several delegation characteristics have been defined on top of RBAC policy:
• The totality characteristic leads to two types: partial and total delegation. In
the first one, called also permission delegation, the delegator delegates a part of his
individual access permissions. In the second, called role delegation, the delegator
delegates his role, which allows the delegatee to act in this role.
• The monotonicity characteristic refers to whether roles/permissions are kept after
delegation or not. Two types of delegation exist based on this characteristic: grant and
transfer delegation. In the grant delegation, the delegator maintains the permissions
that he delegated after the delegation step. In the transfer delegation, the delegator
gives up the delegated permissions after the delegation step.
• The level of delegation defines whether the delegated role/permission can be fur-
ther delegated. The single-step delegation means that the delegated right cannot
be delegated another time in the future. The multi-step delegation means that the
delegated right can be delegated many times.
5.3 Case Study: A Loan Approval Process
To illustrate our approach, we consider a simple loan approval process (LAP) in a bank
(inspired from [172]). We first describe the different steps in that process in an informal
manner and then define the associated user roles such as teller, financial clerk, supervisor,
manager, and customer.
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1. Initial loan application (Enter application data): In the first step, a teller interacts
with the customer to identify the loan program for which he qualifies and can apply.
The teller also verifies the financial situation of the customer (e.g., account type,
income, liabilities, assets, etc.) and checks the documents provided together with the
application. If the application is complete and accurate the loan approval process will
be started.
2. Rating process (Check internal rating – Check external rating – Verify rating):
In this step, two types of rating are performed based on the application and the
documents provided with it, the credit history of the customer, and other external
information. The first step, which is about internal rating, is done by one or more
financial clerks FinancialClerk to verify whether the customer financial situation is
acceptable for the loan program he is applying for. The second rating is the external
rating, in which a bank employee in the role Teller interacts with some external agency
to check whether the customer has financial problems with other banks or companies
such as unpaid bills, etc. In the third step, an employee in the role Supervisor verifies
whether the internal and external rating steps were done appropriately in order to
avoid errors and prevent the risk of fraud.
3. Bank decision (Take decision): Based on the results of the internal and external
ratings, and the level of risk defined by the Supervisor , a decision is made on the
loan application. If the loan application is approved, a supervisor gives the order to
create the contract and proceed with the signature steps; otherwise the process will
be canceled.
4. Contract signature (Sign customer contract – Sign manager contract): After the
loan application has been approved, a contract document is prepared and sent to the
manager , who is the bank legal representative and to the customer for signature.
5. Loan closing (Transfer money – Verify transfer): In this step, the teller who entered
the loan application data transfers the approved amount of money to the customer.
To eliminate any possibility of error an employee, belonging to the supervisor role,
verifies this money transfer step.
In the rest of this chapter, we will use this case study to explain the formal specification
and the runtime enforcement of separation of duties and delegation policies.
5.4 The Approach in a Nutshell
We applied the Seven-pro approach to access control policies. The instantiation of the
approach in this context gave rise to a three-steps approach for the development of secure
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applications. We show this approach in Figure 5.2. The approach supports the specification
and enforcement of role-based access control, separation of duties and delegation policies.
The security designer uses TemporalZ to formally specify the RBAC policy and the
different policies and constraints on top of it. Then, he verifies the consistency of the formal
specification by using the tool Z-EVES for theorem proving. To facilitate this specification
task, we proposed some specification patterns for structuring the whole specification and
for formally specifying separation of duty properties.
After that, the application developer implements the functional code of the application
using Java. The functional code does not contain any logic for authorization, i.e., if the
application implements a certain workflow process then any user will be able to execute any
task in the workflow. In addition, the implementation of the application should conform to
the specification, i.e., all classes, methods, and fields that are mentioned in the specification
should be implemented.
Once both the application logic is implemented and the security policies are specified,
the developer can use our aspect generator tool to generate the security module of the
application. The tool translates the formally specified authorization policies in TemporalZ
to separate Alpha aspects. At runtime, these aspects will be triggered at appropriate
points during the execution of the application and the respective advice will enforce the
specified security policies.
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Figure 5.2: Specifying and enforcing access control policies
74
5.5. Specification of Access Control Policies
5.5 Specification of Access Control Policies
In this section, we detail the formal specification and verification of the separation-of-duties
properties and delegation policies on the top of role-based access control policy. We used
TemporalZ as a domain specific specification language for expressing access control policies.
5.5.1 Formal language: TemporalZ
TemporalZ [167] integrates linear temporal logic into the Z framework. We formally define
the syntax and the semantics of TemporalZ. First, we define the syntax of the temporal
formulas, which combine temporal operators and security predicates that are required to
specify temporal properties. As shown in Figure 5.3, a TemporalZ formula is either (a)
a domain specific predicate (DSPredicate), or (b) constructed from other formulas using
the temporal operators: 2(always), 3(eventually), ©(next), −2(up till now), −3(previously),
©−(atlast), U (until), and S (since).
Formula ::= DSPredicate
| 2〈〈Formula〉〉 | 3〈〈Formula〉〉 | ©〈〈Formula〉〉
| −2〈〈Formula〉〉 | −3〈〈Formula〉〉 | ©−〈〈Formula〉〉
| U 〈〈Formula × Formula〉〉
| S 〈〈Formula × Formula〉〉
Figure 5.3: Syntax of TemporalZ
The semantics of these formulas is defined as an evaluation according to a temporal
model presented below. This model is specified as a function which assigns a time t to the
set of specific predicates that hold at t. We formalize this by writing Time for a natural
number denoting the current time and Model for the function that maps each point in time
to a finite set of formulas.
Time == x : N
Model == Time → FFormula
We define three axiomatic functions that allow the evaluation of temporal formulas at
different abstraction levels. EvalMT interprets each formula at a given point in time t , using
the temporal model m. EvalMT evaluates domain-specific predicates without temporal
operators to True (E1), if, according to m, the predicate holds at t. For composed formulas,
a variant of EvalMT is defined for each temporal operator; for brevity, only the evaluation
of formulas composed with eventually 3 (E2) is shown below.
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EvalMT : P(Formula ×Model × Time)
∀ dsp : DSPredicate;m : Model ;t : Time [E1]
• EvalMT (dsp,m, t)⇔ dsp ∈ m(t)
∀ f : Formula;m : Model ;t : Time
• EvalMT ((3(f )),m, t)⇔ [E2]
(∃ t1 : Time | t1 ≥ t • EvalMT (f ,m, t1)
. . .
Then, we generalize our evaluation by abstracting away the time parameter and obtain
a new function that evaluates temporal formulas according to the model as shown below.
EvalM : P(Formula ×Model)
∀ f : Formula;m : Model • EvalM (f ,m) [E3]
⇔ (∀ t : Time • EvalMT (f ,m, t))
After that, we define a second generalization by abstracting away the model parameter
and we obtain the following evaluation function.
Eval : PFormula
∀ f : Formula • Eval(f )⇔ (∀m : Model • EvalM (f ,m)) [E4]
Finally, we define equivalence relationships between each temporal operator and its
evaluation definition as shown below for the temporal operators Eventually ([E5]) and
Until([E6]). This logical equivalence allows us to specify the temporal constraints in a
more convenient way and facilitates their translation to code.
∀ f : Formula • Eval(3f )⇔ 3f [E5]
∀ f , g : Formula • Eval(U (f , g))⇔ f U g [E6]
. . .
5.5.2 TemporalZ for Access Control policies
We use TemporalZ for the formal specification of the RBAC policy and stateful access
control policies such as the separation-of-duty and delegation policies. For that purpose, we
extend the syntactic and semantic definition from the previous Section with domain-specific
security predicates. The syntactic definition of these predicates is shown in Figure 5.4
whereas their semantic definition is shown in Figure 5.5, using the evaluation function
EvalMT ([E2]).
The predicate include(u,r) (Figure 5.5, E7) tells whether the user u is one of the users
that exist in the current RBAC system, is assigned to the role r.
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DSPredicate ::= include〈〈USER × ROLE 〉〉 | active〈〈USER × ROLE 〉〉
| execOp〈〈USER × ROLE ×OPERATION 〉〉
| execOpObj 〈〈USER × ROLE ×OPERATION ×OBJECT 〉〉
| execSeqOp〈〈USER × seq OPERATION 〉〉
| execSeqOpObj 〈〈USER × seq OPERATION ×OBJECT 〉〉
Figure 5.4: Syntax of security predicates
The predicate active(u,r) (Figure 5.5, E8), verifies that the user u has activated the
role r, i.e., the user should be belonging already to the role r (defined using the predicate
include) and should have connected to that role within a session s (defined using the relation
UserSession). In the implementation phase, the activation of a session in a specific role is
implemented by the fact that the user executes for the first time an operation belonging to
this role.
Figure 5.5, E9, defines the semantics of the domain specific predicate execOp(u, r, op).
This predicate verifies whether the user u has already the access to execute the operation
op. The user u should be already a member of the role r and can active it (defined by the
predicate include). This role r should contain the operation op (defined using the relation
RoleOperation).
The predicate execOpObj(u, r, op, obj) (Figure 5.5, E10) refines the predicate execOp
by checking whether the user u can execute the operation op with the object obj as pa-
rameter. In addition to the constraints defined for the predicate execOp, the the object obj
should be specified as an input parameter for the operation op (defined using the relation
OperationObject).
The predicate execSeqOp (Figure 5.5, E11) introduces the concept of an ordered oper-
ation sequence. The predicate execSeqOp(u,sop) tells whether the user u can execute the
sequence of operations sop in the order defined by the sequence. The user u, belonging to
any role, should first have the access to execute all operations of the sequence sop (using
the predicate execOp). Second the execution of these operations should be conforms to
the mentioned order in the sequence, using future and past temporal operators. i.e., the
operation with the order (i) denoted by Sop(i) cannot be executed only after the execution
of the operation with the order (i-1) denoted by Sop(i-1).
The predicate execSeqOpObj(u,sop,obj) (Figure 5.5, E12) refines the predicate execSeqOp
to express that all operations are executed on the same object obj. Instead of using the
predicate execOp to verify if the user has the access to execute the sequence operations,
execOpObj is used to ensure in addition that this operation can be executed on the object
obj.
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E7: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;r : ROLE
• EvalMT ((include(u, r)),m, t)⇔
(∃ system : RBAC • u ∈ system.users
∧ r ∈ system.roles ∧ u ∈ system.RoleUser(| {r} |))
E8: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;r : ROLE •
∃ s : SESSION • EvalMT ((active(u, r)),m, t)⇔
(∀ system : RBAC • EvalMT ((include(u, r)),m, t)
∧ s ∈ system.sessions ∧ s ∈ system.UserSession(| {u} |)
∧ s ∈ system.RoleSession(| {r} |))
E9: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;r : ROLE ;
op : OPERATION • EvalMT ((execOp(u, r , op)),m, t)⇔
(∀ system : RBAC • EvalMT ((active(u, r)),m, t)
∧ op ∈ system.operations ∧ op ∈ system.RoleOperation(| {r} |))
E10: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;r : ROLE ;
op : OPERATION ;obj : OBJECT
• EvalMT ((execOpObj (u, r , op, obj )),m, t)
⇔ (∀ system : RBAC • EvalMT ((execOp(u, r , op)),m, t)
∧ obj ∈ system.objects ∧ obj ∈ system.OperationObject(| {op} |))
E11: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;Sop : seq OPERATION
• EvalMT ((execSeqOp(u,Sop)),m, t)
⇔ (∀ i : N | 1 ≤ i ≤ #Sop
• (∃ r : ROLE • EvalMT ((3(execOp(u, r , (Sop(i))))),m, t)))
∧ (∀ i : N | 1 < i ≤ #Sop
• ((∃ r1 : ROLE • EvalMT ((execOp(u, r1, (Sop(i)))),m, t))
⇒ (∃ r2 : ROLE • EvalMT ((−3(execOp(u, r2, (Sop(i − 1))))),m, t))))
E12: ∀m : Model ;t : Time • ∀ u : USER;Sop : seq OPERATION ;
obj : OBJECT • EvalMT ((execSeqOpObj (u,Sop, obj )),m, t)
⇔ (∀ i : N | 1 ≤ i ≤ #Sop
• (∃ r : ROLE • EvalMT ((3(execOpObj (u, r , (Sop(i)), obj ))),m, t)))
∧ (∀ i : N | 1 < i ≤ #Sop
• ((∃ r1 : ROLE • EvalMT ((execOpObj (u, r1, (Sop(i)), obj )),m, t))
⇒ (∃ r2 : ROLE • EvalMT ((−3(execOpObj (u, r2, (Sop(i − 1)), obj ))),m, t))))
Figure 5.5: Semantics of security predicates
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The proposed specification language TemporalZ is well suited to specify access con-
trol policies for several reasons: Set theoretic and predicate logic foundations of Z directly
support the expression of RBAC concepts such as roles, rights, and related constraints.
Moreover, the use of LTL temporal operators in TemporalZ allows expressing temporal
constraints on system behavior in a declarative way. Further, complementing the general-
purpose elements of Z and LTL with domain-specific predicates increases the level of abstrac-
tion of the specifications and makes them more declarative. Finally, tools for verification
and theorem proving such as Z-EVES [139] can be used to verify the consistency of the
formally specified security policies.
5.5.3 Specification of the RBAC
RBAC
roles : FROLE ;users : FUSER;sessions : PSESSION
operations : FOPERATION ;objects : FOBJECT
RoleOperation : ROLE ↔ OPERATION [D1]
RoleUser : ROLE ↔ USER [D2]
RoleSession : ROLE ↔ SESSION [D3]
UserSession : USER ↔ SESSION [D4]
OperationObject : OPERATION ↔ OBJECT [D5]
dom RoleOperation ⊆ roles [C1]
ran RoleOperation ⊆ operations [C2]
dom RoleUser ⊆ roles
ran RoleUser ⊆ users
. . .
∀ u : users;r : roles • ∃ s : sessions • (r , u) ∈ RoleUser
⇔ (u, s) ∈ UserSession ∧ (r , s) ∈ RoleSession [C3]
. . .
Figure 5.6: Specification of the RBAC model
The specification of the basic RBAC system in TemporalZ is shown in Figure 5.6. The
upper part defines sets of roles, users, operations, objects, and sessions, as well as relations
between them. Each role has a set of operations associated with it, defined by RoleOperation
[D1]. A user should have the role, as defined by the relation RoleUser [D2], to be allowed
to execute the operations of that role. A session is a mapping of a user to a subset of his
roles as defined by ([D3] and [D4]). The relation OperationObject [D5] maps operations to
objects they operate on. The lower part of Figure 5.6 defines constraints on RBAC model
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in terms of first-order predicates: For example, [C1] and [C2] define the ranges and domains
of the relations defined in the upper part. [C3] specifies that a user establishes a session
during which the user activate some roles that he is assigned.
In SystemConstraints schema, the designer can specify the constraints that depends
on the application. Figure 5.7 defines constraints on LAP that restrict the number of
(a) roles [C4], (b) users assigned to the role Teller [C5], and (c) operations belonging to
a role [C6]. We can also define other types of constraints, e.g., an operation cannot be
included in more than one role [C7].
SystemConstraints
RBAC
#roles < 10 [C4]
#(RoleUser(| {Teller} |)) ≤ 5 [C5]
∀ r : roles • #(RoleOperation(| {r} |)) ≤ 7 [C6]
∀ p : operations;r1, r2 : roles | r1 6= r2
• p 6∈ RoleOperation(r1) ∨ p 6∈ RoleOperation(r2) [C7]
Figure 5.7: Specification of the system constraints
Each administrative operation, e.g., assigning a role to a user, is specified by an operation
schema, which defines its input parameters and its pre- and post-conditions. For example,
in LAP, we can specify that a new user cannot be a member in any role or any special role,
as shown in Figure 5.8.
assignUserToRole
∆RBAC
u? : USER;r? : ROLE
∀ r : role • (r , u?) 6∈ RoleUser [C8]
users ′ = users ∪ {u?}
RoleUser ′ = RoleUser ∪ {r?, u?}
. . .
Figure 5.8: Specification of the prerequisite constraints
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5.5.4 Specification of SoD Properties
We proposed some specification patterns using TemporalZ to facilitate and to structure the
specification of SoD properties. Similar properties (having the same SoD type) are specified
in a Z schema which refines the RBAC specification. The declarative part of this schema
contains the name of the RBAC specification schema while the predicative part contains
the specification of the SoD properties. We propose a pattern for each SoD type.
The specification pattern for static SoD is shown in the following Z schema. This
pattern uses the predicate include defined in (Figure 5.5, E7) to state that a user USER
can be a member only of one of two exclusive roles (Role1 and Role2) at the same time.
The predicate ExclusiveRole is used only in static SoD to ease the translation of the SoD
property to Alpha code and to avoid the conflict between SoD and delegation policies.
Static SoD Pattern
RBAC model schema
∀Role1,Role2 : ROLE • ExclusiveRole(Role1,Role2)⇔ ∀ u : USER
• ¬ include(u,Role1) ∨ ¬ include(u,Role2)
For example, the Z schema above specifies that an employee in LAP (cf. Section 5.3)
cannot be a Manager and a Supervisor at the same time.
StaticSoD
SystemConstraints
ExclusiveRole(Supervisor ,Manager)⇔ ∀ u : USER
• ¬ include(u,Supervisor) ∨ ¬ include(u,Manager)
The specification pattern Dynamic SoD Pattern uses the predicate active (Figure 5.5,
E8) to state that an employee can be a member in two roles Role1 and Role2, but not
simultaneously.
Dynamic SoD Pattern
RBAC model schema
∀ u : USER;Role1,Role2 : ROLE • 2(¬ (active(u,Role1) ∧ active(u,Role2)))
We applied dynamic separation of duty to the Teller and the FinancialClerk roles:
a teller (resp. financial clerk) employee cannot execute any operations belonging to the
financial clerk (resp. teller) role.
DynamicSoD
SystemConstraints
∀ u : USER • 2(¬ (active(u, teller) ∧ active(u,financialClerk)))
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Using the predicates execOp and execOpObj (Figure 5.5, E9 and E10), the specification
ObjectBasedSoD states that a user who has executed the Operation1 in the Role1 can never
in the future execute the Operation21 and the Operation22 in the Role2 on the same object
obj.
Object Based SoD Pattern
RBAC model schema
∀ u : USER;obj : OBJECT ;Role1,Role2 : ROLE •
2((execOpObj (u,Role1,Operation1, obj ))
⇒ (¬ (3((execOpObj (u,Role2,Operation21, obj ))
∧ (execOpObj (u,Role2,Operation22, obj ))))))
The following TemporalZ schema presents an example of the specification of object-
based SoD on the LAP case study. An employee can belong to the roles FinancialClerk
and Supervisor at the same time. However, if he has executed checkInternalRating in the
FinancialClerk role, he can never in the future execute verifyRating in the Supervisor role
for the same customer cst.
ObjectBasedSoD
SystemConstraints
∀ u : USER;cst : Customer •
2((execOpObj (u,financialClerk , checkInternalRating , cst))
⇒ (¬ (3(execOpObj (u, supervisor , verifyRating , cst)))))
The specification OperationalSoD uses execSeqOp (Figure 5.5, E11) to prohibit an em-
ployee from executing the critical sequence (Operation1,Operation2,Operation3). The spec-
ification OperationalObjectBasedSoD uses execSeqOpObj (Figure 5.5, E12) to disallow exe-
cuting the operations of a subprocess on the same object obj.
Operational SoD Patterns
RBAC model schema
SeqOp : seq OPERATION
∀ u : USER | SeqOp = 〈Operation1,Operation2,Operation3〉
• 2(¬ (execSeqOp(u,SeqOp)))
∀ u : USER;obj : Object | SeqOp = 〈Operation1,Operation2,Operation3〉
• 2(¬ (execSeqOpObj (u,SeqOp, obj )))
The specification OperationalSoD, on the LAP case study, prohibits an employee from
executing the critical sub-process (enterApplicationData, verifyRating, verifyTransfer). The
82
5.5. Specification of Access Control Policies
specification OperationalObjectBasedSoD disallows executing the operations of the rating
sub-process (checkInternalRating, checkExternalRating, verifyRating) on the same customer
application ctr.
OperationalSoD
SystemConstraints
SeqOp : seq OPERATION
∀ u : USER |
SeqOp = 〈enterApplicationData, verifyRating , verifyTransfer〉
• 2(¬ (execSeqOp(u,SeqOp)))
OperationalObjectBasedSoD
SystemConstraints
SqOO : seq OPERATION
∀ u : USER;ctr : Customer |
SqOO = 〈checkInternalRating , checkExternalRating , verifyRating〉
• 2(¬ (execSeqOpObj (u,SqOO , ctr)))
5.5.5 Specification of Delegation Policies
The specification of the delegation policy is composed of two parts. In the first one, we
extend the RBAC model with the delegation concepts. We specify the different types and
characteristics of delegation (cf. Section 5.2.3) using a Z schema and we include this schema
in the defined RBAC policy by means of schema inclusion. In the second part, we define the
delegation operations that correspond to the actions executed by the delegator at runtime.
Specification of the delegation system
We specified user-to-user (U2U) and user-to-role (U2R) delegations combined with per-
mission delegation (PD) and role delegation (RD). We obtained four types of delegation
(i.e., U2U4PD, U2U4RD, U2R4PD, and U2R4RD) which are specified in the Z schema
RBACDelegation which is refined from the RBAC schema. We also specified monotonicity
and delegation-level characteristics.
In the declaration part, we specify the relations that connect the delegator, the delegated
permission/role and delegating user/role. In the constraints part, we specify the constraints
that should be satisfied during the delegation operation. As an example, for U2R4PD
(Figure 5.9), the delegator should not be a member of delegating role and the delegated
operation should not be already assigned in the delegating role.
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RBACDelegation
RBAC
U 2R4PD : USER × ROLE ×OPERATION ↔ ROLE
TransferPD : USER ↔ OPERATION
MultiStepPD : USER ↔ OPERATION
GrantPD : USER ↔ OPERATION
SingleStepPD : USER ↔ OPERATION
...
∀ u1 : users;r1 : roles;op1 : operations;r2 : roles
| (r2, op1) 6∈ RoleOperation ∧ (r2, u1) 6∈ RoleUser
• ((u1, r1, op1), r2) ∈ U 2R4PD
...
Figure 5.9: Specification of the delegation
Specification of the Delegation Operations
We specify the delegation operations that correspond to the actions that the delegator
executes at runtime. The designer should specify each delegation operation by means of
a Z operation schema and define the input parameters and pre- and post-conditions. The
pre-conditions are constituted by the constraints defined in the operation schema and the
constraints related to the operations which are defined in the delegation schema. Delegation
operations are executed only if their preconditions are satisfied. The post-conditions are the
conditions that should be satisfied after executing the delegation operation. The designer
should first update the delegation system by defining the new state of the delegation relation.
Second, the designer should choose the type of delegation by updating the relations dealing
with the delegation characteristics: monotonicity and delegation level.
For illustration, Figure 5.10 presents the operation schema U 2R PD , which specifies
the operation user to role for permission delegation. The defined preconditions verify if the
delegator is allowed to delegate the corresponding permissions. First, we verify that the
role containing the delegator and the delegating role are not defined as exclusive roles in
static separation of duties property (cf. Section 5.5.4) [PreC1]. Second, we verify that the
user (delegator) is the owner of the delegated permissions [PreC2], or he already received,
in a multi-step manner, the corresponding permissions or any whole role containing that
permissions [PreC3, PreC4]. We verify also that the delegator does not delegate, in a transfer
manner, the corresponding permissions and any whole role containing that permissions
[PreC5, PreC6]. For the post-conditions [PostC1, PostC2], the designer updates the system
state and specifies that the current operation is transferred in a grant manner.
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U 2R PD
∆RBACDelegation
u1? : USER;op1? : OPERATION
r1? : ROLE
r2? : ROLE
(r1?, r2?) ∈ ExclusiveRole [PreC1]
(r1?, op1?) ∈ RoleOperation [PreC2]
∨ ((u1?, op1?) ∈ MultiStepPD [PreC3]
∨ (∀ r : roles | (r , op1?) ∈ RoleOperation
• (u1?, r) ∈ MultiStepRD) [PreC4]
((u1?, op1?) 6∈ TransferPD [PreC5]
∨ (u1?, r1?) 6∈ TransferRD) [PreC6]
U 2R4PD ′ = U 2R4PD ∪ {((u1?, r1?, op1?), r2?)} [PostC1]
GrantPD ′ = GrantPD ′ ∪ {(u1?, op1?)} [PostC2]
Figure 5.10: Specification of the delegation operation
5.5.6 Ensuring Consistency and Conflict Resolution
To ensure consistency, we verify that the specification of the base RBAC system and its
constraints does not contain any contradiction. We do so by using Z-EVES to prove an
initialization theorem [192], which states that there exists a state SystemInit of the RBAC
system and the RBAC extension for delegation that fulfills all constraints.
Theorem ConsistencyTheorem
∃SystemConstraints • SystemInit
Using Theorem proving, we verify also the preservation of the consistency of the RBAC
delegation system after a delegation operation, using a pre-condition theorem [128]. One
may still argue that SoD constraints can introduce other inconsistencies. However, as we
use a prohibition-based approach [5] (defined by the axioms ¬ ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ¬ ψ . . . ),
SoD properties are safety properties and therefore cannot produce any inconsistencies into
an already consistent RBAC system. If a SoD constraint is evaluated to True, the user
is prohibited from executing the respective operation. Another reason for choosing the
prohibition-based approach is that we cannot force the users to do certain actions to comply
with the constraints; we can only prohibit them from executing operations that may break
the constraints.
The specification of the separation-of-duty properties on top of RBAC can conflict with
a model allowing for the delegation of authority through role and permission transfer [171].
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As a simple example, assume that the users u1, u2 already hold the roles manager and
supervisor respectively. We specify static separation of duty between these two roles, i.e.,
the two roles must never be assigned to the same user. The delegation of the role or part of
the role of the user u1 to the user u2 would result in a conflict with the separation-of-duty
property.
Our solution is based on stating that separation of duties properties always have prece-
dence over other properties [171]. There are two types of conflicts that should be detected
and resolved. The first conflict is related to the static separation of duties (as the example
presented above). We propose to verify before each delegation operation that the role of the
delegator and the delegated role are not defined as mutually exclusive roles. We can verify
this through a pre-condition defined in the delegation operation Z schema (see [PreC1] in
Figure 5.10 for the LAP example).
For dynamic separation of duties, we present as an example the simple dynamic SoD
(the solution concept is the same for the other dynamic SoD). Suppose that we define a
simple dynamic SoD constraint between the role r1 and r2. At runtime, a user u1 delegates
his role r1 to the user u2 that belongs to the role r2. A conflict is detected, the user u2
can execute the operation of the role r1 and r2 at the same time. We propose a solution on
the implementation level: we can verify in all SoD properties that the user does not receive
the permission to execute the corresponding action by a delegation operation.
5.6 Aspect-based Enforcement of Access Control Policies
In this section, we present the mapping of the formally specified security policies into
enforcement aspects. First, we present the mapping of TemporalZ predicates into domain-
specific Alpha predicates used in the pointcuts of enforcement aspects. Then, we outline
the generation schema of aspects that enforce SoD policies and also of aspects that en-
force delegation policies. We developed a prototype implementation that incorporates the
presented mapping and generates enforcement aspects from the formal specification and
deploys them into the Alpha runtime. The prototype is a proof of concept: Efficiency
issues are not addressed in this version.
5.6.1 Aspect Language: Alpha
The enforcement of access-control policies is an example of crosscutting concerns. In a
conventional implementation, individual application’s execution actions that are relevant
for the enforcement of a security property, e.g., calls to assignUserToRole in LAP, may
be brought to being by the execution of code scattered all over the application’s module
structure. If we want, e.g., to enforce the ObjDSoD property stated in ObjectBasedSoD
(Section 5.5.4), a check needs to be performed before any call to verifyRating(cst) to
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make sure that (a) the user performing the operation is in the Supervisor role (basic RBAC)
and (b) there has not been a call to checkInternalRating(cst) by the same user in the role
FinancialClerk. To enable such reasoning about the past of the execution, some bookkeeping
needs to be further performed after each checkInternalRating call.
The aspect-oriented programming language Alpha [156] uses logic queries (a subset
of valid Prolog queries [187]) as pointcuts to reason about related actions in the program
execution. Alpha has a rich joinpoint model: its pointcut queries are run against several
models of the program execution including the static program structure (AST), the complete
history of the execution (execution trace), and the object store at each moment in execution.
The availability of the execution trace is one of the features that distinguishes Alpha
from other AO languages. The execution trace can be thought of as a list containing repre-
sentations of all joinpoints that occurred in the execution of the program so far. In Alpha,
this list structure is only implicit. Instead, all joinpoint representations carry a time stamp
which corresponds to their position in that listing. There are different types of joinpoints
corresponding to different types of execution events of an object-oriented program, such as
method calls, or field accesses. For each type of joinpoint, there is a relation that has a
time stamp as its first argument, the joinpoint specific information as further arguments.
Method calls, e.g., are stored in the database as pairs of calls/5 (i.e., |/n| specifies the
arity of the relation.) and endCall/3 facts denoting the beginning respectively the end
of a method call. For example, calls(ID,ExpID, Receiver, Method, Arg) describes a
method call execution action that occurred at time stamp ID, the method Method is called
on the receiver Receiver with Arg as the input argument; ExpID identifies the lexical po-
sition of the expression that caused the action. The unary relation now/1 has – at every
point in the execution – only one fact in the database that contains the current time stamp
as its argument. The relation before/2: T→ T holds if the first time stamp corresponds to
an execution action that occurred before the one corresponding to the second time stamp.
Another important model is the store model, which can be used to query arbitrary rela-
tions between objects: the store/3 relation ranges over all possible combinations of objects
and fields in these objects by defining a relation between object, field name and their value.
Using these relations, pointcut queries can be built-up by the usual Prolog connectives: and
(,), or (or, ;), and negation as failure (\+). As in most Prolog dialects, identifiers starting
with uppercase letters are considered variables, whereas all names starting with lowercase
letters or enclosed by single quotes (’) are considered constants.
The following properties of Alpha are especially useful in the context of encoding
stateful access control policies such SoD policies into aspects: First, the availability of
the execution trace gives access to all relevant execution actions and associated data in
a natural way. Furthermore, the ability to add or remove facts during runtime allows a
flexible binding between the data objects and the elements in our domain. For example,
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information about the relation between users and roles can be added and removed to the
runtime database when this information changes. Second, the pointcut language allows to
precisely and declaratively specify temporal relations between actions and relations between
objects that are part of or related to these actions. This avoids the need for manually
implementing the bookkeeping logic for relating this data. Third, the possibility to define
new predicates/relations in Alpha allows building up an abstraction of predicates specific
for our domain – access control policies.
5.6.2 Mapping TemporalZ Predicates to Domain Specific Alpha Predicates
A library of domain specific predicates has been defined in Alpha to facilitate the process
of mapping formal specifications to enforcement aspects. These predicates are used in
the pointcuts of these aspects. The library includes a Prolog predicate for each temporal
operator; RBAC and SoD specific predicates are also part of the library.
The temporal operator −3 is mapped to the Prolog predicate before/2. The opera-
tor 3 is mapped to the Prolog predicate eventually/2 which verifies that the first time
stamp corresponds to an action after the action corresponding to the second time stamp.
Predicates justBefore/2 and next/2 correspond to ©− and ©, respectively. The latter are
restricted versions of before/2, respectively eventually/2: not only does the first time
stamp correspond to an action before, respectively after, the second time stamp; there is
also no action in-between. The operators U and S are mapped to until/2 and since/2
predicates, respectively. There is no need for a predicate corresponding to 2; the use of
time stamp variables in Prolog predicates states that a property should hold at any time,
i.e., always.
There is also a mapping of the logical conjunctives, e.g., the formal conjunction operation
(∧) is mapped to the and operator (,) of Prolog. Any parameter declared in the formal
specification with the quantifier for all (∀) is translated to a Prolog variable.
An example of an RBAC/SoD specific Alpha predicate is the callingUser/2 predicate.
It makes the user who called an operation accessible. Its implementation is application
specific; it depends on the way that user information is stored in the underlying business
code.
Another predicate is verifyRoleAccess/3 which checks that a user belongs to a role
that contains an operation using the predicates roleUser/2 and roleOperation/2. These
predicates define the relation between roles and users, respectively roles and operations.
5.6.3 Aspects for SoD Properties
For each formally specified SoD property, an Alpha aspect is generated. This aspect uses
an around advice to skip the execution if the property does not hold.
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Simple Static SoD
The generation of aspects for SSoD properties maps each pair of predicates Exclusive-
Role(r1,r2) and include(user,r1) to the following conjunction of Alpha predicates: now(T),
calls(T, , ,assignUserToRole,<User,r1>), roleUser(r2,User). For illustration, the as-
pect generated from the specification StaticSoD in Section 5.5.4 is shown in Listing 5.1.
The pointcut matches in two cases (note the use of the Prolog operator or). First (lines 3–
4), assignUserToRole is called to assign an arbitrary user (the parameter User) the role
manager, while that user has the role supervisor (see the query roleUser in line 4). Second
(lines 5–6), assignUserToRole is called to assign an arbitrary user the role supervisor,
while that user is a member of the role manager (see the query roleUser in line 6). If none
of these execution states is reached, the SSoD property is violated; hence, the around advice
displays an error and skips the execution of the intercepted method (no call to proceed).
1 class SimpleStaticSoD {
2 void around
3 now(T), calls(T,_,_,assignUserToRole,<User,manager>),
4 roleUser(supervisor,User);
5 now(T), calls(T,_,_,assignUserToRole,<User,supervisor>),
6 roleUser(manager,User).
7 {
8 System.out.print("Violation of a SSoD property");
9 }
10 }
Listing 5.1: Aspect for SSoD
Simple Dynamic SoD
The generation of aspects for SDSoD properties maps the formal predicate active(u, r) to
the following conjunction of Alpha predicates:
calls(T, , ,Op, ),callingUser(T,u),verifyRoleAccess(u,r,Op). To verify a SDSoD prop-
erty for two exclusive roles r1, r2 for any user, the pointcut of the generated aspect should
be triggered whenever there is a pair of time stamps (T1,T2), such that operations Op1 and
Op2 are called by User at T1, respectively T2, whereby Op1 and Op2 are associated with roles
r1 and r2 respectively. If such a pair is found, and T1 or T2 denotes the current time stamp
(now(T1);now(T2)), a violation of the SDSoD constraint is found. If none of them denotes
the current time, the violation must have been found earlier. For illustration, Listing 5.2
shows the aspect generated from the specification DynamicSoD in Section 5.5.4, which
states that any user that is a member of the two exclusive roles Teller and FinancialClerk
cannot activate them at the same time.
89
Specifying and Enforcing Access Control Policies
1 class SimpleDynamicSoD {
2 void around
3
4 %One of timestamps is the current time
5 (now(T1);now(T2)),
6
7 %Translate from the predicate active(User, teller)
8 calls(T1,_,_,Op1,_), callingUser(T1,User),
9 verifyRoleAccess(User,teller,Op1),
10
11 %Translate from active(User,financialclerk)
12 calls(T2,_,_,Op2,_), callingUser(T2,User),
13 verifyRoleAccess(User,financialClerk,Op2).
14 {
15 System.out.print("Violation of a SDSoD property");
16 }
17 }
Listing 5.2: Aspect for SDSoD
Object-Based SoD
The specifications of ObjSoD properties use the formal predicate execOpObj (u, r , op, obj ).
In Section 5.5.4, this predicate is used twice in ObjectBasedSoD (with concrete bindings of
op to checkInternalRating, respectively verifyRating and of r to financialClerk, respectively
supervisor). The evaluation of execOpObj (u, r , op, obj ) to true (E10 in Section 5.5.2) re-
quires that execOp(u, r , op) is evaluated to true for any obj in the set of objects on which
op operates (obj ∈ OperationObject(op)); The predicate execOp(u, r , op), in turn, is true if
active(u, r) is true and op is one of the operations assigned to r (E9 in Section 5.5.2). Fol-
lowing this reduction of the evaluation of execOpObj to active, the two uses of execOpObj
in ObjectBasedSoD are mapped to the conjunction of Alpha predicates shown e.g., in lines
4–6 and 8–10 of Listing 5.3. The condition obj ∈ OperationObject(op) used in execOpObj
is mapped to having the calls predicates in the pointcut explicitly relate op and obj .
This listing shows the aspect generated for the ObjectBasedSoD property specified in
Section 5.5.4: a user who has executed checkInternalRating as a FinancialClerk can never
in the future execute verifyRating for the same customer as a Supervisor . The pointcut is
triggered whenever a user in a supervisor role is about to verify the rating (at the present
time T2) and the same user has checked the internal rating of the same Customer as a
financial clerk at T1 in the past (eventually(T2,T1)); in this case, the advice signals a
violation and truncates the execution (no proceed).
Unlike the conjunction generated for active in Listing 5.2, which uses variables Op1
and Op2 to express that the corresponding SDSoD property holds for any pair Op1, Op2,
concrete operation names are used in the conjunction sequences in Listing 5.3 to reflect the
fact that execOpObj in ObjectBasedSoD refers to concrete operations. Also, in addition to
90
5.6. Aspect-based Enforcement of Access Control Policies
the User variable, the Customer variable is used in the calls predicate in Listing 5.3 to
express that the property should hold for any customer object.
1 class ObjDynamicSoD {
2 void around
3
4 calls(T1,_,_,checkInternalRating,Customer),
5 callingUser(T1,User),
6 verifyRoleAccess(User,financialClerk,checkInternalRating),
7
8 now(T2), calls(T2,_,_,verifyRating,Customer),
9 callingUser(T2,User),
10 verifyRoleAccess(User,supervisor,verifyRating),
11
12 %checkInternalRating is called before verifyRating
13 eventually(T2,T1).
14 {
15 System.out.print("Violation of a ObjDSoD property");
16 }
17 }
Listing 5.3: Aspect for ObjDSoD
Operational SoD
The generated aspect has a pointcut that verifies if the user is about to execute the last oper-
ation of a critical sequence of operations. For instance, given the sequence (enterApplicationData,
verifyRating, verifyTransfer) passed to the formal predicate execSeqOp in Operational-
SoD in Section 5.5.4, the pointcut shown in Listing 5.4 is generated. It is triggered on a call
to the last operation of the sequence and checks if the user has called the other operations
of that sequence in the respective order. In this case, a violation is signaled and the last
operation is not executed.
1 class OperatSoD {
2 void around
3
4 calls(T1,_,_,enterApplicationData,_),
5 callingUser(T1,User),
6 verifyAccess(User,enterApplicationData),
7
8 calls(T2,_,_,verifyRating,_),
9 callingUser(T2,User),
10 verifyAccess(User,verifyRating), eventually(T2,T1),
11
12 now(T3), calls(T3,_,_,verifyTransfer,_),
13 callingUser(T3,User),
14 verifyAccess(User,verifyTransfer), eventually(T3,T2)
15 {
16 System.out.print("Violation of a OpDSoD property");
17 }
18 }
Listing 5.4: Aspect for OpDSoD
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Operational Object-Based SoD
The generation of aspects for OpObjDSoD properties is similar to that for operational SoDs
except that the last parameter of the generated calls predicates is a variable rather than
unbound. This is to reflect that object-based operational SoD properties are specified for
any obj ∈ OBJECT . By using the same variable in all generated calls predicates, Prolog
unification ensures that the pointcut is triggered only when the critical sequence is executed
on the same object.
5.6.4 Aspects for Delegation Policy
There is one aspect for each delegation operation which enforces the corresponding pre-
conditions and delegation constraints. The pseudo code in Listing 5.5 shows the overall
structure of such an aspect.
The pointcut (line 2) is composed of the Alpha predicate calls that is used to intercept
calls to the method in the functional code which corresponds to the formally specified
delegation operation. The advice (lines 2–20) associated with the pointcut has the type
around, i. e., it is executed instead of the intercepted method calls.
1 class DelegationOperation {
2 void around calls (N, _, _, delegateOperation,obj){
3
4 //Evaluate pre-condition in operation schema
5 //Evaluate conditions in delegation schema
6 if (zOperatorMethod(parameters, systemState)){...}
7 if (constraint_i()) { ... }
8
9 //Evaluate all defined conditions
10 if (allConstraints) {
11 //Execute of the delegation Operation
12 proceed();
13 //Update post-conditions
14 updateSystemState();
15 }
16 else
17 {
18 //An exception is handled
19 }
20 }
21 public boolean constraint_i() { ... }
22 public void updateSystemState() { ... }
23 }
Listing 5.5: Template of the generated Alpha aspect
In the advice body, each Z constraint is translated to a conditional statement. In order
to easily translate the Z constraints to Java conditions, we implemented a Java library for
Z. It contains the implementation of the most used Z operators and mathematical objects
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as Java methods. Two types of conditions are generated depending on the Z constraints.
Constraints of the first type are simple conditions, generated from formal constraints with-
out quantification. These constraints are checked by calling the corresponding method in
the Java Z library zOperatorMethod (line 6), which takes the system state as parameter.
Helper methods, denotated by the constraint i, are generated for each formal constraint that
uses a quantification operator (lines 8 and 21).
If all generated conditions are fulfilled (line 10), the intercepted operation will be ex-
ecuted using the keyword proceed (line 12), which executes the intercepted method call.
Otherwise, the aspect prohibits the execution of the operation (lines 16–19). In addition,
the generated aspect comprises a method (line 22) to update the system state according to
the specification of the post-conditions. This method is called after the proceed when the
generated preconditions are fulfilled (line 14).
5.7 Related Work
We discuss next related work on the specification and the enforcement of access control
policies and especially works on RBAC, separation and duties and delegation policies.
5.7.1 Specification of Access Control Policies
Several works have addressed the specification of role-based access control using formal
methods and essentially using logic such as temporal logic [146, 172] or Z notation [1,
197]. Many other formal methods have been also used to specify access control likes Petri
Nets [174], graphs [119], process algebra [37], and automata [71,130,173].
To cover all aspects of access control policies, we use a new formal language called
TemporalZ, which is an extension of the Z notation with temporal operators. The advan-
tages of TemporalZ for specifying these policies are detailed in Section 5.5.2. Several works
proposed to extend Z with formal methods supporting temporal features, such as linear
temporal logic [62], temporal logic of action [127], interval temporal logic [40], etc.
The most related work to ours is that of Duke and Smith [62], which extends Z to
include temporal logic operators. Unlike our TemporalZ language, Duke and Smith [62]
just use temporal operators to reason about (possibly infinite) sequences of Z schema states,
where two consecutive states correspond to “before and after” states of an already specified
Z schema operation. In our work, we extend the Z mathematical notation with temporal
operators. Thus, temporal operators can be applied to any Z formula, which is not necessary
about Z states. Moreover, the semantics that we provide for temporal formulas within the
framework of Z enables us to use the existing Z tools for syntax and consistency checking
as well as theorem proving of TemporalZ specifications.
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Fidge [70] propose to specify timing requirements expressed in real time logic (RTL) in
Z specifications. He extends the Z notation with most of RTL operators. The proposed
approach is based on the execution history as defined in Duke’s work [62]. An event is
defined as an operation, or a state attribute becoming true or false. An occurrence function
is defined which returns for each event (i.e., input argument) the sequence of all time which
it occurred or the i th occurrence of the event (i.e. with i as second input argument). In
addition, a verification approach of real-time properties based on this extension is defined.
The proposed approach is related to our temporal model which defines for each time the set
of security predicates that hold at this time. Unlike our approach, no semantic definition
of the new language is proposed. In our temporal model and the evaluation functions, we
defined formally the semantics of our Z extension. In addition, we proposed a verification
approach of the temporal properties using Z theorem prover.
In the following, we concentrate on approaches, which are related to ours with respect
to the specifications of access control policies. These works use different formal languages
and methods.
Based on automata theory, Schneider [173] defined security policies that are enforceable
by execution monitoring. The author proposed security automata which are formed of Bu¨chi
automata that recognize safety properties. Bauer et al. [130] extended this idea by defining
edit automata which are formal machines that modify the program action via the operation
of sequence truncation, insertion and suppression of actions. Fong [71] defined the Shallow
History automata which track only the shallow history previously granted access events.
With this automata, it is still possible to express policies like the Chinese Wall policy [178].
These previous works are more theoretical and have not been applied for access control
policies. Also, they do not provide any rules and algorithms for translating specifications
to code. The work of Basin et al. [24] is more practical and proposes to specify security
automata using CSP-OZ.
Using temporal logic, Mossakowski et al. [146] specify RBAC and essentially dynamic
separation of duties. This work does not cover all RBAC constraints and it does not support
formal verification as no tool has been used for verification. Similar to this work, Schaad
et al. [172] propose a model-checking approach for analysis of delegation and revocation
in RBAC system as well as the formal specification of the different types of separation of
duties. In this approach, no verification approach is defined to verify the absence of the
contradiction between formal constrains. In contrast to these works, we use Z notation to
formally specify RBAC and delegation properties. In addition, we verify, with the Z/EVES
theorem prover, the consistency and other application specific properties.
Z notation [181] and the theorem prover tools provide an effective means for a precise
and unambiguous specification of secure software systems. In [1], the authors show formal Z
specifications of several flat RBAC models. They define formally the RBAC concepts (i.e.
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roles, permissions, principals,. . . ), the relationships between them, and some constraints
but they do not address the separation of duty properties. In [197], the authors specified
the RBAC model using Z and verified the consistency of the specified model using theorem
proving. This approach is similar to ours w.r.t. specification but it supports only the simple
static and dynamic SoD, which can be specified with Z notation as presented in our case
study. The other types of separation of duties, which require temporal constraints, are not
supported. We note also that the previous works do not address the translation of formal
specifications to code.
Using an extension of the pi calculus, Braghin et al. [37] define an RBAC scenario for
concurrent systems. This approach does not support the specification of SoD properties.
Compared to the pi calculus, TemporalZ is more declarative and can be translated to code
easier, because Z specifications are near to the implementation unlike other more abstract
formal languages.
Ahn and Sandhu developed the RSL 99 [6] language and its extension RSL 2000 [7]
language to specify the SoD properties. In these works, the authors describe the formal
syntax and semantics of this language by defining an automatic translation to a first-order
predicate logic called RFOPL. Moreover, the authors proposed a new form of static and
dynamic SoD by defining the set of roles, permissions, and users. In their work, the authors
are interested only in the simple separation of duties properties and they do not care about
the other constraints in role-based systems. Moreover, the defined language cannot be used
to specify the different types of SoD properties as it does not support the concept of object,
sequence and time of execution.
Unlike our proposal, these works do not present any mechanism to enforce the access
control properties in application code.
5.7.2 Enforcement of Access Control Policies
Several works focused on the development of the translation of specified access control to
code. Some works use UML and OCL for that purpose [23, 99, 190]. Others proposed a
new notation to define easily the access control requirements [7, 150].
The UML-based approaches use different extension mechanisms and various UML dia-
grams to model access-control constraints. The most related work to ours in that thrust
is the one of Basin et al. [23]. The authors propose a model-driven security approach to
specify access control authorization and they generate automatically the application model
including access control support. In that work, a new security modeling language is defined.
It combines system models and their security requirements using dialects. In addition, sev-
eral transformation functions are defined. The latter produce model elements that support
95
Specifying and Enforcing Access Control Policies
access control for distributed component-based applications and for web applications. How-
ever, only RBAC system constraints are addressed; temporal constraints (including sepa-
ration of duties) cannot be specified because of OCL limitations. Also, there is no support
to verify the consistency of the system and prove that the specification does not contain
any contradiction. At the implementation level, we generate modular and executable code
to enforce the RBAC constraints whilst the work in [23] generates an incomplete code for
some component model, which is tangled with the rest of the application code.
In [150] Neumann presented the design and implementation of an RBAC-service called
xoRBAC. This service provides a policy monitor for RBAC policies which can be applied to
applications providing C or Tcl linkage. xoRBAC is implemented with XOTcl. It supports
high-level modeling of roles, permissions and constraints, and provides RDF import/export
for access-control data. This approach supports context constraints, which makes it flexible
and dynamically extensible. This approach does not define a dedicated policy language for
specifying RBAC and separation of duties policies. No verification mechanism or tool can be
used to verify that no contradiction exists between constraints. The enforcement mechanism
works only for web-based mobile code that is implemented with an object-oriented scripting
language.
5.7.3 Access Control using Aspect-Oriented Techniques
Many works [51,158,180,188,194] profit from the advantages of aspect-oriented techniques
for modeling and enforcing access control policies in a modular way. In the following, we
present the most related works to ours.
In [188], Verhanneman et al. proposed an approach for enforcing context-based ac-
cess control policies. They implemented a modular access control service for supporting
application-specific policies. This service intercepts the critical operations using aspects,
calls the authorization engine, and enforces the respective constraints. The approach is
based on two concepts: access interfaces and view connectors. The first is an abstraction
layer that reflects the information that is relevant for access control. The view connector
binds the access interface to the application and uses the access control decision defined by
the authorization engine each time an application event occurs. A prototype is implemented
in JAC [161] and CaesarJ [14]. This approach allows only to enforce simple access-control
constraints defined in Ponder [56] or in XACML [81]. The separation of duties properties
and administrative operations cannot be specified by these security mechanisms. In ad-
dition, compared to Alpha, the aspect languages used for implementing the service are
based on less powerful pointcut languages. This leads to less modular aspects especially
when temporal constraints are to be enforced [156].
Song et al. [180] proposed an aspect-oriented modeling approach to design role-based
access control. This approach is based on UML and OCL. It allows to design access control
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features by the verifiable composition of the aspects and primary model. This composition
yields a design model in which access control features are integrated with the other appli-
cation features. The proposed approach covers only the modeling phase and it can specify
only the basic system constraints using OCL. No temporal constraints are supported for
specifying dynamic separation of duties properties. In addition, the security constraints
defined with OCL cannot be rigourously verified with respect to consistency. Moreover, no
mechanisms have been proposed to translate the defined aspect model to aspect code.
Mariscal et al. [158] propose a formal framework for enforcing role-based access control
model. The authors formalize the concept of a role slice (i.e., new visual notation to present
roles and permissions in RBAC) by defining a specialized UML class diagram. This diagram
contains a list of permissions defined in form of allowed or prohibited methods. Then, they
define a formal framework for secure software applications by translating automatically the
role slice access control policy into aspect enforcement code. The authors formalized the
compilation process in order to integrate AOP generated security code with the application
code. However, this work is merely theoretical and does not provide any support to generate
aspects. Moreover, separation of duties properties and delegation policies are not addressed.
5.7.4 Specification and Enforcement of Delegation Policies
Several delegation models have been proposed in the literature [20, 179, 198, 199]. In the
following, we present the most related ones to our work.
RBDM0 [20] is a role-based delegation model. It extends the basic RBAC by new com-
ponents and relations for differentiating the delegated and original member as well as their
assignment to roles. RBDM1 [21] is an extension of RBDM0 to support delegation in a role
hierarchy. Compared to our approach, RBDM0 does not support permission delegation and
transfer delegation. Further, enforcement is not addressed. A prototype implementation of
RBDM has been proposed [19]. The implemented code is not well modularized compared
to ours using aspect-oriented programming.
RDM2000 [198] is an extension of RBDM0, which supports role delegation. In that
work, the authors define a rule-based policy specification language for enforcing delegation.
This language is used with GUIs to handle delegation and revocation requests. In our
approach, we use the Alpha language based on Prolog which allows to easily manage the
delegation components and relations as queries. In addition, we generate automatically the
security enforcement code from the formal specification, which avoids errors.
PBDM [199], is a model for role and permission delegation that supports multi-step
and grant delegation. Similar to RBDM, this model extends RBAC with new components
to define the delegation policy and its characteristics. PBDM is extended to PBDM1 and
PBDM2 to allow security administrators to perform the delegation operation and role-to-
role delegation. PBDM and its extensions do not support the transfer delegation and the
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management of delegation history.
In [179], Sohr et al. specify formally using temporal logic and predicate logic the delega-
tion model. In this work, the authors follow the RDM2000 model and define new concepts
and components to manage the delegation in RBAC model. Compared to our approach, the
delegation operations and the preconditions to delegate rights are not defined. In addition,
no verification was proposed to check if the formal specification contains any contradiction.
Also, no enforcement mechanism has been proposed.
Few works have been done on enforcing delegation policies with AOP. In [50], the author
extends his access control framework for Struts-based Web applications to include delegation
of access rights. The proposed approach is based on the aspect language AspectWerkz
used to dynamically enforce delegation policies. Compared to our approach, the automatic
generation of delegation aspects from formal specification allows the user to easily specify
the delegation model and its characteristics and bridge the gap between specification and
implementation. In addition, our approach supports different types and characteristic of
delegation that are not considered in [50], such as user-to-role delegation.
5.8 Conclusion
We applied the Seven-pro approach on access control policies. Our approach covers the
formal specification and enforcement of separation-of-duties and delegation policies on top
of RBAC. To easily specify and enforce these policies, we extended TemporalZ by domain
specific predicates and we proposed some specification patterns for SoD properties. We also
extended the Alpha language by new predicates for easily enforcing specified policies. We
also explained the automatic translation of TemporalZ specifications into Alpha aspects.
The efficiency of Alpha as an aspect language for enforcing access control policies is
one of the limitations of this work. Alpha is very slow and cannot be applied to real
systems. It is also hard to guarantee termination of the system execution given that all
Alpha predicates (facts) are stored in the database and will be never removed. Also, our
approach does not address role hierarchy, which is an extension of flat RBAC to structure
the roles in a large organization. This extension is a key concept for delegation policies in
reals systems.
In the next chapter, we apply the Seven-pro approach on the specification and the
enforcement of temporal properties in Web service compositions. We combine the XTUS
language within timed automata for formally specifying absolute and relative temporal
properties. These specifications are automatically translated to aspects in AO4BPEL, which
is aspect-oriented extension for BPEL.
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Specifying and Enforcing Temporal Properties
6.1 Introduction
Web service composition is being used in various domains, such as business-to-business inte-
gration (B2B) or enterprise application integration (EAI). Current composition approaches
focus on the specification of a set of interactions between Web services together with the
flow of control and data around them and often neglect other important concerns such as
temporal properties or quality of service.
Temporal properties are essential in several Web service composition scenarios as time
plays a crucial role in business processes and B2B interactions. Current Web-service com-
position approaches and languages, such as the standard WS-BPEL [98], provide language
constructs for managing time. E.g., WS-BPEL provides special activities such as onAlarm
or wait that can be used to implement temporal properties. However, the WS-BPEL ap-
proach has several limitations: (1) to express temporal properties, one needs to program
them manually in the process specification using WS-BPEL activities; (2) only simple time
expressions such as timeouts and durations may be expressed; (3) the correctness of a
Web service composition after manual insertion of time related activities cannot be verified;
(4) the process code implementing the temporal properties is mixed and tangled with the
process logic.
To recap, current Web service composition approaches do not allow a declarative and
separate specification of temporal properties. This leads to maintenance problems as the
designer of the composition cannot modify the temporal properties without understanding
the whole process logic and identifying the process activities implementing a given temporal
constraint. Further, Changes to temporal properties cannot be done at runtime, i.e., one has
to stop the composite Web service, undeploy the corresponding process, change the process,
and redeploy it. In addition to the maintainability problem, there is a correctness problem
that arises when not using a formal language. For instance, when temporal properties are
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implemented using BPEL activities one cannot verify if there are inconsistencies or deadlock
states because of lacking formal verification tools.
In this chapter, we address the limitations explained above. We apply the Seven-pro
approach on temporal properties in Web service compositions. The contributions presented
in this chapter are published in [104].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces a running
example: a travel agency scenario. Section 6.3 describes the proposed approach for imple-
menting temporal properties. Section 6.4 presents the formal language and the specification
patterns used for specifying temporal properties in Web service composition. Section 6.5
describes the mapping of the formal specifications to aspect code, and Section 6.6 presents
an overview of the research prototype of this mapping. Section 6.7 reports on related work
and Section 6.8 concludes this chapter.
6.2 Example: Travel Agency Scenario
We introduce an example of Web service composition in the context of a travel agency
scenario. The example is inspired from [84].
We consider two business processes that contain activities representing either business
tasks or interactions between Web services and customers: the travel package search process
and the travel package booking process. Both processes compose services of airlines and
hotels to find (resp. book) vacation packages whereby five partners are involved: the travel
agency, customers, an airline, a hotel chain, and a payment service.
Once a customer sends a travel request to the travel agency, the travel-package search
process interacts with the information systems of the airline companies to find flights that
match the customer’s needs. In addition, this process searches for available hotel rooms
by interacting with the information systems of several hotel chains. After that, the travel
agency sends the response as a set of offers combining the respective flight and hotel re-
sponses. Next, the customer could select one offer. This step launches the travel-package
booking process, which interacts with the airline and hotel services to verify availability.
Upon availability, this process asks the customer to confirm the purchase of the travel offer
and to provide payment details (e.g., using a credit card). In the last step, this process
performs the booking of the different components of the travel package and sends to the
customer a confirmation by e-mail including all trip documents.
We present in the following some temporal constraints, that are important in the context
of the travel agency example.
• C1: The customer should pay the selected offer by providing his credit card data
within 30 minutes after the reservation step. Otherwise, the reserved offer will be
canceled.
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• C2: The customer is allowed to do only 3 failed payment trials and these trials should
occur during 5 minutes.
• C3: The customer can cancel a travel reservation 7 days before his travel at the latest.
• C4: The customer can change his travel reservation only 2 times. Changes are only
allowed between 1 day and 5 days after the reservation date.
• C5: If the booking is done in a special period, a discount is given.
6.3 The Approach in a Nutshell
We applied the three steps of the Seven-pro approach for enforcing temporal properties in
Web service compositions, as shown in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Specifying and enforcing temporal properties
In the formal specification step, the designer formally specifies the temporal properties
using XTUS-Automata, which is a combination of Timed Automata [12] with the eXtended
Time Unit System [35]. Thereby, the designer should follow and respect so-called specifi-
cation patterns, which we provide for different types of temporal properties. In addition,
101
Specifying and Enforcing Temporal Properties
the activity names and the parameters used in the formal specification step should be the
same as those used in the WS-BPEL process. After this step, formal verification of dead-
lock freedom and other properties can be done using existing model-checking tools such as
UPPAAL [58].
In the implementation step, the designer defines the Web service composition using
WS-BPEL but without implementing any temporal properties.
In the enforcement step the designer uses our aspect-generator tool to automatically
generate enforcement code consisting of AO4BPEL aspects. These aspects enforce the
temporal properties at runtime and ensure that they are satisfied. If that is the case,
the process activities are executed; otherwise, the aspect prohibits the execution of the
monitored activities, and throws an exception.
6.4 Formal Specification
In this section, we first present the timed automata and the extended time unit system.
Then, we define the syntax and the semantics of our new formal language XTUS-Automata
combining the two previous languages. Finally, we introduce the specification patterns that
enable expressing temporal properties in Web service composition using XTUS-Automata.
6.4.1 Formal Languages
For the sake of a better understanding of XTUS-Automata, we review the concepts of timed
automata and extended time unit system.
Timed Automata
Timed Automata (TA) [12] specify the behavior of real-time systems over time. They extend
finite-state automata with time constraints using continuous clock variables. Clocks can be
reset at certain transitions and their values can be used in constraints for enabling/disabling
transitions.
Definition1: Timed Automata
A Timed Automaton A is a 6-tuple (L, l0,E ,C , Inv ,T ):
• L is a finite set of locations,
• l0 ∈ L is an initial location,
• E is a set of events/actions,
• C is a finite set of clocks,
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• Inv is a mapping that labels each location l ∈ L with some inequalities of the form c
≤ n, for some clock c and integer n,
• T : L × E × 2C × Φ(C ) × L is the transition relation.
(l , e, λ, ϕ, l ′) is a transition from location l to location l ′ on event e. λ gives the clocks
to be reset with this transition, and ϕ is a clock constraint over C that specifies when the
transition is enabled. The set of clock constraints Φ(C ) is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ := c1 ∼ n | c1 − c2 ∼ n | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ
where ∼ ∈ {<, ≤}, c1, c2 ∈ C , and n ∈ N.
A transition (l , e, λ, ϕ, l ′) ∈ T is enabled if the control is at location l , the clock
constraint ϕ is satisfied and the event e is enabled. After taking the transition, the control
moves to location l ′ and the clocks in λ are reset.
Clock constraints are evaluated over clock valuations. The clock valuation v : C → R≥0
is a function from the set of clocks to the positive reals. A valuation v satisfies the clock
constraint ϕ, denoted by v  ϕ, and defined as follows, where c is a clock and r is a positive
real.
v  c < r iff v(c) < r
v  c ≤ r iff v(c) ≤ r
v  ¬ϕ iff v 2 ϕ
v  ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff v  ϕ1 and v  ϕ2
Definition 2: Semantics of Timed Automata
The semantics of a timed automaton A = (L, l0, E , C , Inv , T ) is defined as a labeled
transition system 〈S , s0,→〉 , where
• S ⊆ L× RC is a set of states. Each state si is defined as a pair (li ,vi) such that li is
a location and vi is a clock valuation for C and vi satisfies Inv(si), i.e., S = {(l , v) ∈
L× R≥0 | v  Inv(l)}
• s0 = (l0, v0) is a initial state, where l0 is an initial location and v0= 0 for all clocks,
and
• → ⊆ S ×{R≥0 ∪E}× S is a transition relation that takes into account the invariants
and that is defined as follows:
– (l , v)
d−→ (l , v + d) if
∀ d ′ :∈ R≥00 ≤ d ′ ≤ d ⇒ (u + d ′)  Inv(l), where d ∈ R≥0,
– (l , v)
a−→ (l ′, v ′) if
∃ t = (l , e, λ, ϕ, l ′) ∈ T ⇒ v  ϕ and v ′  Inv(l ′), with v ′ = [λ 7−→ 0]v , where
[λ 7−→ 0]v denotes the clock valuation which maps each clock in λ to 0.
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Extended Time Unit System
The Time Unit System (TUS) [125] provides a simple way to specify time instants and
intervals based on a common way for expressing dates. TUS represents time intervals as
sequences of non-negative whole numbers in the form [Year, Month, Day, Hour, Minute,
Second,...]. For example, [2009,6,13,22,30,0] denotes the first second of the minute 30
of the hour 22 on the 13th day of June 2009. Intervals can also be built using the operator
convexity. For any two time intervals t1 and t2, convexity(t1, t2) is the smallest convex
interval that contains both t1 and t2. For example, convexity ([2000],[2009]) denotes the
first ten years of the 21st century.
The Extended Time Unit System (XTUS for short) [35] extends TUS and improves its
expressive power to define time intervals. In addition to the fixed time instants presented
as integers in TUS, XTUS proposes new elements. An interval element defines the time
interval between two time instants, denoted by [ ti – tj ] which is equivalent to [ti , ti + 1,
ti + 2, ..., tj ]. For example [5−11] corresponds to [5,6,7,8,9,10,11]. An anonymous
element corresponds to any possible value of the time unit denoted by “ ” (underscore –
inspired from the anonymous variable in Prolog). For example, [2009, ,[1−10]] denotes
the first 10 days in any month of 2009. A combined element corresponds to the result of
the combination of two different elements (i.e., integer or interval) in any level of hierarchy,
denoted by {}. For example, the combined element [ ,{[1−5],[8−12]}, ] denotes every
day in every month except June and July (months 6 and 7) of any year.
XTUS supports also some algebraic operations for defining more complex temporal
properties. Given r1, r2 two terms specifying intervals of XTUS, then r1 ∪ r2, r1 ∩ r2, r1\r2
denote respectively the union, the intersection, and the difference of these intervals.
6.4.2 XTUS-Automata Language
To the best of our knowledge, there is no formal language that can be used to specify both
relative time and absolute time properties for Web service composition. The combination
of XTUS and timed Automata overcomes the limitation of timed automata with respect to
absolute time. In fact, XTUS allows to specify temporal properties that use absolute time,
while timed automata allow to (1) specify the execution order of the different actions/ac-
tivities in the process underlying the service composition, (2) specify the maximum and
minimum occurred time between the execution of two different actions/activities, and (3)
express that certain actions may be repeated n times within a given time period.
In addition, temporal properties specified using XTUS-Automata can easily be trans-
lated to code. The translation of XTUS expressions is straightforward, as time is specified
using a set of integers and elements (i.e., interval, anonymous, and combined elements).
Thanks to the specification patterns and the aspect templates the timed automata can be
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translated to code. This will be presented later.
In addition to clock resets and to temporal constraints (see definition 2 in Section 6.4.1),
we propose to specify XTUS constraints at the automata transitions (see Section 6.4.1). In
this way, an action defined in the business process (i.e. modeled as a timed automated
transition) will be executed if and only if two types of constraints defined on the corre-
sponding transition are satisfied: Timed Automata constraints and XTUS constraints. To
allow expressing constraints that are relative to the current time, the designer can assume
the availability of a special clock ct that corresponds to the current time. That special clock
cannot be reset.
In order to use XTUS for the formal specification of temporal constraints we have
formally defined its syntax and semantics using the Z notation [181].
In the following, we first present the formal definition of the different elements Element
defined in XTUS (simple time or date value (N), interval (Interval〈〈N × N〉〉), anonymous
(Anonymous), and combined elements ( FUnitInterval)), which were informally presented
in Section 6.4.1. The function Def describes the semantics of each element: we associate
for each type of Element a set of integers that represents the possible values of this element.
For example, the function Def associates with the element Interval(n1,n2) the set of all
possible integers between n1 and n2.
XTUS = seq Element
UnitInterval ::= N | Interval〈〈N× N〉〉
Element ::= Anonymous | UnitInterval | FUnitInterval
Def : Element → FN
Def (Anonymous) = {n : N}
∀n : N • Def (n) = {n}
∀n1,n2 : N • Def (Interval(n1,n2)) =
{n : N | n ≥ n1 ∧ n ≤ n2}
∀ u : FUnitInterval • Def (u) = {n : N | n ∈ u}
∪{n,n1,n2 : N | Interval(n1,n2) ∈ u
∧ n ≥ n1 ∧ n ≤ n2 • n}
In our formal definition, we consider the time in the form [Year, Month, Day, Hour,
Minute, Second] and a time instant is represented by a set of time values (natural numbers)
corresponding to the different units. We specify also using appropriate Z schemas the
domains of the different time units (i.e., seconds, minutes, etc). The domains allow us to
prohibit users from specifying constraints such as [2009,[1−4],[20−30]], as February
does not have the days 29 and 30.
An XTUS constraint is satisfied only if the current time ct is one of the possible time
values corresponding to that constraint (after applying the function Def ). For that, each
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time value in the current time instant ct(i) (year, month,...) defined as natural number
(N) should satisfy its respective element X (i) (Element) in the XTUS constraints using the
function Verif defined below.
The satisfaction function Sf allows to verify that the time values of all units (i.e., seconds,
minutes, etc) in the current time instant are satisfied using the function Verif .
Verif : P(N× Element)
∀n : N;e : Element • Verif (n, e)⇔ n ∈ Def (e)
Sf : P(seqN× seq Element)
∀SeqNat : seqN;SeqElem : seq Element
| #SeqNat = #SeqElem = 6 •
Sf (SeqNat ,SeqElem)⇔ (∀ i : 1..#SeqNat •
(Verif (SeqNat(i),SeqElem(i))))
6.4.3 Specification Patterns
We propose specifying temporal properties in Web service compositions using XTUS-Automata
based on specification patterns. The use of patterns facilitates the specification of complex
temporal constraints and allows to structure the specification so that it can be automatically
translated to runtime monitoring code.
In our specification model, the Web service composition is considered as a sequence
of finite states, which are reached by transitions representing WS-BPEL activities such as
the messaging activities invoke, receive, and reply used for invoking a partner Web service
and/or interacting with a client. The message transmitted from the caller is denoted by the
symbol !msg and the message received is denoted by the symbol ?msg . For us, only the time
or date variables are considered as parameters in the transmitted messages msg(t1, t2, ...).
The automata clock can be defined and initialized in three ways. First, the clock can be
initialized to zero, as in timed automata. Second, the clock can be an input parameter for
a BPEL activity (i.e., defined as message transmitted between Web services). Third, the
clock can be defined as an output parameter of some BPEL activity already executed.
In the following, we describe some XTUS-Automata patterns used to define some useful
temporal properties that occur frequently in the context of Web service compositions.
Patterns for Duration Properties
These properties allow to specify a fixed duration between the execution of two different
activities. An activity must eventually follow another activity within, after, or at the time t .
Figure 6.2 depicts three patterns of this type which specify that the activity en should
be executed within a fixed time after the execution of the activity e1. In Figure 6.2a, at the
106
6.4. Formal Specification
automata transition of the activity e1, a clock x is reset and a clock constraint is defined
at the transition of the activity en . This activity en can only be executed if the defined
constraint is satisfied. In case the activity e1 corresponds to a BPEL activity with a date or
time as input parameter (see Figure 6.2b), or if the BPEL activity returns a time or date as
an output parameter (see Figure 6.2c), these parameters are defined at the corresponding
transition instead of the expression for resetting a clock. In these two cases, we use the
current time ct to define the clock constraints.
…e1 e2 ek en
x:=0 x ~ t
…e1(d) e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
…d=e1() e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
(a) Pattern with clock reset
…e1 e2 ek en
x:=0 x ~ t
…e1(d) e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
…d=e1() e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
(b) Pattern with input parameter
…e1 e2 ek en
x:=0 x ~ t
…e1(d) e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
…d=e1() e2 ek en
ct ~ d+t
(c) Pattern with output parameter
Figure 6.2: Patterns for duration properties
Where ∼ denotes <, ≤, >, ≥, and =.
In Figure 6.3, we apply the pattern shown in Figure 6.2a as duration pattern with clock
reset for specifying the constraint C1 defined in Section 6.2. C1 requires that the customer
should pay the travel fees the latest 30 minutes after the reservation. We store the time of
the reservation step by resetting the clock x at the transition reservePack, and we define the
clock constraint (x < 30min) at the transition bookTicket. In case the customer books the
ticket of his travel before the end of the 30 minutes period, he will receive a confirmation
of his booking; otherwise the reservation will be canceled automatically.
For example, to specify the constraint C3, which states that the customer can cancel his
reservation the latest 7 days before his travel, we apply the duration specification pattern
with input parameter (Figure 6.3). The transition reservePack should be defined as a
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transition with input parameters (departure date DD and arrival date AR). In the transition
cancelReservation, the designer specifies the time constraint (ct 6 DD − 7days) to express
that canceling the reservation cannot be executed if it happens later than 7 days before the
departure date.
?reservePack(DD,AR)
x:=0
!PaymentDetail ?bookTicket
!PaymentDetail!CancelReservation
ct ≤ DD-7days
X < 30 min
!EmailConfirm
Figure 6.3: Example of a duration property
Pattern for Temporal Properties over Cardinalities
The following properties define that some activity e can be executed successively n times
within a fixed time period. Figure 6.4 shows the specification pattern for this type of
temporal properties. The designer should specify the repetition of the activity e using
multiple transitions (and without using a loop). In the first transition, a reset clock has to
be defined to store the time execution of this activity. The other (n − 1) activities should
be defined as next transitions and can contain some clock constraints depending of the
temporal property. In addition, between the transitions corresponding to the activity e,
any other transition ai can be specified.
…e ek
e
x:=0
x ~ t
…ai aj ak
al
Figure 6.4: Pattern for temporal properties over cardinalities
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Figure 6.5 shows an instance of the pattern for temporal properties over cardinalities.
This example pattern specifies the constraint C4 of Section 6.2, which states that a customer
can change the date of his travel only two times and this must happen between 1 and 5
days after the reservation. The designer should specify the resetting of the clock (x := 0) in
the transition reserveP and define the clock constraint (x > 1day) on the first changePack
transition, and (x < 5day) on the second changePack transition. Between these two tran-
sitions, the designer can specify other transitions that correspond to the booking of a new
travel package and the reception of the confirmation email.
?changePack
?reservePack(DD,AR)
x:=0
!PaymentDetail
?bookTicket
x <5 days
!EmailConfirm
?bookTicket
x > 1 day
?changePack
?bookTicket
!EmailConfirm
Figure 6.5: Example of temporal property over cardinalities
Pattern for Absolute Time Properties
These properties allow to specify that an activity can be executed only if its current time
satisfies some XTUS constraint, which is associated with a transition in the automaton
(Figure 6.6). Note that this pattern can be easily combined with the two other patterns
discussed above to specify more complex properties.
ei
[ [ yi-yj ], [ mi-mj ], [ di-dj ], …]
bookTicket
[ _, [ 3 - 5 ], [ 1 - 7 ] ]
Figure 6.6: Pattern for absolute time properties
As example, we use this pattern for the specification of the constraint C5, which states
that a discount is given if the booking is done in a special period (e.g. in the first week of
March, April and May). The automaton that defines this constraint would look like the one
shown in Figure 6.7 where ei will be replaced by the transition bookTicket and the XTUS
expression [ ,[3−5],[1−7]] is specified on that transition.
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ei
[ [ yi-yj ], [ mi-mj ], [ di-dj ], …]
bookTicket
[ _, [ 3 - 5 ], [ 1 - 7 ] ]
Figure 6.7: Example of absolute time property
The expressive power of timed automata allows to specify most of relative time properties
and XTUS allows specifying absolute time properties. As presented below, the designer can
easily use XTUS-Automata for specifying temporal properties in Web service applications.
He can also combine the proposed specification patterns to express more complex properties.
6.4.4 Verification of Temporal Properties
After specifying the temporal properties related to the Web services composition, the de-
signer can verify the structure and the consistency of his specification.
The designer verifies the syntax and the domain of the XTUS expressions. The veri-
fication of the syntax allows to check if the designer follows the XTUS grammar formally
defined in Z notation. The designer should use the defined XTUS elements Element and
take into account the constraints defined in the axiomatic function def (cf. Section 6.4.2).
The verification of the domain allows to prohibit the designer to specify an incorrect XTUS
expression. There is intra- and inter- domain verification. (i) The intra-domain verification
allows to verify the domain of elements constituting the XTUS expression: The time and
the date, specified by an XTUS expression, should be correct. For example, the domain of
the following XTUS expression [2012,[1−4],[20−30]] is not correct, as February does
not have the days 29 and 30. In addition, the XTUS expression should represent a time or
a date in the future. (ii) The inter-domain verification allows to verify the domain of an
XTUS expression according to the other ones. Suppose that there are two XTUS expres-
sion e1 and e2 which are defined respectively on two automata transitions t1 and t2. The
transition t2 represents a BPEL activity that will be executed after the activity represented
by the transition t1. The time and the date resulting of e2 should be greater than the one
resulting of e1. Otherwise, a deadlock state can be reached.
The designer can also formally verify some specific properties using a model checker that
supports timed automata, such as UPPAAL [186]. In addition to the graphical modeling of
the timed automata and networks of automata, the designer can validate, verify, and sim-
ulate the specifications of his Web service compositions. The designer can easily verify the
absence of a deadlock state in the timed automata. Based on the temporal logic operators,
the designer can also verify safety, liveness and reachability properties [27].
The designer cannot use UPPAAL to verify the properties of his system specified by
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XTUS-Automata. Actually, UPPAAL does not support constraints on absolute time, and
more specially the XTUS specifications. To resolve this limitation, a formal semantics of
XTUS-Automata must be defined using axioms and inference rules. This semantics defines
all elements supported by the XTUS language and specifies how to formally combine XTUS
within timed automata.
6.5 Aspect-based Enforcement
After the verification phase, to enforce the specified properties we automatically generate
aspects from the formal specification. For that purpose, we implemented an XSLT template-
based generator engine as an eclipse plug-in. Our plug-in generates enforcement aspects
in the AO4BPEL language [44, 45], based on the defined templates and the proposed pat-
terns. Our approach is extensible, as further patterns can be easily defined. The respective
transformations to AO4BPEL aspects need to be defined using XSLT templates. These
aspects will be deployed together with the processes on an aspect-enabled BPEL engine,
which allows the dynamic composition of processes and aspects.
In the following, we first present the aspect language AO4BPEL used for enforcing
specified properties. We then explain the aspect generation workflow. After that, we
discuss the types of aspects generated for each specification pattern. Finally, we present in
detail an aspect template that builds the basis for the aspect generation.
6.5.1 AO4BPEL Language
AO4BPEL [44,45] is an aspect-oriented extension of the Web service composition language
BPEL, which allows for more modular and dynamically adaptable processes.
Like BPEL, AO4BPEL is XML-based. Aspects consist of a set of pointcut-and-advice.
The pointcut language of AO4BPEL uses XPath expressions to select a set of activities
using two types of join points. The first type, activity joint points, is used to select points
corresponding to the execution of activities, e.g., the interception of the invoke or reply
activities. The second internal join points is used to select points corresponding to internal
points during the interpretation of messaging activities, e.g., the interception of the send out
of a SOAP message. An advice is a BPEL activity that implements some crosscutting logic,
e.g., security, monitoring, etc. Special constructs may be used inside the advice to access
the input and/or output data of the join points as well as reflective information. Advice can
be executed either before, after, or instead of (i.e., around) the intercepted BPEL activities.
Further, like BPEL, an AO4BPEL aspect may declare partners, variables, fault handlers,
etc. These constructs have the same syntax as in BPEL.
An orchestration engine that supports the dynamic composition of AO4BPEL aspects
is available [43]. This engine was implemented on top of IBM’s BPEL engine BPWS4J.
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6.5.2 Aspect Generation Workflow
The aspect generation workflow is composed of three main phases.
The first phase consists in verifying the conformity the XTUS-Automata specifications
with the BPEL process. Certain constraints must be fulfilled by the automata implement-
ing the constraints. The automata states and transitions must match the BPEL process
implementing the composition. For example, the name of the transitions in the automaton
must match the names of activities in the BPEL process. Further, the name of the input
and output parameters of the transitions must match those of the activities. If that phase
is not successful, the designer should modify his specifications.
The second phase consists in identifying all instances of the specification patterns in the
XTUS-automata specifications describing the system and its temporal constraints. Note
that, the designer can separately specify his specifications as a set of XTUS-Automata
specifications that instantiate the specification patterns.
The third phase consists in automatically generate AO4BPEL aspects by filling the
placeholders and parameters of the respective aspect templates with data from the concrete
pattern instances. We proposed the specifications patterns as incomplete and parameterized
AO4BPEL aspects that enforce the properties expressed by the corresponding pattern. An
aspect template contains generic enforcement logic that is independent from a particular
scenario. Certain data and parameters need to be completed from the formal specification,
and this is done using the following two mappings:
• Each specified automaton transition is mapped to an AO4BPEL pointcut as an XPath-
expression [193] that matches WS-BPEL activities, i.e., in order to know when to reset
or test a counter.
• Each temporal constraint from the automaton model is mapped to the expression
language of WS-BPEL which is evaluated by a time helper service. The expression
contains the concrete clock name and clock values.
Once the template is instantiated, the generated aspects can be deployed together with
the process on the AO4BPEL engine. Thus, they ensure through runtime monitoring the
enforcement of the respective constraint.
6.5.3 The Runtime Enforcement Aspects
We generate two types of aspects to enforce temporal properties specified as instances of
the pre-defined specification patterns. The first type uses an after advice and allows to start
a timer (timer aspect) or an activity counter (counter aspect) after the execution of a given
activity. The second type uses an around advice (decision aspect) and allows or prohibits
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the execution of the intercepted activity according to the specified constraint and to the
state of the timer and/or the counter defined in the first aspect.
Next, we explain in more detail which aspects are needed for each specification pattern,
the mapping of constructs of the specification XTUS automaton to AO4BPEL pointcuts
and advice, and the advice logic in each case.
Aspects for Duration Properties
The enforcement of duration properties requires a timer aspect and a decision aspect. The
pointcut of the timer aspect intercepts the BPEL activity specified as a reset transition (i.e.
the automaton transition labeled with a reset of the clock variable or the transition labeled
with the definition of a clock as input or output parameters). The advice of this aspect
invokes a helper time Web service to start a timer after the execution of the intercepted
activity. For the decision aspect, the pointcut intercepts the execution of the activity
specified as an automaton transition labeled with a temporal constraint. The advice of this
aspect contains two parts. In the first part, a helper Web service is invoked to stop the timer
before the execution of the intercepted activity. The identification of the timer in the two
aspects is ensured by the name of the clock variable used in the two transitions specifying
the intercepted activities. In the second part, the aspect checks the constraints defined in
the automaton transition that corresponds to the intercepted activity. If the constraint is
satisfied, the activity will be executed. Otherwise, the aspect prohibits the activity and an
exception will be raised.
Aspects for Temporal Properties over Cardinalities
The enforcement of temporal properties over cardinalities can be seen as an extension of
the monitoring of duration properties. In addition to the timer aspect, a counter aspect
is generated, which allows to calculate the number of times an activity is executed. The
pointcut of the counter aspect intercepts the BPEL activity specified by a transition that is
repeated more than one time and defined between a reset transition and a transition that
is labeled with a temporal constraint. The advice invokes a helper Web service to start and
increment the counter. The decision aspect verifies also the number of times the activity is
executed against the number of the transition labeled with activity name.
Aspects for Absolute Time Properties
The monitoring of the absolute time pattern requires only a decision aspect. The generated
pointcut intercepts the automaton transition labeled with an XTUS expression. The advice
verifies if the current time and date satisfy the XTUS constraints as formally defined in
113
Specifying and Enforcing Temporal Properties
Section 6.4.2. Based on that the advice allows or prohibits the execution of the intercepted
activity.
6.5.4 Aspect Templates
In the following, we present in detail an aspect template and illustrate the aspect generation
based on the concrete examples shown in Section 6.4.3.
Listing 6.1 shows the template of the timer aspects (lines 16–39) and the decision aspects
(lines 45–76) defined in Section 6.5.3. As an example, we illustrate the use of this template
to generate monitoring aspects for the duration patterns defined in Figure 6.3. The tem-
plate uses loop constructs to iterate over the set of transitions in the XTUS-Automaton
specification (lines 14 and 41, 43 and 78) and defines several placeholders (lines 18, 29, 47,
55, and 67).
For the timer aspect, the pointcut (lines 17–19) intercepts the corresponding BPEL
activity specified by the reset transition. The Reset Transition placeholder (line 18) is re-
placed by a pointcut that matches the process activity that leads to the resetting of the
corresponding counter. In an AO4BPEL aspect, the pointcut representing the interception
of an activity is defined as an XPath-expression in the form of
//process//activityType [@operation="operationName "].
For the example in Figure 6.3, the timer aspect intercepts the execution of the activity
reservePack which resets the counter x . The Reset Transition placeholder is replaced by
//process//reply[@operation="reservePack"]. After the execution of the intercepted
activity, the advice (lines 21–38) invokes the operation startTimer (lines 4 and 34) on a
helper time Web service to measure the execution time of the intercepted activity. This
operation takes the name of the monitored activity and the clock variable as input param-
eters. The name of the activity is set by an assign activity (lines 23–32) to the name of
the current join point activity, which is accessed by using the reflective AO4BPEL vari-
able ThisJPActivity (line 25). The clock name placeholder (line 29) is extracted from the
automaton transition corresponding to the intercepted activity.
For the monitoring of temporal properties over cardinalities (Figure 6.4), an additional
counter aspect should be generated with the same structure as the timer aspect. This aspect
intercepts the corresponding activity and invokes another helper Web service to calculate
the number of times the intercepted activity has been executed so far.
The decision aspect (lines 45–76) is defined with an around advice. The pointcut
(lines 46–48) intercepts the activity modeled by the automaton transition labeled with the
temporal constraint. The Enforce Transition placeholder (line 47) is replaced by a pointcut
that matches the corresponding activity. For the example shown in Figure 6.3, the point-
cut //process//reply[@operation="bookTicket"] matches the activity representing the
ticket booking, which should be performed in the first 30 minutes after reservation. In the
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advice (lines 50–75), a helper Web service is invoked to count the number of times the in-
tercepted activity is repeated (line 60) and calculate the duration between this activity and
the activity intercepted in the first aspect (line 63). At the end, the temporal constraint
is verified using a switch condition (lines 66–73). The Constraint Expression placeholder
(line 67) is replaced by the technical expression in the expression language of WS-BPEL.
E.g., in Figure 6.3 the temporal constraint x < 30 defined on the bookTicket transition
is mapped to “getVariableData(timeWsResponse,duration) > 30”. If the constraint is
satisfied, the corresponding activity will be executed using the keyword proceed (line 68),
otherwise the activity will not be executed and an exception will be raised (line 70–72).
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1 <aspect>
2
3 <partners>
4 <partner name="TimeWService" serviceLinkType="tns:TimeWServiceSLT"/>
5 ...
6 </partners>
7
8 <variables>
9 <variable name="timeWsRequest" messageType="tns:TimerRequest" />
10 <variable name="timeWsResponse" messageType="tns:TimerResponse" />
11 ...
12 </variables>
13
14 BEGIN-FOR-EACH (clock reset transition)
15
16 <pointcut-and-advice name="startTimer">
17 <pointcut name="startTimePc" contextCollection="true">
18 Reset Transition
19 </pointcut>
20
21 <advice type="after">
22 <sequence>
23 <assign>
24 <copy>
25 <from variable="ThisJPActivity" part="name" />
26 <to variable="timeWsRequest" part="activityName" />
27 </copy>
28 <copy>
29 <from expression="’ clock name ’" />
30 <to variable="timeWsRequest" part="identifier" />
31 </copy>
32 </assign>
33
34 <invoke name="invokeStart" partner="TimeWService" operation="startTimer"
35 inputVariable="timeWsRequest" .../>
36
37 </sequence>
38 </advice>
39 </pointcut-and-advice>
40
41 END-OF-FOR-EACH
42
43 BEGIN-FOR-EACH (constrained transition)
44
45 <pointcut-and-advice name="TimeMonitor">
46 <pointcut name="VerificationTimePC" contextCollection="true">
47 Enforce Transition
48 </pointcut>
49
50 <advice type="around">
51 <sequence>
52 <assign>
53 ...
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54 <copy>
55 <from expression="’ clock name ’" />
56 <to variable="timeWsRequest" part="identifier" />
57 </copy>
58 </assign>
59
60 <invoke name="invokeStop" partner="TimeWService" operation="stopTimer"
61 inputVariable="timeWsRequest" .../>
62
63 <invoke name="invokeDuration" partner="TimeWService" operation="getDuration"
64 outputVariable="timeWsResponse" ... />
65
66 <switch name= "ProhibitAllowAction">
67 <case condition = " Constraint Expression ">
68 <proceed />
69 </case>
70 <otherwise>
71 ...
72 </otherwise>
73 </switch>
74 </sequence>
75 </advice>
76 </pointcut-and-advice>
77
78 END-OF-FOR-EACH
79
80 </aspect>
Listing 6.1: Template of the generated AO4BPEL Aspect
6.6 Overview of the Prototype
We implemented a research prototype to prove the concepts of the proposed approach
for implementing temporal properties in Web service composition. The prototype is an
Eclipse plug-in which allows the specification of these properties and the generation of the
corresponding enforcement code.
We developed an Eclipse visual editor based Eclipse Modeling Framework [64] (EMF),
Graphical Editing Framework [77] (GEF) and Graphical Modeling Framework [80] (GMF)
frameworks. Using this editor, the designer models the XTUS-Automata presenting the
specification of the temporal properties of his Web service composition. Four steps were
required to create this editor.
1. We specified the meta-model of the XTUS-Automata language presenting as an ecore
file. This meta-model is based on EMF and contains the meta-classes required for
drawing XTUS-Automata.
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2. We specified a graphical representation of each defined meta-class. This representa-
tion extends the standard representation of timed automata (e.g., state as a circle,
transition as a link between circle, etc.) by a label on a transition for the XTUS
expression.
3. We developed a palette that includes the required buttons for drawing the elements
constituting the XTUS-Automata (i.e., automata state, transition, initialization, guard,
and XTUS expression). To easily use this palette, we defined colors, icons, and groups
of buttons.
4. We defined a mapping between the meta-model (ecore file), the graphical representa-
tion and the palette. After that, we generated, using the EMF and GMF frameworks,
Java code to finalize the creation of the Eclipse plug-in.
A screenshot of our eclipse visual editor is shown in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8: Screenshot of the XTUS-Automata-to-AO4BPEL plug-in
After specifying the temporal properties of the Web service composition, the designer
should verify the structure of his specification as previously discussed in Section 6.4.4. Our
plug-in automatically translates the graphical representation of the temporal properties into
an XML-based textual representation. We developed a module, as a part of this plug-in,
which parses and extracts the required information from the XMI files to verify the structure
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of the specification. Using the menu item verify properties shown in the Figure 6.9, the
designer verifies:
• The conformity of the specification with the BPEL process: for example, the name of
the automata transitions are conform with the defined BPEL activities.
• The static semantics of the automata guard: for example, the used variables should
be already initialized in a previous transition.
• The syntax and domain of the XTUS expression as detailed in the verification phase
(cf. Section 6.4.4).
The designer can also verify other properties of the specification using the model checker
UPPAAL. Using the menu item export to UPPAAL shown in Figure 6.9, the designer can
export his specification designed in our plug-in into a XML file that can be consumed by
the UPPAAL model checker.
Figure 6.9: Menus of the XTUS-Automata-to-AO4BPEL plug-in
If the verification step is successful, the designer can easily identify all instances of the
specification patterns in the XTUS-Automaton (or automata) describing his composition
system and its temporal properties. Using the item view patterns, the designer verifies that
the specification is correct (i.e., based on the proposed patterns) and extracts the required
information for each instance to generate the corresponding aspects. The identification of
the instance step is performed by parsing the XMI file representing the specification of the
temporal properties.
Using the menu item Code generation, the designer can automatically generate the
aspect code, according to the defined templates, from each identified pattern instance. At
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runtime, the generated AO4BPEL aspects will be woven in the BPEL process (without
stopping the process) using the AO4BPEL engine [43].
6.7 Related Work
In this section, we present related work on the formal specification and the implementation
of temporal properties in Web service compositions. Several formal methods were used to
model Web service compositions, such as Petri nets [86], and finite automata [72]. The
main goal of these works is to verify the business process properties using model checking
tools. The majority of these works do not consider the implementation of non-functional
properties such as temporal properties or quality of service.
Other works [164, 177] used different languages and tools to specify and monitor ser-
vice level agreements (SLA). Most of these works describe in a high-level specification the
contract between the customer and the service provider in terms of quality of service prop-
erties. These works focus on the description of software qualities such as maintainability,
robustness, performance. They just verify, at runtime, if the these properties (defined as a
contract) are satisfied. They do not stop/skip the execution of a critical operation if one of
these properties is not satisfied. In addition, these works do not address temporal properties
required in Web service composition.
Another group of related work concentrates on the specification of non-functional prop-
erties, and more specifically on temporal properties. In [112], the authors propose a new
model, called web service timed state transition systems, inspired from timed automata
for specifying temporal behavior of web services compositions. The authors use also inter-
val temporal logic to express complex temporal requirements. Based on this model, they
propose a model checking approach for temporal properties on top of BPEL. Similar to
our approach, the authors extend timed automata to cover more temporal properties. The
semantics of this language is not formally defined. This language does not support the spec-
ification of absolute temporal properties defined in our approach using the XTUS language.
Another limitation of this work is that it does not propose any mechanism to control at
runtime the specified temporal properties.
Baresi et al. [18] propose a temporal extension of an XML-based assertion language called
Timed WSCoL, which allows expressing temporal properties over the actions that occur
during the process execution. The authors propose powerful operators (such as between
and within) in addition to the linear temporal operators (such as always and until). A
semantics of this language is formally defined. For the monitoring phase, they propose to
use Dynamo, an aspect-oriented extension for ActiveBPEL, as well as an external analyzer
to ensure asynchronous monitoring. Compared to our approach, Timed WSCoL is not really
expressive and does not cover all temporal properties addressed in our work, especially the
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properties defined by XTUS. Also, this work does not provide any mechanism to formally
verify the specified properties.
The approach proposed by Barbon et al. [17] is quite similar to ours. The authors
propose the specification of temporal properties and statistic properties in BPEL processes
using the RTML language (Runtime Monitoring Specification Language). They also gener-
ate Java code for monitoring the specified properties. However, compared to our approach,
this work is less expressive than ours, as absolute time properties for example are not
supported. Further, the monitoring code generated is not modular as it is mixed with ap-
plication code. In addition, that approach is static, i.e., it does not allow dynamic changes
of temporal properties at runtime, which is possible in our approach thanks to dynamic
weaving in the AO4BPEL engine.
In [84], Guermouche et al. specify temporal properties using an extension of the WSTTS
language (i.e. Web Service Timed Transition Systems). They use temporal properties to
analyze the compatibility in Web service composition. Compared to to our approach, the
authors use a similar model to specify temporal properties in Web service composition, they
propose also an extension of timed automata. However, their extension to support absolute
temporal properties is not formally defined: no formal semantics is provided. They propose
just to add an interval of date under the automaton transitions. In addition, in [84], no
monitoring mechanism is presented to verify at runtime the specified properties.
6.8 Conclusion
The contributions presented in this chapter are many-fold: First, we defined a new for-
mal language, called XTUS-Automata that combines timed automata and extended time
unit system. This language allows specifying temporal properties involving both relative
time and absolute time. Second, we provided generic specification patterns that ease the
specification of temporal properties in Web services compositions. Third, we designed and
implemented an aspect-based monitoring mechanism, in which formally specified tempo-
ral constraints are translated automatically to modular aspect code in the aspect-oriented
workflow language AO4BPEL. As AO4BPEL supports dynamic weaving the aspects can
be integrated at runtime with the processes. The generated aspects intercept the execution
of process activities. If the respective temporal properties are satisfied, the activity will be
executed, otherwise the aspect prohibits the activity execution and throws an exception.
Our approach suffers from some limitations and usage restrictions: The proposed specifi-
cation patterns can only specify restricted set of temporal properties. As a solution, we plan
to extend our approach by other specification patterns for more complex temporal prop-
erties and will implement the necessary templates for generating the monitoring aspects.
On the other hand, no mechanism is proposed to formally verify if there is a inconsistency
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between timed automata and XTUS constraints. Software testing [41] can be applied to
resolve such limitation. Finally, the AO4BPEL engine is available only for BPEL1.0.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Summary
In this thesis, we proposed a solution for implementing non-functional safety properties in
distributed systems in a reliable and modular way. It consists of a holistic approach for the
formal specification and the aspect-based enforcement of these properties.
Before discussing the motivations of this work, this thesis presented the necessary back-
ground comprising brief definitions and reviews of the mechanisms and methods used in
this PhD work. In addition, a comparative study on existing approaches for specifying non-
functional properties was presented. These approaches use different specification mecha-
nisms such as UML profiles, Aspect-oriented modeling, and formal methods and languages.
A detailed study on runtime verification approaches was also presented. This study focuses
on existing approaches that automatically generate code from a high-level specification and
use Aspect-oriented programming as a runtime verification mechanism.
To show the usefulness of our approach, we detailed the limitations of existing research
works. These limitations are due to the use of semi-formal methods at the specification
level, the problem of crosscutting concerns modularity, and the gap between specification
and implementation.
The central topic of this work is the combination of formal methods and aspect-oriented
programming for specifying and enforcing non-functional safety properties. The specifi-
cation of non-functional safety properties is formally verified and its structure is validated
according to a well defined meta-model. Then, it is automatically translated to aspect code.
Our approach, called Seven-pro, solves the problems and limitations identified in existing
approaches.
After detailing the proposed approach and its phases, this thesis presented how Seven-
pro can cover several types of non-functional properties and can also be applied in different
application domains and to different types of architectures. Our approach was applied to
three case studies presented in this thesis.
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The first case study deals with dynamic software architecture of object-oriented ap-
plications. Seven-pro is applied for specifying and enforcing architectural invariants. A
combination of the Z notation and Petri nets is proposed for specifying such properties.
These properties are classified into: properties on objects and object cardinality, properties
on object relationships and their cardinality, properties on methods that modify the soft-
ware architecture, and method call protocols. These properties are formally verified using
the Z/EVES theorem prover and automatically translated to AspectJ aspects.
The second case study consists of applying Seven-pro to specifying and enforcing access
control policies. TemporalZ, as a formal language, is extended by specific security predicates
for specifying separation-of-duties and delegation policies on top of role-based access control.
Alpha, as an expressive aspect-oriented language, is extended also by a security library
for supporting the specified policies. An automatic translation process is defined from
TemporalZ specifications as a domain-specific specification language to Alpha code as a
domain-specific implementation language.
The third case study focuses on the specification and the enforcement of temporal prop-
erties in Web service composition. The formal language XTUS-Automata is defined for
specifying relative and absolute time related properties. This language is a combination
of the XTUS language with timed automata. The specification of temporal properties is
automatically translated to AO4BPEL aspects which can be woven in a modular way in
the BPEL process.
7.2 Review of the Seven-Pro Approach
In this section, we present a review of our approach. We will focus on the most important
criteria for reviewing methods and tools. The considered criteria are inspired from [117,
143, 169] such as generality, usability, and applicability. For each criterion, we present a
general definition, its proof and some limitations.
7.2.1 Reviewing Strategy
Our review follows a strategy based on three classes of criteria. The first class includes
review criteria that can be addressed with different case studies and examples [117]. These
case studies should be selected using an appropriate process in order to cover the different
concepts and to express the advantages and the disadvantages of the reviewed method. The
second class concerns criteria based on logical reasoning. This class covers the criteria that
can be deduced from the tools and facilities provided with the method. Criteria belonging
to the third class are addressed using empirical studies which reveal the difficulties and
research challenges in the practical use of the approach and its software. The empirical
studies allow answering important questions about, for example, the real user benefits, the
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required time and effort, etc. For lack of time and the complexity of the empirical study
process, we do not consider this class of evaluation methods in this work. Instead, we will
focus on the other two classes.
7.2.2 Review based on the Analysis of Case Studies
In the following, we focus on the generality and simplicity criteria.
The generality criterion states that the proposed method can cover most important
aspects of the application domain. In order to review the generality of our approach, we
apply the Seven-pro approach to three types of properties. First, we applied our approach
to software architectural invariants as an example of structural properties. Second, we
applied it to access control policies as an example of qualitative behavioral properties.
Third, we applied our approach to temporal properties in Web service compositions as
an example of quantitative behavioral properties. The details of these applications are
presented in the three previous chapters.
The simplicity criterion expresses that the desired application can be easily defined
based on the proposed approach.
Despite the difficulty and the diversity of the considered non-functional properties (ar-
chitectural properties, security properties, temporal properties), we easily applied this ap-
proach in three complex case studies. This is due to the fact that the approach facilitates
the design work in the different phases of development. Seven-pro minimizes the difficulty
of using formal methods and mechanisms by proposing useful and powerful specification
patterns. A non-expert designer can easily specify his non-functional properties. He just
needs to instantiate the provided patterns to create his specification. In the verification
phase, the use of XML and XML schema allow to easily detect if the specification cor-
responds to the predefined patterns or not. In the implementation phase, the executable
aspect code is automatically generated while assuming that the functional code of the appli-
cation conforms to the formal specification. The designer should just deploy the generated
aspects.
Our approach has significant advantages but also some limitations with respect to the
simplicity criterion. Despite the advantage of using specification patterns in the first phase
of our approach, which facilitates the tasks of designers and minimizes the complexity
of the formal methods, the use of graphical notations, such as UML, is the most simple
way. We can even take advantage of design patterns in the UML language. To remedy the
problems related to this language such as the lack of a rigorous semantics and the verification
techniques, we propose to generate formal specifications from a graphical modeling of non-
functional properties. We have already applied this approach to specifying and enforcing
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architectural invariants in dynamic software architecture [110,111]. We combine the Seven-
pro approach with one that proposes a UML profile for modeling the dynamic architecture
and its constraints. In addition, we automatically generate a Z specification from the model.
7.2.3 Review based on Logical Reasoning
In this section, we present the criteria belonging to the class describing the review based
on logical reasoning. We focus on usability, applicability, and code quality.
The usability criterion expresses that the developed application should be easy to use by
the class of users for whom it was intended [143]. We explain how the Seven-pro approach
simplifies the work of the designers in two steps.
First, we note that we developed an Eclipse plug-in supporting the proposed approach
for each case study. The details of each plug-in and their functionalities are presented in
the previous chapters. The accessibility of the different functionalities of the plug-ins is
ensured using menu-items. For example, we consider the developed plug-in for specifying
and enforcing temporal properties of Web service composition. This plug-in supports
• the graphical modeling of temporal properties using the extended timed automata,
• the translation of the graphical model to XMI files to verify the conformity to the
patterns,
• the generation of the format supported by the model checker UPPAAL for the formal
verification, and
• the generation of the corresponding enforcement aspects in AO4BPEL.
Second, we detail the benefits of the automatic transition between the different phases
of the development process for implementing non-functional properties. This automatic
transition saves time and effort of the designers.
Figure 7.1 presents approximately the benefit (color gradient) in terms of effort and
time provided to the designer using the Seven-pro approach and its plug-ins. Seven-
pro automates more than 50% (5/8). In the specification step (1), the benefits are achieved
through the provided patterns: the designer should just instantiate the patterns to create the
specification. The validation step (2) is performed automatically. An XML file representing
the specification is automatically generated and validated according to the XML schema
that represents the patterns. In the enforcement phase, the aspect code is also automatically
generated and integrated into the functional code of the application. This is achieved by
the proposed templates and automatic generation tools.
As we presented above our approach is easy to use by the software designer because it
automatically generates aspect code from the high level specification. In this context, the
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Figure 7.1: Benefits of Seven-pro approach in terms of effort and time
limitation that is still not resolved is how to prove that the generation of aspects is correct,
i.e., how to confirm that the generated aspects conform to the formal specifications.
The applicability criterion expresses that the method meets the needs of the designer
and covers the development phases [143].
Generally, for developing non-functional properties, the designer needs powerful mech-
anisms to quickly express these properties and concentrate on the functional part of the
application.
The designer needs an approach to easily specify the non-functional properties. He also
requires mechanisms to validate and verify these properties. In addition, the designer has
difficulties in refining his specification into a corresponding implementation. These needs
are supported by our Seven-pro approach and its associated tools. We propose, in the
Seven-pro approach, a high-level specification of the non-functional properties based on
some specification patterns and followed by the validation and verification steps. Finally,
the verified specifications are automatically translated to aspect code and woven with the
functional part of the application.
The quality of the code is an important review criterion for non-functional properties.
Based on Aspect-Oriented Programming, the generated code for enforcing these properties
is well modularized and separated from the functional code. If the invariants change, e.g., to
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accommodate some changes in the requirements, the designer does not need to localize the
code affected by the implementation of the invariants enforcement logic. He can just modify
the specification and generate the corresponding aspects. The designer can easily modify or
define a new property since the corresponding code is automatically generated in a modular
way. In addition, aspect-oriented techniques allow targeting faster aspect compilation and
runtime efficiency. Compared to writing aspects manually, the generation of aspect code
from a formally consistent specification avoids the risk of overlap between the properties
and between the functional application code and the code implementing non-functional
properties.
7.3 Future Work
In this section, we present some directions for future work. We focus on three areas: the
extension of the Seven-pro approach, the application of the Seven-pro approach to other
properties, and the validation of aspect generators.
1. Works on the Seven-pro approach
• Extend Seven-pro by a high-level modeling phase
The use of formal methods in software development has several advantages such
as reliability, safety, and correctness. However, it requires a high degree of math-
ematical expertise and a solid foundation in logic, which is a difficult task for
non-expert designers. For overcoming this limitation in our approach, we plan
to extend the Seven-pro approach with a high-level modeling phase.
In the modeling phase, the designer models his non-functional properties using
a semi-formal language based on graphical notations. Since UML is the most
appropriate and adopted language for graphically modeling such properties, we
plan to define a UML profile for each type of properties. We can define design
patterns to help the designer for modeling the generic properties. We will propose
also a generation process which automatically translates UML models into the
corresponding formal specification in order to formally verify its consistency.
• Extend Seven-pro to support decentralized distributed applications
Although our approach can be applied to object-oriented, component-based,
service-oriented architectures, it provides centralized solutions to control and
monitor distributed applications. This limitation comes from the fact that the
generated aspects are not distributed—they are localized on the host server (a
centralized host). The advices of these generated aspects can be executed only
on the host server on which the pointcut is matched.
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For supporting decentralized monitoring, we plan to automatically translate for-
mal specifications to AWED aspects [149, 185], as distributed aspects. The
pointcuts of these aspects are more expressive than the traditional pointcut lan-
guage by supporting remote sequence. The advice of AWED aspects can also be
executed on any hosts different from the host where the corresponding pointcut
is matched.
2. Works on applying Seven-pro to other properties and application domains
• Applying Seven-pro to real-time embedded software systems
We plan to apply the Seven-pro approach to specifying and enforcing resource-
related properties of real-time embedded software systems. These systems evolve
during the execution according to the environment context, user requirements
and resources limitations [121].
In this context, the designer formally specifies his system and it evolution by
defining the reconfiguration activities (i.e. creating/deleting, activating/deac-
tivating threads) associated with their pre-conditions. The latters check the
availability of resources before any reconfiguration activity (e.g., CPU utiliza-
tion, memory size, bandwidth, etc.). Extended timed Petri nets that support
the specification of resources can be used as a formal specification language.
These preconditions will be automatically translated into aspects which verify at
runtime if the resource-related constraints are satisfied.
• Apply Seven-pro on other access control policies
The development of secure applications is usually a complex task for developers.
No errors should occur during the development process. These policies are often
changed to manage the system and user requirements. Our approach is well-
suited for implementing access control policies.
The designer can easily obtain a secure application by formally specifying his
security policy. The code that enforces the specified constraints is generated
automatically and integrated modularly within the functional code. In addition
to the RBAC and its extensions, other access control policies can also be applied
such as Chinese Wall [38], OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) [103],
TRBAC (Temporal Role-Based Access Control Model) [28], etc. Each policy
requires special features in the specification language. Different aspect languages
can also be used depending on applications domains and architectures.
3. Works on the validation of aspect generators
To fully benefit from the use of formal methods in our approach in terms of verification
of properties, the correctness of aspect code generation has to be verified formally.
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This verification of the correctness of our aspect code generator is similar to the
validation of a compiler. The generated aspect code should have the same semantics
as the formal specification. There are three directions for resolving this problem.
• The first direction is the use of formal methods such model checking, static
analysis, theorem proving, etc. These verification techniques can be applied to
the generated aspect code. The generator is only a weak connection between the
formal specification and the generated code.
• The second direction is the also about the use of formal methods on the code
generator itself. The syntax and the semantics of all constructs of the source
language (formal language) and also of the output language (aspect language)
should be formally defined. In addition, a correspondence between these two se-
mantics implemented as transformation rules should be defined. The verification
of the correctness of the generator consists in ensuring that the transformation
rules are correctly implemented.
• The third direction is about the use of software testing for detecting the errors
and bugs of the generator. A large number of possible execution scenarios are
automatically generated to test if the generated aspect code is conform to the for-
mal specification by comparing the behavior of generated advice to the expected
behavior.
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